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Abstract
An extensive amount of evolving guidance and rules are provided to banks by finan-
cial regulators. A particular set of instructions outline requirements to calculate and
set aside loss-absorbing regulatory capital to ensure the solvency of a bank. Mathe-
matical models are typically used by banks to quantify sufficient amounts of capital.
In this thesis, we explore areas that advance our knowledge in regulatory risk man-
agement.
In the first essay, we explore an aspect of operational risk loss modeling using scenario
analysis. An actuarial modeling method is typically used to quantify a baseline capi-
tal value which is then layered with a judgemental component in order to account for
and integrate what-if future potential losses into the model. We propose a method
from digital signal processing using the convolution operator that views the problem
of the blending of two signals. That is, a baseline loss distribution obtained from the
modeling of frequency and severity of internal losses is combined with a probability
distribution obtained from scenario responses to yield a final output that integrates
both sets of information.
In the second essay, we revisit scenario analysis and the potential impact of catas-
trophic events to that of the enterprise level of a bank. We generalize an algorithm
to account for multiple level of intensities of events together with unique loss profiles
depending on the business units effected.
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In the third essay, we investigate the problem of allocating aggregate capital across
sub-portfolios in a fair manner when there are various forms of interdependencies.
Relevant to areas of market, credit and operational risk, the multivariate shortfall
allocation problem quantifies the optimal amount of capital needed to ensure that
the expected loss under a convex loss penalty function remains bounded by a thresh-
old. We first provide an application of the existing methodology to a subset of high
frequency loss cells. Lastly, we provide an extension using copula models which allows
for the modeling of joint fat-tailed events or asymmetries in the underlying process.
iii
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Mathematical modeling in financial institutions has come under increasingly amounts
of scrutiny, especially since the 2007/2008 global financial crisis
(
BCBS (2009) [21],
BCBS (2011) [24] ,BCBS (2013) [27], BCBS (2014) [29]
)
. Slowly as the world evolves,
there are different camps of thinking. Some believe that with better technology and
advanced theory and research, that models used within the financial sector can be
fine-tuned to better predict future events
(
Andersen et al (2007) [5], Spronk and
Hallerbach (1997) [107]
)
. Others are starting to accept that models, by their nature,
are descriptions or proposals of some underlying process and have to be used with
caution. These individuals acknowledge there are limitations inherent in modeling
that do not accurately address the nonlinear behaviour of the financial markets nor
do one set of models work during times of financial stress
(
Danielsson (2002) [48],
Derman (2011) [54]
)
. With these polarized views, one may even want to choose not
to believe in the benefit of any models and believe everything should be simplified.
However, digging deeper we see that financial models are everywhere and even the
simplest set of calculations can be defined as a model.
Financial institutions, specifically banks, use numerous mathematical models in every
facet of their organization. For example, traders rely on a series of models to help
price and value numerous financial instruments in order to trade within the market
place. Whether it is the underlying security such as foreign exchange rate, equity,
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commodity, interest rate, credit or a derivative security such as an option referencing
an underlier, pricing alone is a complex task. Other parts of a bank may require
models to extend credit or loans to other institutions, individuals or to any type of
obligor. The ability to ascertain and assimilate relevant information on an entity is
of paramount importance in order to price in the appropriate margin or profit that
is to be expected.
Then there are the vast number of models used to risk-manage the activities that
a bank undertakes. Whether used internally to inform the business side of the bank
or used to inform the risk management side of a bank, the reliance on models does not
diminish. There also are other purposes for which risk management models fall under
much scrutiny. This is where the notion of financial regulation puts the issue under a
microscope and does so from an arm’s-length. In order for a bank to operate within
a particular country, they are subject to regular reporting of risk metrics, data, and
detailed information to an independent financial regulator. One such area of interest
is the branch of models and risk measures used to quantify regulatory capital. At a
very high level, money/assets/capital or something of value should be kept aside in
order to absorb losses that are to be expected during the normal course of business.
For those losses that are unexpected, a best-guess with the use of models are used
to quantify the amount of capital to set aside to absorb those potential losses. This
idea of solvency is of utmost importance to the health of the financial system as well
as to the economy in general as stated by Berger et al (1995) [30].
Banks are allowed, through regulatory guidance, to set capital requirements either
through standardized formulas or internally-derived models. Risk management mod-
els built internally used to set capital requirements are formally approved by a reg-
ulator. As regulatory guidance changes and matures, so do the models in lock-step.
Whereas much attention in the previous years has been placed on market and credit
risk, little emphasis has been placed on operational risk. In our work, much of our
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attention will be focused on the advanced method to set capital requirements for
operational risk. In this thesis, our contribution starts by highlighting facets of oper-
ational risk modeling that are subject to debate or have had very little attention and
propose new ways of tackling the problems. Our goal is to advance the theory and
application of mathematical tools used in operational risk modeling. The implication
of investigating such risks is that it imparts an enterprise-wide effect and so we also
address the impact to the organization as a whole. Moreover, the formulation of
certain problems are also applicable for wider risk management purposes and hence
have importance not only for regulatory reasons, but also influence internal business
judgement.
1.2 Outline of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we define the main
risk types a bank is exposed to and focus the discussion on operational risk. We
approach the problem from a risk management perspective and introduce the meth-
ods used to set regulatory capital requirements. We cover the current state of the
modeled method used to quantify operational risk called the Advanced Measurement
Approach (AMA), dissect its elements, and motivate areas for research. In Chapter
3, we postulate a new method to integrate expert opinion via scenario analysis into a
baseline model calibrated on loss data. We present a literature review covering possi-
ble integration techniques and introduce a procedure using the convolution operator.
After the necessary theory is introduced, an example is provided. In Chapter 4, we
investigate an area of scenario quantification that has attracted minimal attention
- that of the enterprise-wide/catestrophic scenarios. We present a literature review
showing the sparse attention received by this type of scenario and how the industry
has concerned itself with a more granular approach. We generalize an algorithm to
quantify the aggregate risk conditioned on a particular type and intensity of scenario
and then show the mechanics of the method in an example. We also draw the parallel
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that the output of the algorithm could also be used in the context of the previous
chapter and hence provide an extension over the original framework. We complete
the problem by allocating enterprise-wide calculated capital to granular levels of busi-
nesses. In Chapter 5, we study the topic of shortfall risk allocation to sub-portfolios
with various forms of interdependencies. The problem is formulated as an optimiza-
tion problem where the goal is to determine the minimum amount of capital to offset
the expected loss of each sub-portfolio in a financial network under a convex penalty
function. The framework is applied to a set of high frequency loss cells in an oper-
ational risk context. In addition, we extend the problem to include the case where
various forms of dependencies are found to be inherent in the system and incorpo-
rate this modeling behaviour with copulas. In Chapter 6, we conclude and discuss
further areas of research. In the Appendices, we provide formulas for commonly used
probability distributions relevant for our work and also provide alternate methods to
compute the aggregate loss distribution.
4
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Financial Regulation of Market, Credit and
Operational Risk
The regulation of financial institutions is a process that appears to be ever-green and
requires collaboration among experts to set standards and rules. The Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) is the world’s oldest international financial organization
whose mission is to serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial
stability and to foster international cooperation. A specialized committee belonging
to the BIS called the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is respon-
sible for setting standards for the prudential regulation of banks. Its mandate is
to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the
purpose of enhancing financial stability as stated in a charter from BCBS (2013) [26].
The regulatory rules and guidance prescribed by independent regulators are subject
to interpretation and best practice measures among the financial community.
The BCBS (2006) [19] defines market risk as the risk of losses in on and off-balance-
sheet positions arising from movements in market prices. The risks subject to this
requirement are those pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in
the trading book and foreign exchange and commodities risk throughout the bank.
Credit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counter-
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party will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms (e.g. mortgage
term loan, revolving credit card). Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss result-
ing from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external
events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational
risk. As a more generic definition, operational risk could be seen as everything that
is neither market nor credit risk.
In 1988, the BCBS compiled a set of international banking regulations, now known
as the Basel I Accord
(
Basel I (1988) [15]
)
, with the intention of introducing a set
of credit risk capital requirements for financial institutions. This was introduced be-
cause during the 1980’s, banks were lending extensively, countries were indebted, and
the risk that a loss would occur because a borrower would not fulfill its obligations
was high. The capital rules were simplistic in their assumptions and sophistication
required to calculate risk metrics. In 1996, there was a growing concern for market
risk and the concern for the level of exposure of financial institutions to this risk type.
The BCBS then amended the Basel I Accord to include market risk capital require-
ments as seen in Basel (1996) [16]. In subsequent years, there was a realization of an
overestimation of credit risk through the application of the capital rules and banks be-
gan to lobby the BCBS for permission to use more sophisticated methods to measure
credit risk. Moreover, the international community began to believe that the Accord
needed substantial revisions and that the new revision should include operational risk
as part of the financial risks reflected in the requirements. The change came in the
form of Basel (2006) [19] with an initial publication in 2004 with slight revisions up
until 2006. The new Accord was based on a three-pillar framework. Pillar I referred
to the requirement that banks needed to calculate a minimum capital charge for mar-
ket, credit and operational risk. Pillar II referred to the internal supervisory review
process that ensured that a bank’s capital level was sufficient to cover its exposure
to overall risk not captured under Pillar I. Pillar III aimed to provide supervisory
expectations and minimum requirements for both the qualitative and quantitative
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disclosure by banks to the public. An expeditious update was introduced via BCBS
(2009) [21] with a slightly different naming convention termed Basel 2.5. The up-
date saw revisions to the market risk framework to rectify deficiencies highlighted
in the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. A more comprehensive change came in the
form of Basel III via Basel (2011) [24]. Among some of the strengthening measures
introduced in order to promote more resilient banks and banking systems were (i)
raising the quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base, (ii) enhancing
risk coverage, (iii) supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a leverage
ratio, (iv) reducing procyclicality and promoting countercyclical buffers, (v) address-
ing systemic risk and interconnectedness. With such exhaustive changes, Basel III
phase-in arrangements were made to allow banks to get up to speed. The timeline
for phase-in started in 2013 and stretches out to 2019. However with all the changes,
the three pillar framework is still adopted and for our discussion on the banking side,
the standards that must be followed for Pillar I translate to minimum regulatory
capital that must be set aside by banks in order to adequately reflect the risk-taking
activities that are taken. It is here that the concept of holding the “right” amount of
capital is imperative from a bank’s perspective.
Banks are usually publicly-traded companies. That is among the many other rea-
sons, they list their institution on a stock market exchange to raise money from
various individuals. If an individual chooses to purchase a set of shares, the shares
allow for partial ownership into the organization. In turn, the bank should be able
to create value for that individual and make a return on their money (sometimes
referred to as shareholder value). Now if a bank, for regulatory purposes, is told to
hold a certain amount of capital (assets) to buffer against unaccounted losses, they
are not purely putting that money to work for their shareholders. A bank creates
value by increasing assets - for example by opening branches, making investments,
or acquiring other banks to name a few. From the view point of the shareholder,
they may want the bank to hold less capital in order to fully realize the potential of
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their investment. However, capital is not a bad thing. Market, credit or operational
loss events do happen and hence shareholders should support the concept of enough
capital to be kept on reserve in order to cover those unexpected losses. For example,
in 2011 Wells Fargo was fined by the US Federal Reserve board for $85 million due
to mortgage fraud dealings as seen in Operational Risk and Regulation (2011) [97].
Also, in 2013, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group was fined by the US Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for $325 million due to manipulation of the
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as seen in Operational Risk and Regula-
tion (2013) [98]. Hence, a middle ground of capital requirements must be sought out
as stated by Berger et al (1995) [30]. Typically under the Pillar I framework, banks
have a choice to set capital requirements using a standardized or advanced method for
market, credit or operational risk. Standardized methods are typically risk-insensitive
and are capital-intensive. The BCBS sets rules and formulas for each risk type and
differentiates on a more granular basis the nuances of each asset classes. However, as
banks grow and become more sophisticated, they are incentivized to proceed along
a path to advanced or sometimes referred to as “modeled methods”. The aim of
capital requirements depending on risk type is to seek assurance for loss-absorbing
capabilities for unexpected losses. In some instances, even the general provisions in
the expected loss region should be capitalized for and added to the unexpected loss
value. We depict this in Figure 2.1.
The most popular method to quantify market risk and hence market risk capital re-
quirements is the Value-at-Risk (VaR) method. VaR aims to satisfy the statement,
“I am X percent certain there will not be a loss of more than V dollars in the next
N days”. For market risk capital requirements, X = 99 %, N = 10 days (1 day VaR
usually scaled to 10 days by the square root of time rule). The underlying modeling
approach used to characterize the random process will yield a unique value of V in
dollars. For example, a trading desk may have a portfolio of financial instruments
whose value fluctuates with market conditions aside from the trading strategy and
its payoff structure. To compute the 1-day VaR, there are three popular methods:
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Expected Loss
(EL)
Unexpected Loss
(UL)
confidence level
Value-at-Risk (VaR)
Probability
Loss
Figure 2.1: Loss regions.
Historical Simulation, Monte Carlo methods and Variance-Covariance methods.
In the first case, a long time series of data is collected on the returns of the assets.
A percentage change of each asset is computed to generate scenarios. The results are
reordered by the magnitude of the change in the value of the portfolio and a desired
percentile is chosen to quantify VaR. For example, if there are 1,000 scenarios and
a VaR of 95 % is required, then the actual loss exceeding 5% (50 cases) is the 51st
worst loss. For Monte Carlo methods, an underlying model (e.g. Geometric Brow-
nian Motion) and hence distribution is assumed to generate scenarios. Parameters
for the model are calibrated on market data and random draws from the Standard
Normal are used to simulate paths for the process. The value of the portfolio for each
scenario is computed and a distribution is again formed for which the desired per-
centile is taken. For the least common of the three methods, the Variance-Covariance
method (used in Risk Metrics and originally developed by JP Morgan) uses volatility
and correlation data and constructs a variance -covariance matrix to calculate VaR.
The assumptions underlying the model is that the likely distribution of returns on
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Parameter Definition Explanation
LGD Loss Given Default
Loss realized during an economic down-
town from an obligor defaulting
N
Standard normal distribu-
tion function
Applied to threshold and conservative
value of systematic factor
R Asset Correlation
Quantifies how asset value of one bor-
rower depends on asset of another bor-
rower determined by asset class
PD Probability of Default
Expected default rates usually over 1
year time horizon of an obligor
G
Inverse standard normal
distribution function
Applied to PD to derive default thresh-
old
M Maturity adjustment
Captures effect that long-term credits
are riskier than short-term credits
b
Smooth (regression) matu-
rity adjustment (smoothed
over PD)
b(PD) = (0.11852 − 0.05478 ∗
log(PD))2
Table 2.1: ASRF inputs.
financial assets in the future can be measured based on the observed volatility of the
returns on those assets in the past and the distribution of those returns in the future
will be Normal.
For modeled methods for credit risk, the BCBS explanatory note on the risk weight
function (2005) [18] explains one of the most popularized model for credit risk. The
formula used to determine the risk weight (K) is shown in (2.1). The value K is
a modeled risk-weight function which once applied to a notional or exposure dollar
value would produce a capital requirement. The motivation and derivation is out-
lined in Gordy (2003) [72] and the model is referred to as the Asymptotic Single Risk
Factor (ASRF) model. The risk weight is computed as
K =
[
LGD ∗N[(1−R)−0.5 ∗G(PD) + ( R
1−R)
0.5 ∗G(0.999)]− PD ∗ LGD]∗(
1 + (M − 2.5) ∗ b(PD))(
1− 1.5 ∗ b(PD)) ,
(2.1)
where the inputs are defined in Table 2.1.
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To provide some more context, banks are allowed through this formula to determine
the borrower’s probabilities of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and exposure
at default (EAD) on an exposure-by-exposure basis. These risk parameters are con-
verted into risk weights and regulatory capital requirements by means of the risk
weight formula. An artifact that is used by banks is that in a particular year, the
average level of credit losses can be reasonably forecasted. This expected loss (EL) is
managed by various means such as pricing of credit exposures and through accounting
provisioning. Losses above expected levels are referred to as unexpected losses (UL)
and one use of bank capital is to provide a buffer for this region of losses. Hence
capital is set to ensure that UL exceeds the capital buffer with low, fixed probability.
The derivation of capital charges for UL is based on the ASRF model and has a
few inherent properties. The model is portfolio invariant in the sense that the capital
required for any given loan depends on the risk of the loan and not on the portfolio
that it is added too. Portfolio invariance schemes are also referred to as rating-based
schemes which imply that obligor-specific characteristics like PD, LGD, and EAD are
enough to determine capital for credit loans. Also associated with the ASRF scheme
is the fact that when a portfolio consists of a large number of small exposures, id-
iosyncratic risks tend to cancel out with one another and only systematic risks that
affect many exposures have a dominant effect on portfolio losses. Most simply, a
single risk factor is believed to drive the systemic risk component which is reflective
of the state of the global economy, industry or even regional risks.
The ASRF model shows that it is possible to calculate the sum of EL and UL asso-
ciated with each credit exposure. The conditional EL for an exposure is expressed as
a product PD and LGD which describes the loss rate on the exposure in the event
of default. The method by which this is achieved is that average PDs estimated by
banks are turned into conditional PDs by using a supervisory mapping function. This
essentially pushes out the PD to a high quantile given a conservative value of the sys-
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tematic risk factor. Note that LGD is not transformed in the same manner and scales
linearly in the formula. Moreover, EAD does not appear until the end calculation
which applies a notional value. The mapping function used to produce the condi-
tional PD is derived from an adaption of the work by Merton (1974) [89] and Vasicek
(2002) [111]. Therein, borrower’s default if they cannot meet their obligations at a
fixed assessment horizon (e.g. one year) because the value of their assets are lower
than the due amount. The value of assets of a borrower are represented as a variable
whose value can change over time. The change in value of the borrower’s assets is
modeled as a normally distributed random variable. Since the default threshold and
the borrower’s PD are connected through the normal distribution function, the de-
fault threshold is inferred from the PD by applying the inverse normal distribution
function to the average PD. As well, the conservative value due to the systematic risk
factor can be derived by applying the inverse of the normal distribution function to
the high quantile value. A correlation-weighted sum of the default threshold and the
conservative value of the systematic factor yields a conditional default threshold.
In a following step, the conditional default threshold is used as an input into the
original Merton model and is used to derive a conditional PD via the normal dis-
tribution function. It is noteworthy to point out that the ASRF model calculates a
requirement from zero to the VaR value of 99.9 % and hence through regular credit
provisioning, EL is subtracted from the ASRF so as to not double count the EL value.
The asset correlation values (R) represents the degree of an obligor’s exposure to
the systematic risk factor. They are asset class dependent and follow supervisory
mandated values. A final tack on is a maturity adjustment multiplier that is again
calibrated and mandated by supervisors. The reason for its use is to address that capi-
tal should reflect the fact that long-term credits are riskier than short-term credits and
hence should increase with maturity. The form of the maturity adjustment has been
derived using a mark-to-market credit risk model. From a matrix of decreasing PD
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grades in rows and increasing time horizons along the columns, a statistical regression
model was fit and the output has been given to the industry to be used in the formula.
The takeaway is that setting modeled credit risk capital requirements is different
than modeled market risk capital requirements and, as we will see, modeled opera-
tional risk capital requirements which is the focus of our work is different than both of
them. For modeled operational risk, an actuarial approach has been borrowed called
the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA). It is again a VaR method but taken at an
even higher quantile. As we will see, there are added layers to the baseline LDA model
which results in a nice blend of quantitative and qualitative methodologies and is at
the intersection of art and science in terms of modeling. Operational risk research
has lagged in importance compared to its counterparts but is now starting to gain
momentum. Before we go deeper into operational risk methodologies, we motivate
the importance of the subject in the next section.
2.2 Importance of Operational Risk
We argue that both from a bank’s perspective as well as from a research perspective,
operational risk as a whole has unjustly been placed on the back-burner when it should
not have. For the Canadian market, we may motivate the importance of operational
risk by looking at the big five Canadian banks’ [Bank of Montreal (BMO), Scotia-
bank (BNS), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Royal Bank of Canada
(RBC) and Toronto-Dominion Bank(TD)] supplementary financial statements. Each
quarter, banks make public on their websites capital held against market, credit and
operational risk as well as disclosing key operating capital ratios. We have briefly
covered mathematical approaches that are used to attach a dollar value to the cor-
responding risk. This value was referred to as a regulatory capital requirement but
with a short extension, we may look at the related concept of risk weighted assets
(RWA). For market and operational risk, the simple relation is to multiply the capital
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requirement by 12.5
market or operational RWA = 12.5 ∗ capital requirement. (2.2)
The 12.5 arises from a legacy value of the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio
of 8% as seen in BCBS (1988) [15]. The capital requirement value could be derived
either from a standardized method or a modeled method and in both instances, would
be multiplied by 12.5 to form a RWA. RWA represents a bank’s assets or off-balance
sheet exposures weighted by riskiness. From either standardized or modeled methods,
less risky assets would result in smaller capital requirements and hence would equate
to smaller RWAs. For modeled credit risk, we saw how to determine the capital
requirement risk weight K. As an intermediary step, we must multiply K by an
exposure at default (EAD) amount first and then multiply by 12.5. The EAD is the
notional amount in dollars that represents exposure for a given obligor. Hence for
credit risk RWA, we have
credit RWA = 12.5 ∗ EAD ∗ risk weight. (2.3)
Another slight technicality is that unlike market or operational RWA, there is a split
between the treatment of standardized and modeled credit risk RWA. There is a scalar
of 1.06 applied to modeled credit risk
credit RWA = credit RWAStandardized + 1.06 ∗ credit RWAModeled. (2.4)
In brief, the factor was designed to offset the expected decrease in the capital re-
quirement resulting from the change in the capital formula from our expected loss
plus unexpected loss orientation, to an unexpected loss-only orientation. The size of
the scaling factor was derived based on the results of the third Quantitative Impact
Study conducted by the BCBS (2003) [17].
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At this stage it is enough to grasp that capital requirements are directly proportional
to RWA. Thus, comparing how RWAs are split among market, credit and operational
risks would convey a sense of size/importance. However, rather than purely focus on
RWA, the discussion can be framed in terms of regulatory capital ratios for which
RWA is a key input. Institutions are expected to meet minimum regulatory risk based
capital requirements for exposure to market risk, credit risk and operational risk. The
generic formula for a capital ratio is given as
Risk Based Capital Ratios =
Capital
Total RWA
(2.5)
where
Total RWA = Credit RWAStandardized
+ 1.06 ∗ Credit RWAModeled
+ 12.5 ∗Operational Risk Capital
+ 12.5 ∗Market Risk Capital.
(2.6)
The three most important types of capital take the form of either common equity tier
1 (CET1), total tier 1, or total capital. All three ratios are again publicly disclosed
in the supplementary financials. The most scrutinized ratio is the CET1 ratio and is
defined as
CET1 ratio =
CET1 capital
Total RWA
. (2.7)
The qualifying instruments that make up CET1 capital (subject to regulatory adjust-
ments) are reproduced from the BCBS guidance on capital disclosure (2012) [25] in
Table 2.2. Without getting into the accounting of what instruments qualify as viable
CET1 instruments, CET1 capital represents the highest quality of assets which may
be drawn upon if a bank needs to fulfil its obligations. CET1 capital is a dollar value
and total RWA is a simple sum of total RWA for market, credit and operational risk.
From a regulatory perspective, the ratio is one of the most important metrics used
to monitor a bank’s solvency. In Table 2.3, we see that operational risk is the second
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Common Equity Tier 1 Capital
• Directly issued qualifying common share (and equivalent for non-joint stock
companies) capital plus related stock surplus
•Retained earnings
•Accumulated other comprehensive income (and other reserves)
•Directly issued capital subject to phase out from CET1 (only applicable to
non-joint stock companies)
•Common share capital issued by subsidiaries and held by third parties
(amount allowed in group CET1)
•Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1
Table 2.2: Common Equity Tier 1 qualifying instruments.
most capital intensive capital requirement and is on average across the big five Cana-
dian banks almost two times greater than market risk RWA.
$ Million BMO BNS CIBC RBC TD
CET1 capital (A) 22,340 28,499 13,347 32,998 27,803
Credit Risk RWA 198,803 253,196 118,548 253,799 263,971
Market Risk RWA 14,494 16,714 4,170 44,055 13,177
Operational Risk RWA 26,779 32,160 *17,787 43,898 35,824
Total RWA (B) 240,076 302,070 140,505 341,752 312,972
CET1 ratio (A/B) 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.7 8.9
Table 2.3: Big five Canadian bank risk weighted assets and common equity tier 1
ratios for Q1 2014. *Reports modeled operational risk.
Now, it is easy to form an argument in support of the importance of operational
risk management and research. A lot of attention has been be focused on trading
activities, sophisticated models used to value financial instruments, and associated
models used for risk management. However, resources should also be adequately al-
located for operational risk activities. A more risk-sensitive method via AMA allows
management to get a handle on operational risk vulnerabilities and potentially im-
plement mitigating strategies to ward off future losses. The AMA model also allows
for a more granular drill-down view to track capital allocation commensurate with
the losses observed in different areas of the bank.
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2.3 Basic Indicator Approach and The Standard-
ized Approach
The BCBS defines two standardized methods to set regulatory capital requirements
for operational risk. The two methods are referred to as Basic Indicator Approach
(BIA) and The Standardized Approach (TSA). For BIA, the amount of capital to
set aside is 15% of the 3-year average of positive gross income reported by a bank.
If there are year(s) of negative gross income, then the average is taken only on the
remaining positive year(s). There are technicalities that are needed to produce a
gross income value, however for our purpose, it is enough to treat this as a starting
point. The thinking behind the BCBS for using gross income as a metric to proxy
operational risk is that it conveys information on the size and activities a bank may
partake in. Hence as gross income increases, operational risk capital should increase
proportionately. A by-product of this is that during a boom of an economic cycle,
banks would hold increasing amounts of operational risk capital. If a crisis was to
occur and gross income for a bank would fall, then a bank would be required to
hold a proportionately reduced amount of capital. Hence the bank would be able to
draw-down on the capital reserve and partially weather the crisis. A simple example
demonstrates the use of BIA.
Example 2.3.1. A bank has positive gross income of $1,000,000, $3,000,000 and
$900,000 over three consecutive years. Under the BIA, the bank would need to hold
15% of ($1,000,000+$3,000,000+$900,000)
3
or 0.15 * $1,633,333 or $245,000.
For TSA, the BCBS specifies to segment a bank into 8 business lines (according to
the Basel II suggested classification). Gross income is calculated/allocated for each of
these segments (each segment should be assigned some gross income; whereas before
we looked at a top-of-the-house number). However, now each gross income increment
is weighed by some factor β. This is illustrated in Table 2.4. To outline the application
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of TSA, we again proceed via an example.
Business Line β value
Corporate Finance 18 %
Trading and Sales 18 %
Retail Banking 12 %
Commercial Banking 15 %
Payment and Settlement 18 %
Agency Services 15 %
Asset Management 12 %
Retail Brokerage 12 %
Table 2.4: TSA weights across business lines.
Example 2.3.2. A bank has gross income per Basel business line as indicated in
Table 2.5. (Note, this is an independent example from that in Example 2.3.1 and the
result should not indicate that in all instances, a bank would receive a reduction/en-
largement of capital requirements from using the TSA approach opposed to the BIA
approach). In this example, taking the 3 year total weighted gross income values and
averaging would yield ($15000,000+$200,000+$100,000)
3
or $150,000.
2.4 Advanced Measurement Approach
The modeled method used to calculate operational risk capital is referred to as AMA.
While in the early phases most banks initially started reporting operational risk cap-
ital using the BIA and TSA method (TSA being preferred in some instances because
it allows for more risk differentiation), AMA is seen as the next step in robust risk
management. At its core, there are four elements to AMA modeling: Internal Loss
Data (ILD), External Loss Data (ELD), Business Environment and Internal Control
Factors (BEICF) and scenarios analysis. The AMA model, as we will see, is a blend of
both rigorous quantitative/statistical analysis as well as qualitative analysis. Detailed
descriptions of AMA modeling are found in Aue and Kalkbrener (2006) [10], Cruz et
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Year 1 Gross Income β Weighted Gross Income
Corporate Finance $200,000 18% $36,000
Trading and Sales $100,000 18% $18,000
Retail Banking $350,000 12% $42,000
...
...
...
...
Year 1 Total $ 5,000,000 $150,000
Year 2
Corporate Finance $150,000 18% $27,000
Trading and Sales $400,000 18% $72,000
Retail Banking $250,000 12% $30,000
...
...
...
...
Year 2 Total $ 6,000,000 $200,000
Year 3
...
...
...
...
Year 3 Total $ 3,000,000 $100,000
Table 2.5: Gross income by business line weighted by β.
al (2015) [47], Dutta and Perry (2006) [58] and Panjer (2006) [101]. Actuaries are
most familiar with the LDA method to model aggregate claims. Empirically, losses
tend to occur at random times (think frequency) and random magnitudes (think
severities). By fitting separate frequency distributions and separate severity distribu-
tions, both random events may be combined to produce an estimated loss amount.
A BEICF assessment is a post-modeling capital adjustment that adjusts a baseline
LDA capital requirement. BEICF is an acronym whereby each letter represents an
attribute that could be used to develop a view on an operational risk characteristic
of a business unit. The attributes make up a scorecard and the weights assigned
to each item in the scorecard are completely up to a bank. Finally, and perhaps
the most controversial element, scenario analysis requires business line experts to
quantify potential events that may occur at a financial institution. There are several
difficulties that arise from this element alone. For instance, what questions should be
asked of business line experts in order to extract relevant information to quantify a
scenario? What necessary and sufficient information is required to form a scenario?
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Once formed, how do you use the scenario in the AMA model? More specifically, what
are direct or indirect methods that could be used to take the scenario information
obtained from workshop and integrate it to a baseline LDA model? It is this topic
of scenario analysis that will occupy much of our attention. Whereas it may appear
at first to be an area that should not pose much debate, there is much ambiguity
and room for rich application of mathematical and statistical tools. As there is little
consensus within the finance community on scenario analysis, this is a wide-open area
to explore techniques of scenario quantification and integration. However, before we
explore methods for scenario analysis, we must fully introduce all elements of the
AMA model and ancillary components that effect the AMA model. It is only then
will the scenario analysis piece, which will be our focus, be holistically integrated.
2.4.1 Element 1: Internal Loss Data
Internal loss data is the first stepping stone in building the AMA model. (It is helpful
to keep reminding ourselves of the applied nature of this problem and the real-world
application it serves. Loss data is booked by risk managers into a central database
within a bank and the onus is on them to be timely and accurate with recording the
losses.) The BCBS provides guidance within Basel II (2006) [19] in Annex 8 how to
segment a bank and record operational risk losses by 8 business lines (same as in the
TSA method) and by 7 event types which is a level 1 classification. Each segment is
referred to as a unit of measure (UoM) or alternatively a cell. The cell is in reference
to an entry in the 56 cell matrix. We note that we may further refine the 8 business
lines into 19 categories and 7 events types into 20 categories which is then referred
to as a level 2 classification. For our analysis, let’s consider the 8 by 7 matrix with
business lines as rows and event types as columns which is depicted in Table 2.6. A
convention that is commonly used in the literature is to refer to a particular business
line as BL and then its position in the matrix and similarly with event type as ET.
Hence, keeping the same convention we have the mapping in Table 2.7.
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Business
Line/Event
Type
Internal
Fraud
External
Fraud
Employment
Practices
and Work-
place
Safety
Clients,
Prod-
ucts &
Busi-
ness
Prac-
tices
Damage
to
Phys-
ical
Assets
Business
Disrup-
tion
and
System
Fail-
ures
Execution,
Delivery,
Process
Mgmt
Corporate Finance
Trading and Sales
Retail Banking
Commercial Banking
Payment and Settlement
Agency Services
Retail Brokerage
Asset Management
Table 2.6: 56 cell matrix for recording operational risk losses.
Now over the course of time, it is possible to think of each of cell in Table 2.6 being
populated with a loss event. An example of simulated data is located in Table 2.8
and Table 2.9. In practice, an operational risk manager may be tasked to oversee
the accurate recording of loss events into a central database. Most banks in Canada
use a $10,000 threshold as a cut off value. For example, the retail banking business
could experience an external credit card fraud (BL3ET2) of $40,000 which would be
recorded in the third row and second column in Table 2.6. However, a loss of $5,000
would not be recorded in a cell because it falls below the threshold value and reasoned
not to inform the tail of the distribution too much. From a modeling perspective, it
is not always easy to obtain a plentiful data set from internal losses alone. Regulation
does allow for the collapsing of cells in order to increase the number of data points
across business lines or event types provided that neighbouring cells have similar
characteristics. The combined cells would then be treated as one and yield a more
coarse structure than the Basel-recommended 56 cell classification. However, to help
prevent numerous situations for collapsing, external loss datasets have arose to, among
other possible uses, help with data scarcity.
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Business Line
BL1 Corporate Finance
BL2 Trading and Sales
BL3 Retail Banking
BL4 Commercial Banking
BL5 Payment and Settlement
BL6 Agency Services
BL7 Asset Management
BL8 Retail Brokerage
Event Type
ET1 Internal Fraud
ET2 External Fraud
ET3 Employment Practices and Workplace Safety
ET4 Clients, Products and Business Practices
ET5 Damage to Physical Assets
ET6 Business Disruption and System Failures
ET7 Execution, Delivery and Process Management
Table 2.7: Business Line/Event Type mapping.
Date of Discovery Business Line Event Type Gross Loss ($)
09-Jan-13 BL3 ET2 84,880
10-Jan-13 BL3 ET2 90,355
14-Jan-13 BL3 ET2 71,620
16-Jan-13 BL3 ET2 85,056
23-Jan-13 BL3 ET2 75,129
25-Jan-13 BL3 ET2 106,295
29-Jan-13 BL3 ET2 91,039
29-Jan-13 BL3 ET2 103,552
29-Jan-13 BL3 ET2 200,431
06-Feb-13 BL3 ET2 64,186
06-Feb-13 BL3 ET2 83,426
13-Feb-13 BL3 ET2 1,417,927
19-Feb-13 BL3 ET2 162,538
Table 2.8: Retail Banking/External Fraud data.
2.4.2 Element 2: External Loss Data
External loss data is another element in the AMA model that addresses the issue of
limited internal loss data. In the form of public and/or pooled industry data, ELD
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Date of Discovery Business Line Event Type Gross Loss ($)
17-Jan-13 BL3 ET7 70,000
18-Jan-13 BL3 ET7 42,281
25-Jan-13 BL3 ET7 34,463
29-Jan-13 BL3 ET7 104,903
30-Jan-13 BL3 ET7 49,250
01-Feb-13 BL3 ET7 197,320
05-Feb-13 BL3 ET7 177,623
07-Feb-13 BL3 ET7 50,000
08-Feb-13 BL3 ET7 31,782
14-Feb-13 BL3 ET7 64,000
18-Feb-13 BL3 ET7 39,666
25-Feb-13 BL3 ET7 51,769
Table 2.9: Retail Banking/Execution, Delivery and Process Management data.
allows a bank to incorporate information that could supplement their internal loss
experience. Intermixed with ILD, ELD could first be scaled appropriately depending
on the scale of business or bank from which the data comes from. It could then be
directly used in the capital calculation. Indirectly, ELD may also be used as a guide
during brainstorming for scenario analysis which we will see later on.
The two main sources for ELD are vendor databases and consortia databases as
stated by the OCC (2012) [95]. Vendor databases such as IBM-Algo FIRST and
SAS OpRisk Global are compiled from public data and have a story-line approach to
describing losses. The losses are extracted from newspapers, court records, journals,
etc. Consortia databases such as ORX (Operational Risk Exchange) and the Amer-
ican Bankers Association (ABA) operate on a give-and-take basis allowing banks to
contribute operational loss data in order to receive anonymized loss data from peers
groups. Attributes for both ELD types are shown in Table 2.10 and Table 2.11. An
ongoing debate among institutions before using ELD is the difficulty in agreeing on a
metric to scale the data, especially when data from consortiums are made anonymous.
Current proposals are to scale using asset size or revenue of the institution/busines
line which is an indictor made available.
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SAS OpRisk Global IBM-Algo FIRST
Total number of observations 22,000 12,000
Industries covered 21 20
Financial services covered 6,361 4,519
Loss threshold USD $100,000 USD $1,000,000
First year of losses 1971 1972
Table 2.10: Vendor databases.
2.4.3 Loss Distribution Approach
Having established the data for which an AMA model is built, it is now appropriate to
showcase the LDA model. Using the data, separate probability distributions for loss
frequency and severity are fit at the business line/event type level and then combined.
That is for each cell (k = 1, . . . ,m) where m is suggested to be 56, the aggregate loss
distribution is given by
Sk =
Nk∑
i=1
Xk,i (2.8)
where Nk represents realizations from a frequency distribution and Xk,1, . . . , Xk,Nk
represent random draws from the severity distribution Xk which are modeled sep-
arately over a one year time horizon. Hence the aggregate loss for a single cell is
obtained by the convolution of severity where the weights are the frequency mass
ORX ABA
Total number of observations 160,000 27,535
Severity of losses e55 billion $2.7 billion
Member banks 54 10
Location of banks 18 countries U.S. only
First year of losses 2002 2003
Loss threshold e20,000 USD $10,000
Table 2.11: Consortia databases.
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probabilities
FS(x) = Pr(S ≤ x)
=
∞∑
n=0
pnPr(S ≤ x|N = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
pnF
∗n
X (x) (2.9)
where pn = Pr(N = n) and F
∗n
X is the n-fold convolution of the cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) of X. To define the convolution in greater detail, we adapt
the explanation from Klugman et al (2012) [81]. We focus on one UoM with the
understanding that the same procedure applies to all other cells. The random sum
for one cell is given as
S = X1 +X2 + . . . XN (2.10)
where index N is represented by a counting distribution. The distribution of S is
called a compound distribution or the aggregate distribution for a cell. From (2.9),
we define F ∗nX (x) iteratively as
F ∗0X (x) =
{
0, x < 0
1, x ≥ 0
(2.11)
and
F ∗kX (x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
F
∗(k−1)
X (x− y)dFX(y) for k = 1, 2, . . . (2.12)
A simplification which applies to AMA modeling occurs when X is a continuous
random variable with probability zero on nonpositive values, then (2.12) reduces to
F ∗kX (x) =
∫ x
0
F
∗(k−1)
X (x− y)fX(y)dy for k = 2, 3, . . . (2.13)
25
For k = 1, (2.13) reduces to F ∗1X (x) = FX(x). Upon differentiating the probability
density function (PDF) is recovered
f ∗kX (x) =
∫ x
0
f
∗(k−1)
X (x− y)fX(y)dy for k = 2, 3, . . . (2.14)
It is (2.14) that will reappear in a later chapter and serve as a foundational technique
used to integrate scenarios into a baseline LDA model. This equation conveys that
in order to compute the n-fold convolution, the integral is computed iteratively using
previously calculated density functions. Then a VaR measure at a one-tailed 99.9
percentile is taken from the corresponding compound loss distribution for each cell
denoted by Sk. We refer the reader to Panjer (2006) [101] or Cruz et al (2015) [47]
for details on forming the compound loss distributions. Before moving on, since VaR
will be our risk measure, we may define this in more detail.
Definition 2.4.1. (Risk measure) A risk measure is a mapping of a random variable
representing risk to a real number. Hence, a general risk measure related to the risk
X is denoted as ρ[X].
The choice of risk measures are numerous and in practice, the decision to use one over
the other may prove difficult. Before rigourously defining our risk measure, which is
seen as one of the simplest and most common risk measures, we turn to a list of
properties that a good (coherent) risk measure should satisfy. These properties were
introduced in Artzner el al (1999) [9] and reproduced here.
Definition 2.4.2. (Coherent risk measure) A coherent risk measure, ρ[X], is defined
to have the following properties for any two random variables X and Y
• Translation invariance: for any constant c, ρ[X + c] = ρ[X] + c;
• Monotonicity: if X ≤ Y for all possible outcomes, then ρ[X] ≤ ρ[Y ];
• Subadditivity: ρ[X + Y ] ≤ ρ[X] + ρ[Y ];
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• Positive homogeneity: for positive constant c, ρ[cX] = cρ[X].
Since a risk measure outputs a capital requirement, we may interpret these properties
in terms of capital. Translation invariance indicates that adding a fixed amount to
a collection of risks will cause the capital requirement to be adjusted by the same
fixed amount. Here loss is defined as a positive value and the fixed amount does
not impart further/new capital requirements. Monotonicity ensures risks that lead to
smaller losses in all instances require less capital. Subadditivity is perhaps the most
popularized because VaR fails to meet this condition in some instances. The prop-
erty, however, allows for a diversification benefit. Loosely interpreted, this property
indicates that the merger of two collection of risk will not create extra risk. Hence,
the sum of the individualized capital requirement serve as the upper bound. Since
this concept is of such great importance, risk managers and regulators are constantly
concerned with the diversification coefficient.
Definition 2.4.3. (Diversification coefficient) For a collection of risks X1, X2, . . . , Xn,
the diversification coefficient is defined as
D = 1− ρ[X1 +X2 + . . .+Xn]
ρ[X1] + ρ[X2] + . . .+ ρ[Xn]
. (2.15)
The coefficient is positive if there is a diversification benefit and negative if diversifi-
cation fails. The negative case then leads to a discussion of superadditivity which will
not be covered here. Finally, positive homogeneity indicates that increasing a risk by
a factor c should increase capital by the same c. Having described properties of a risk
measure, we define the two most popular choices: VaR and expected shortfall (ES).
Definition 2.4.4. (Value-at-Risk) The VaR of a random variable X ∼ F (x) at the
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αth probability level is defined as the αth quantile of the distribution of X
V aRα[X] = F
−1(α) = inf{x : P[X > x] ≤ 1− α} = inf{x : F (x) ≥ α}
= sup{x : F (x) < α}. (2.16)
Hence VaR is the minimum threshold exceeded by X with probability at most 1− α.
VaR, as a quantile of a distribution, has become the de facto choice in Basel II and
used as the risk measure of choice throughout market and operational risk. It is easy
to understand and is capable of being backtested. That is, a VaR model produces an
estimate for potential loss at some future time horizon. Moving forward in time, the
actuals (profit and loss, realized losses, etc.) can be compared to the estimate and the
number of times the quantile is surpassed over a time horizon signifies a backtesting
breach. As pointed out before, VaR may fail the subadditivity property and hence is
not a coherence risk measure. However, expected shortfall is a coherence risk measure
but does come with its own drawbacks.
Definition 2.4.5. (Expected shortfall) The expected shortfall, or tail VaR, of a ran-
dom variable X ∼ F (x) at the αth probability level is
ESα[X] =
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
V aRp[X]dp. (2.17)
Hence ES is the arithmetic average in the tail having exceeding the value α.
Expected shortfall is becoming increasingly important for market risk quantification
as the BCBS seeks to adopt ES as a complementary risk measure. The preliminary
guidance is referred to as the fundamental review of the trading book and has not yet
been fully adopted. For operational risk, ES is not commonly used. As pointed out by
Embrechts et al (2014) [62], backtesting VaR is straightforward (hit-and-miss) while
for ES one may assume an underlying model such as Extreme Value Theory. Addi-
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tional complications of backtesting ES opposed to VaR is discussed therein. Moreover,
backtesting an average metric opposed to a single point is seen as a difficult exercise
as a series of breaches over a quantile may be warranted provided this behaviour
does not repeat indefinitely and allows for other losses below a threshold so that the
average is within an acceptable range.
Hence for reasons of simplicity and tradition, VaR will be our risk measure of choice.
Hence, applying (2.16) to each UoM loss in (2.8), the final regulatory capital require-
ment is achieved by aggregating up each VaR result to an enterprise level for the
bank. While it is important to have a good understanding of the parts used to form
the LDA model, we must revisit each component and provide a bit more detail. It is
not within the scope of our work to provide a thorough discussion on the multitude
of options of building blocks but rather refer the reader to Cruz et al (2015) [47] for
a comprehensive review. However, we do focus on the most common and popular
modeling choices in the next section.
2.4.4 Calibration and Selection
The most common probability distribution choices for modeling the frequency com-
ponent of operational losses are the Poisson and Negative Binomial distributions.
The convention is to use discrete probability distributions in that losses are not typ-
ically seen to occur on a continuous scale. The Poisson distribution has one pa-
rameter whereas the Negative Binomial distribution has two parameters which has
more flexibility in shape. We define both distributions in Appendix A: Probabil-
ity Distributions. The Negative Binomial distribution may be viewed as a gamma
mixture of a Poisson distribution. That is, a Poisson distribution whose parameter
λ is a gamma-distributed random variable. It allows for the case of over-dispersion
where the mean is greater than the variance. In Bo¨cker and Klu¨ppelberg (2005) [35],
we learn there exists a closed-form approximation for operational risk VaR and in
the formula, over-dispersion is of minor importance. Hence, if a modeler would like
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to benchmark an AMA model against an approximation method, the choice of fre-
quency distribution should not matter that much. In that sense, we default to using
the Poisson throughout our analysis. However, what is more important is the choice
of severity distribution.
There are several choices for a severity distribution. Here we allow for continuous
probability distributions as they are better suited to modeling the size of losses on a
continuous scale. A suggested class of sub-exponential distributions are recommended
in the BCBS Supervisory Guidelines (2011) [22] and listed as follows:
• Lognormal,
• Log-Gamma,
• Weibull (shape parameter less than 1),
• Generalized Pareto,
• Burr.
The definitions for each are produced in Appendix A: Probability Distributions. These
distributions have the property that the tails decay slower than any exponential tail.
The concept of heaviness is also outlined in Bo¨cker and Klu¨ppelberg (2005) [35]. To
define the heaviness characteristic, we have
lim
x→∞
P (X1 + . . .+Xn > x)
P (max(X1, . . . , Xn) > x)
= 1 for n ≥ 2. (2.18)
The above states that the tail of the sum of n sub-exponential random variables has
the same order of magnitude as the tail of the maximum variable among them. As a
consequence, one term could explain the reason why the sum of n independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) severities are large and hence a single large loss would
drive operational risk capital. Banks may also choose to model the body and tail of
the distribution separately. Hence, there maybe combinations of the above distribu-
tions which are spliced together at an optimum splice point.
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Common methods to determine the parameters and thus calibrate a severity curve
range from using method of moments, percentile matching, or maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE). As pointed out in Panjer (2006) [101], the method of moments
and percentile matching tend to yield poor performing estimators even though the
methodology is easily implemented. Hence for our discussion, we will default to
using MLE. Once a candidate list of severity curves are calibrated, goodness of fit
tests are used to rank best fits. Common goodness of fits tests used are two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS), right-tail Anderson-Darling (AD), and other useful statis-
tics such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Cri-
terion (BIC). It is common within the banking industry to use MLE for parameter
estimation and a host of goodness of fit tests for the selection of champion frequen-
cy/severity distributions. For a full discussion on parameter estimation and model
selection, we refer the reader to Cruz et al (2015) [47], McNeil el al (2005) [87] and
Panjer (2006) [101]. For context, we reproduce the MLE methodology and a few
goodness of fit tests from the references.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Suppose a random vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn) has joint probability density in some
parametric family fX(x; θ) indexed by a parametric vector θ = (θ1, . . . , θp) in a param-
eter space Θ. If we assume the independence of the random variables X1, X2, . . . Xn
we can interpret the joint probability density function as
P (X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xn = xn)
= P (X1 = x1)P (X2 = x2) . . . P (Xn = xn)
= f(x1; θ)f(x2; θ) . . . f(xn; θ). (2.19)
We consider our data to be a realization of X for some unknown value θ. The like-
lihood function for the parameter vector θ given the data is L(X, θ) = fX(X; θ) and
the maximum likelihood estimator θˆ is the value of θ maximizing L(θ;X). For ease
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and because it occurs often, we select to maximize the logarithm of the likelihood
function l(θ;X) = lnL(θ;X). To be explicit, we write this estimator as θˆn when we
want to emphasize its dependence on the sample size n. For large n we expect that
the estimate θˆn should be close to the true value θ.
For our application to AMA, we consider the classical situation where X is assumed
to be a vector of i.i.d. components with univariate density f so that
lnL(θ;X) = ln
n∏
i=1
f(Xi; θ) =
n∑
i=1
lnL(θ;Xi). (2.20)
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
The two-sample KS test assess the degree of which two probability distributions differ.
In this case, the test compares empirical loss data and simulated loss data based on
a calibrated fit. Assume two samples X and Y with sample size m and n drawn from
continuous distributions. The empirical cumulative distribution functions of both
samples may be given as
FX(x) =
#i : Xi ≤ x
m
and FY (x) =
#i : Yi ≤ x
n
(2.21)
which counts the number of observed values that are less than or equal to x. The KS
statistic is given as
Dm,n = sup
x
|FX(x)− FY (x)| (2.22)
where the smallest distance among a selection of candidate distributions represents
the best fit distribution. The null hypothesis is that both sets of data are from
the same distribution. The alternative hypothesis is that they are from different
distributions. The null hypothesis is rejected at a critical value α where
Dm,n > c(α)
√
n+m
nm
(2.23)
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and c(α) maybe looked up from a table.
Anderson-Darling
Another goodness of fit test arises from a set of quadratic empirical distribution func-
tion statistics. Let Fn(x) be the empirical CDF based on n observations and F0(x)
be the hypothesized CDF. Then determine the hypothesis for goodness of fit testing
where the null claims loss data are from a hypothesized distribution F0(x)
H0 : F (x) = F0(x), ∀x (2.24)
versus the alternative claim that the observed losses are not realizations from F0(x)
HA : F (x) 6= F0(x), ∀x. (2.25)
Then a convenient measure of the discrepancy or distance between two distribution
function is detailed in Anderson and Darling (1952) [6] and the test statistic defined
as
Qn = n
∫ ∞
−∞
[Fn(x)− F (x)]2ψ(x)dF (x) (2.26)
where ψ(x) is a preassigned weight function. When the weight function is ψ(x) = 1,
the statistic is called the Crame´r-von Mises (CVM) criterion. When there is more
emphasis on the tail, the statistic is referred to as Anderson-Darling and given as
Qn = n
∫ ∞
−∞
[Fn(x)− F (x)]2
[F (x)(1− F (x))]dF (x). (2.27)
Finally to complete the test, determine the p-value for the test under the null hy-
pothesis given by considering p-value = P
[|Qn| ≥ qn|H0]. For an AMA model,
fitting candidate distributions that place emphasis on the tail are important in that
operational risk losses that drive capital requirements are usually low frequency/high
severity losses that occur far out in the tails of the distribution.
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Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion
The AIC and BIC are measures of relative quality of a statistical model for a given
data set. AIC and BIC do not convey any warning if a model fits poorly, however,
are useful values to use in conjunction with MLE during the calibration process. AIC
is defined as
AIC = 2k − 2L (2.28)
where L represents the maximized value of the log-likelihood and k represents the
number of parameters in the statistical model. BIC is defined as
BIC = k log(n)− 2L (2.29)
where n denotes the number of data points. In both instances, goodness of fit is
traded off with model complexity. Hence these measures offer a relative estimate of
the information lost when a given model is used to represent the process that gener-
ates the data. The preferred model is the one that has the minimum AIC and BIC
values.
Hence a bank may use a combination of these tests to select a best fitting sever-
ity distribution. A customized scorecard may be used to assign weights to each test
and a final champion distribution may be selected.
2.4.5 Loss Aggregation Approaches
The computation of the compound distribution (2.8) is not a trivial task. We highlight
a few methods that may be used. They are categorically listed as
1. Analytic Approach
• Single Loss Approximation,
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2. Numerical Approach
• Panjer Recursion,
• Fast Fourier Transform,
3. Simulation
• Monte Carlo.
For an in-depth review of these methods, we refer the reader to Panjer (2006) [101].
In Appendix B: Loss Aggregation, we provide a short description of each aggregation
method. Since our work will utilize the Monte Carlo simulation method, we describe
the algorithm here.
Monte Carlo Algorithm
To implement the procedure, we define the following
• N = random variable representing loss frequency with CDF FN ,
• X = random variable representing loss severity with CDF FX ,
• S = random variable representing annual aggregate loss with CDF FS,
• M = total number of times to run Monte Carlo simulation (e.g. 1 million).
1. For m = 1, . . . ,M , draw from the frequency distribution a realization Nm with
associated CDF FN .
2. Draw Nm severity random numbers (X1, X2, . . . , XNm) with associated CDF
FX .
3. Sum all losses represented as Sm =
∑Nm
i=1 Xi.
4. Repeat up to M times. The loop results in M independent simulated annual
aggregate losses S1, S2, . . . , SM with CDF FS(s) = P[S ≤ s] =
∑∞
m=1 P[Sm ≤
s|N = m]P[N = m] with Sk = X1 +X2 + . . . , XNm .
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5. Pick up the 99.9 percentile from the simulated annual aggregate loss distribution
as the operational risk capital requirement.
Thus far, there has been many assumptions with respect to intra-cell i.i.d. frequency
draws, severity draws and aggregate loss draws. Moreover, once each VaR 99.9 es-
timate has been calculated for each cell, a straight forward addition of each VaR
estimate to determine bank-level capital assumes a perfect dependence among cell-
s/UoM. The notion of dependence will be discussion in the next section.
2.4.6 Correlation, Diversification
Thus far we have concerned ourselves with the method to compute a VaR 99.9 capital
requirement for a single UoM without any regard for dependencies with other UoMs.
The types of dependencies that may exist in LDA modeling are discussed in Aue
and Kalkbrener (2006) [10] and Frachot et al (2004) [71]. In the LDA framework,
dependencies among events and losses may occur in numerous way. In Aue and
Kalkbrener (2006) [10], we learn of intra-(within) and inter-(between) cell correlation
that may arise.
intra-cell
• dependence between frequency of losses Nk within a cell,
• dependence between frequency of losses Nk and the severity of losses Xk,Nk
within a cell,
• dependence between severity of losses Xk,1, Xk,2, . . . , Xk,Nk within a cell,
inter-cell
• dependence between the frequency distributions N1, . . . , Nm in different cells,
• dependence between the loss distributions S1, . . . , Sm in different cells.
There are some combinations that are difficult to model due to a lack of data or they
violate certain principles. For example, for loss events occurring within a cell that do
not occur independently, the frequency distribution can not be Poisson. In addition,
from Frachot et al [71] we learn that severity correlation is difficult to tackle under the
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LDA framework. Severity between cells may be evident (e.g. internal fraud losses are
high when external fraud losses are high); however a basic feature of actuarial models
assume that losses within a cell are jointly independent. Hence it would be difficult
to assume severity independence within each cell and severity correlation between
cells. While Aue and Kalkbrener (2006) [10] decided to model inter-cell dependencies
between frequencies for Deutsche Bank, most banks choose to model dependencies on
the aggregate loss level as stated by the OCC (2012) [95].
Having focused the attention to dependencies between aggregate losses, the most
relevant way to incorporate this relationship is through a copula. What is needed
first though is to define a marginal distribution. We do this by first defining the joint
cumulative probability distribution function of X and Y as
F (a, b) = P{X ≤ a, Y ≤ b}, −∞ < a, b <∞. (2.30)
Then the distribution of X can be obtained from the joint distribution of X and Y as
FX(a) = P{X ≤ a}
= P{X ≤ a, Y <∞}
= P
(
lim
b→∞
{X ≤ a, Y ≤ b}
)
= lim
b→∞
P
{
X ≤ a, Y ≤ b}
= lim
b→∞
F (a, b)
= F (a,∞). (2.31)
The CDF obtained is referred to as the marginal distribution which is the CDF with-
out reference to other values of other variables. We have seen this already as the
individual aggregate loss distributions characterizing each UoM. This is the required
element for the copula. Formally we may then define the copula as taken from Panjer
(2006) [101].
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Definition 2.4.6. (Copula) A d-variate copula C is the joint distribution func-
tion of d Uniform (0,1) random variables. If the d random variables are listed as
U1, U2, . . . , Ud, then the C may be written as
C(u1, . . . , ud) = P (U1 ≤ u1, . . . , Ud ≤ ud, ). (2.32)
Considering continuous random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn with distribution functions
F1, F2, . . . , Fd respectively with joint distribution given by F , then the probability
integral transform F1(X1), F2(X2), . . . , Fd(Xd) are each distributed as Uniform (0,1)
random variables. Hence copulas can be seen to be joint distribution functions of Uni-
form (0,1) random variables. Thus a copula evaluated at F1(x1), F2(x2), . . . , Fd(xd)
can be written as
C
(
F1(x1), . . . , Fd(xd)
)
= P
(
U1 ≤ F1(x1), . . . , Ud ≤ Fd(xd)
)
. (2.33)
With the inverse (or quantile function) defined as
F−1(u) = inf
x
{Fj(x) ≥ u}, (2.34)
the copula evaluated at F1(x1), F2(x2), . . . , Fd(xd) can be rewritten as
C
(
F1(x1), . . . , Fd(xd)
)
= P
(
F−1(U1) ≤ x1, . . . , F−1d (Ud) ≤ xd
)
= P (X1 ≤ x1, . . . , Xd ≤ xd)
= F (x1, . . . , xd). (2.35)
Sklar’s theorem (1959) states in a formal way that for any joint distribution function
F , there is a unique copula C that satisfies (2.35). Conversely, for any copula C and
any distribution function
(
F1(x1), . . . , Fd(xd)
)
, the function C
(
F1(x1), . . . , Fd(xd)
)
is
a joint distribution function with marginals
(
F1(x1), . . . , Fd(xd)
)
.
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There are two main reason why we choose to integrate copulas into our talk of AMA
modeling
• risk can be split into two parts: the individual risk and the dependence structure
between them,
• a dependence structure may be defined without reference to the modeling spec-
ification of individual risks.
While the discussion of dependence is of great importance, the questions surrounding
a best practice is another area of research in itself. For example, choosing the “right”
copula to model the dependencies unfortunately has no obvious answer according to
Embrechts (2009) [59]. For example, one encounters selection from such choices as
• Gaussian/Normal copula,
• Student t copula (with associated degrees of freedom),
• Gumbel copula,
• Clayton copula,
• Frank copula.
What this equates to is banks who seek to report a diversified operational risk capital
requirement may favour such a copula that reduces capital. For instance from Em-
brechts (2012) [60], we see that joint tail dependence is a copula property, regardless
what the marginals are. In addition, under asymptotic independence joint extremes
are very rare. This is shown in Figure 2.2. We point out that the top-right quadrant
under the Gumbel copula realizes greater joint tail dependence as shown by an in-
creased number of hits. This is contrasted to the Gaussian copula that has less joint
realizations in the top-right quadrant.
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Figure 2.2: 1000 random variates from two distributions with identical Gamma(3,1)
marginal distributions and identical correlation ρ = 0.7, but different dependence
structures.
Hence the dependence structure directly explains the value that diversification granted
V aRdiversified = (1−D)V aR, 0 < D < 1, (2.36)
where often D is sought to be anywhere from [0.1, 0.3] or translated into a 10-30%
reduction in diversified capital as pointed out by Embrechts (2012) [60]. We have
seen this before in (2.15) where now we use a copula to perform the aggregation and
perhaps receive a diversification benefit.
2.4.7 Element 3: Scenario Analysis
Much of our focus and contribution will be in the area of scenario analysis. In
terms of regulatory guidance from the BCBS, there is minimal guidance for financial
institutions to follow. Preliminary instructions for banks choosing to develop an AMA
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model amounted to a single paragraph in Basel 2 (2006) [19]. Paragraph 675 states
that
“A bank must use scenario analysis of expert opinion in conjunction with
external data to evaluate its exposure to high-severity events. This ap-
proach draws on the knowledge of experienced business managers and risk
management experts to derive reasoned assessments of plausible severe
losses. For instance, these expert assessments could be expressed as pa-
rameters of an assumed statistical loss distribution. In addition, scenario
analysis should be used to assess the impact of deviations from the cor-
relation assumptions embedded in the banks operational risk measurement
framework, in particular, to evaluate potential losses arising from multi-
ple simultaneous operational risk loss events. Over time, such assessments
need to be validated and re-assessed through comparison to actual loss ex-
perience to ensure their reasonableness.”
Since then, the BCBS has released added guidance in Principles for the Sound Man-
agement of Operational Risk (2011) [23] and Operational Risk Supervisory Guidelines
for the Advanced Measurement Approaches (2011) [22], but with little clarification
pertaining to methodology implementation. Essentially, the guidance is principle-
based at best with the intent that scenario analysis provides a forward-looking view
of operational risk exposures. It is only in the past 15 years that operational risk
research has gained momentum and helped being shaped by both academia and in-
dustry.
A thorough development of the nuances of scenario design and the problems surround
quantitative integration will be covered later. Nonetheless, the high-level intent of
conducting a scenario analysis program is to elicit expert opinions of plausible futures
losses from business line experts within a bank. A consequence of AMA modeling is
that data sets are limited in their loss history and the requirement to capitalize for
a 1 in 1000 year event is a difficult, if not an impossible task. It is rationalized that
running workshops comprised of subject matter experts (SMEs) who have a detailed
knowledge of their business are in a good position to theorize potential, future losses.
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By showing a workshop of SMEs data from a variety of sources, the workshop par-
ticipants may be able to formulate stress data points that could be used to modify a
baseline LDA model.
Trying to formalize this process mathematically, the industry has converged on col-
lecting estimates of frequency/duration of potential events and severity of events.
That is, respondents are being asked to quantify worst-case losses that happen, e.g.
one in five, one in ten or even one in forty years. Corresponding to a specific fre-
quency estimate, a dollar impact to a particular business line/event type within a
UoM is attached. Following this elicitation process, the method to integrate scenar-
ios into a baseline LDA model is still subject to debate. As we will see, methods
such as a change of probability measure, Bayesian techniques, and credibility the-
ory techniques are just some mathematical and statistical tools being applied to the
areas of scenario integration. The end-goal is the difficult task to satisfy both se-
nior management within a bank and the independent financial regulator the utility
that scenario analysis provides and that indeed the spirit of the guidance is being met.
If not controversial enough, the debate does differ across geography as well. On
one end of the spectrum, it was shown by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(2003) [67] and Colombo and Desando (2008) [44] that purely basing operational risk
capital requirements on scenarios is a valid modeling approach. This was conferred
upon from a working group composed of representatives from various financial insti-
tutions: Banca Intesa, Barclays Bank, Credit Suisse First Boston, Dresdner Bank,
Fortis Bank, Halifax Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, The Royal Bank of Scotland
Group, UFJ Holdings Inc., and Euroclear. Moreover, an Italian bank has even gone
as far a developing a scenario-based AMA model. In Canada, most banks strive to de-
velop a four element AMA model with regulators adopting the view that scenarios are
a value-added risk management tool. On the other end of the spectrum was the pre-
liminary view by US regulators through guidance on Interagency Guidance on AMA
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(2011) [33] that the subjective nature of scenario analysis may not warrant mixing
of synthetic (scenario) data and observational (internal and external) data elements.
Hence a second, benchmark model may be developed and a weighting between two
models may provide the best answer. However, as research and new ideas started
to take root, US regulators provided an updated view via Supervisory Guidance for
Data, Modeling, and Model Risk Management for AMA (2014) [34] and stated that
scenario analysis may be expanded upon its previous restricted use.
As a final comment on the debate of expert opinion used in quantitative models,
there is a sort of awakening or tolerance for trying new things. There is a realization
that models are inherently an abstraction of a phenomenon that come with limita-
tions and assumptions. In that sense, a hybrid quantitative/qualitative model may
provide a new direction in the future of modeling. This idea was strengthened by a
comment made by the Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz in the Globe and
Mail in reference to (economic) models (2014) [86]
“The bank is now testing a variety of new models and methodologies to
get a better handle on where the economy is headed, and updating its fore-
casts eight times a year. We are working hard to refine those models, but
this experience is also leading us to put increased emphasis on anecdotal
evidence - real conversations with real Canadians making economic deci-
sions. That includes increasing its use of surveys, meeting with business
associations and regular roundtables with business CEOs - to add colour
to our economic analysis.”
Hence with an extension to quantitative modeling where expert judgement may be
utilized, further research into incorporating this element may be a direction for new
applications.
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2.4.8 Element 4: Business Environment and Internal Control
Factors
As a final element in AMA modeling, a BEICF assessment is usually treated as a
post-modeling adjustment that is applied after all the statistical and mathematical
modeling has taken place. The adjustment is usually applied to the allocated di-
versified capital and applied uniquely at each business line. Much like the guidance
surrounding scenario analysis, Basel II (2006) [19] offered a single paragraph clarifying
the expectation of what an assessment must entail. Subsequently, little added guid-
ance has been provided in the BCBS’ Supervisory Guideline (2011) [22] and BCBS’
Sound Management Guideline (2011) [23]. The intent is that a BEICF adjustment
is again a forward-looking assessment which focuses on business risk factors as well
as a bank’s internal control environment. It serves to recognize both improvements
and deterioration in the operational risk environment. Hence it provides manage-
ment the incentive to monitor and improve operational risk management practices.
A methodology to transition from an assessment of business processes to reporting
on results has been covered in Anders and Sandstedt (2003) [4]. The concept of an
operational risk scorecard is defined therein outlining the necessary attributes that a
scorecard must contain to be effective. A specialized set of such attributes that could
be monitored are referred to as key risk indicators (KRIs) and defined in Davies et
al (2006) [49]. KRIs are defined to be measurable metrics or indicators that track
exposures or losses. KRIs should facilitate decision-making and provide a mechanism
for monitoring the assignment of quantitative limits escalation thresholds if risks are
viewed as elevated. In Table 2.12 and Table 2.13, a general overview of the BEICF
acronym is explained and corresponding factors that could assigned, measured and
scored.
Having established a possible number of factors to assess, banks have the ability to
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Business Environment
Factor Examples
External Environment
Sovereign risk, market volatility, position in credit/busi-
ness cycle
Internal Environment Senior management change, lay offs, hiring
Regulatory/Legal Change in regulation, pending lawsuits
Technology
Bank-wide upgrades, increased cyber attacks, automa-
tion
Table 2.12: BE factors.
Internal Control
Factor Examples
Audit scores Audit rating and number of findings
Compliance Identified conditions and time to resolution
Regulatory
New regulatory initiatives that impact internal control require-
ments
Technology Infrastructure upgrades/deficiencies that impact internal controls
Table 2.13: IC factors.
design the weighting scheme as they deem fit. For example, let the realized score for
each BE factor be labelled xi where i = 1, . . . , 4. Each xi may be assigned a grade
on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 indicating high risk. Similarly, each realized score for
each IC factor be labelled xi where i = 5, . . . 8 with the same grading. Next weight
each score
8∑
i=1
xiwi, (2.37)
such that
∑8
i=1 wi = 1. Depending on the final BEICF score, a capital adjustment
may be made. Typically in the industry, a symmetric range is used to adjust diver-
sified regulatory capital anywhere from -10% to +10%. While the overall value of
a BEICF assessment is high for risk management purposes, the quantification pro-
cess and application for mathematical modeling is limited. Each bank would design
unique scorecards and rely on simple weighting and summations to arrive at a score
and an ultimate capital adjustment.
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However, what seems to have been overlooked within the industry is the justifica-
tion to modify post-modeling capital at the 1-year, 99.9 percentile. Within Davies
et al (2006) [49], the argument is made that it is impossible for management to con-
ceptualize and quantify key exposure indicators that influence extreme measures of
risk. A suggested measure is the worst year loss predicted over a 10 year horizon,
or unexpected loss (UL10). This is interpreted as a probabilistic risk measure us-
ing a confidence internal between 90% and 95%. Hence the KRIs and management
information used to manage the risk-and-control environment identify the more rou-
tine unexpected risk that occur once every 5-10 years. Adapted from Davies et al
(2006) [49] is a graph showing the quantiles at which various AMA modeling elements
would add value. This is depicted in Figure 2.3. Referring to 1. Risk mitigation pro-
grammes, we seldom observe in the industry banks trying to use insurance policies to
offset AMA capital requirements. Whereas the regulation allows for up to 20% offset
of total operational risk capital charge under AMA, banks do not actively petition to
use insurance. Possible reasons for this is the difficulty in trying to justify the map-
ping of an insurance policy to a particular operational risk event. We actually touch
on this in a later chapter and offer a transparent methodology for which insurance
could be used. Business continuity planning (BCP) and control strategies technically
influence the total loss distribution, however, the authours focus on the mitigation of
the “less regular” operational risks.
Under 2. Tools & mechanisms, we see the elements used to form a BEICF assess-
ment: KRI reporting and risk maps/control self-assessments (CSAs). This is to our
knowledge the first discussion surrounding the proposal to limit the qualitative factor
adjustments to UL10 rather than at UL99.9 Conceptually, this is an intriguing pro-
posal, however, Davies et al (2006) [49] do not provide a methodology to incorporate
this information at the specific quantile. This is a potential area that may be further
investigated and add value to the industry. We also observe that scenario analysis
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Figure 2.3: Quantiles for which AMA elements impact.
informs the tail of the loss distribution and hence inform capital requirements.
Corresponding to 3. Quantification, we infer that loss data in the form of ILD and
ELD used to produce an aggregate loss distribution is used at every quantile. Under
loss provisioning, EL occurs at the mean of the distribution for which risk managers
and accountants would be highly interested to set aside an allowance to provision for
expected loss. UL is of interest for regulatory capital for which the capital requirement
is the sum of both EL and UL. This was highlighted in Figure 2.1.
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3 Scenario Integration in AMA modeling
3.1 Overview
There is little debate that the starting building block of an AMA model is built us-
ing the LDA approach as seen in (2.8) and calibrated using some type of internal or
external operational loss data. Having formed a loss distribution, scenario analysis
and the methods to include the results of expert opinions obtained from scenario
workshops into a data-driven AMA model does lend itself to an area of research and
discussion. It is this area of scenario integration that is the focus of this chapter. We
propose a method that recycles the concept of convolution and is used as a method
of blending of two distributions. The algebraic properties of convolution also make it
very flexible and open to many applications.
This technique has been published in The Journal of Operational Risk and authoured
by Aroda, P., Guergachi, A., and Huang, H. (2015) [8]. The title of the paper is Ap-
plication of convolution operator for scenario integration with loss data in operational
risk modeling. Minor formatting has been made in order to integrate the paper into
this thesis. Namely, the introduction from the paper has been removed as the neces-
sary material has already been covered in greater detail earlier in this thesis.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 introduces scenario as-
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sessment as a modeling requirement and covers the current direction of scenario
quantification. Section 3.3 covers a literature review of scenario integration meth-
ods into a baseline LDA model. Section 3.4 revisits the convolution operator and
investigates its use as a scenario integration technique. Stylized methods for scenario
quantification are covered with the intent to show the mechanics of the method. Using
descriptive statistics from a retail bank taken from the operational risk loss literature,
the proposed scenario integration method is implemented with hypothetical scenario
responses. Section 3.5 concludes with a discussion of the pros and cons of the method.
3.2 Scenario Formulation
We have already stated that the guidance provided to the financial community in
terms of the design and use of scenario analysis was limited at best. Reading between
the lines, the industry has interpreted the guidance as to assemble a team of busi-
ness line experts and run workshops to elicit opinions of future, potential losses. By
virtue of having seasoned experts and referencing internal loss history in conjunction
with external losses faced by other banks, the workshop should be able to quantify
exposure of the bank to high-severity events. In trying to distill what form a scenario
would take, the banking community has come to some consensus on fundamental ele-
ments of a scenario. As pointed out in Ergashev (2012) [64], each scenario needs to be
assigned a duration. That is, duration represents the number of years during which
a particular scenario happens only once an average. However, when assigning loss
severities to scenarios, the range of practice does vary somewhat. Banks may choose
to collect scenarios with a range via an upper and lower bound, just a lower bound,
or a point estimate. With a point estimate, it is also possible for a modeler to add a
confidence interval around the estimate before inclusion. However, a simple way to
arrive at some form of consensus around the magnitude is to always select the highest
value of the range, interval or estimate. That is to say that with all frequencies being
equal, the larger the loss, the larger the impact on capital.
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Building on this preliminary concept of a scenario, Chaudhury (2010) [40] highlights
many other challenges of scenario analysis and provides perhaps the most comprehen-
sive review of the key issues in operational risk modeling as a whole. Among the many
areas that pose a challenge for modeling, scenario/workshop data is highlighted as one
such area. Chaudhury (2010) [40] points to issues that arise from the very method of
designing a workshop to asking the necessary questions in order to extract sufficient
information to be passed onto a modeling team to integrate the scenarios. Issues
may also arise when dealing with potential cognitive biases or difficulty in mapping
loss events to different probability values as pointed out by Barberis (2013) [14] and
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) [79]. To mitigate problems with trying to quantify
extreme probabilities, we limit ourselves to scenario responses anywhere from 1 in 2
to 1 in 40 year events. We believe it is easier for workshop participants to quantify
these sorts of estimates as these losses may happen in the foreseeable future.
Chaudhury (2010) [40] also points out that it would be quite taxing on experts to give
opinions directly on loss distributions since the loss distribution is seldom achieved
by closed-form distributions. Hence, seeking opinions on frequencies and severities is
most logical. Even with this clarified goal there exists some challenges. To calibrate
severity distributions, one may ask participants to provide their opinion about the
expected loss given that the loss exceeds various severities. This task of collecting
key statistics would help calibrate the conditional probability of severity which would
help calibrate the right tail of a severity distribution. As well, quantile information
may be sought by fixing a severity and asking how often (once in a t-year event)
a loss occurred. Finally, the authour also talks about the method of dividing the
severity domain into several buckets and asking participants the percentage of times
they expect the severity of a loss to fall into different buckets.
We provide more detail into one such scenario elicitation method. The description
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of the 1-in-t years method is very clearly explained in De Jongh et al (2015) [50].
A probabilistic explanation presented slightly differently regarding the same concept
has been covered in the change of measure method in Dutta and Babbel (2010) [57].
The method starts off by asking scenario workshop participants what loss level L is
expected to be exceeded once every t years. We envision that the true underlying
annual loss frequency is Poisson distributed with parameter λ and the severity distri-
bution is distributed according to continuous probability distribution G(x, θ). If the
workshop has the ability to see into the future and predict the intended loss profile
that has not yet materialized from observed internal loss data alone and therefore λ
and G are known, then the assessments they provide should line up exactly with
L = G−1
(
1− 1
λt
)
, (3.1)
where G−1 denotes the inverse CDF of G. From this interpretation, we see that with
probability 1− 1
λt
, the level of L will not be superceeded. Stated differently, L is the
1− 1
λt
upper quantile of G.
It is noteworthy to point out that what we have labelled as true λ and G are not to be
confused with the parameters calibrated on realized historical loss data. We denote
these estimates by λˆ and a possibly different severity distribution F (x, θˆ). Hence if
scenario respondents were to provide 1 in t year estimates that perfectly align with
the realized historical loss experience, then their loss prediction Lˆ would align up
perfectly with
Lˆ = F−1
(
1− 1
λˆt
)
. (3.2)
We will exploit this difference later on when formulating a probability distribution
used to quantify the scenario loss distribution. Another observation to be mindful of
when collecting scenario estimates is to note that, for example, a 1 in 35 year event
corresponding to a unit of measure that has λ = 10, one may look at the 1− 1
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= 0.997
or 99.7th percentile of a CDF to find the value that will not be superceeded. So a
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natural question that would arise is whether assessments go up to t = 50, t = 100
or beyond. Operational risk capital is mainly driven by infrequent large losses but
human judgement may become unstable when deciding on the exactness of infrequent
events.
3.3 Literature Review
Having shown just some of the challenges in arriving at a set frequency and severity,
there are still a host of options to integrate scenario analysis with loss data. A thor-
ough summary of the methods are detailed in Cope (2012) [45]. A popular method
for scenario integration is the change of measure approach proposed by Dutta and
Babbel (2010) [57]. The method starts from a baseline assuming that a modeler has
fitted appropriate frequency and severity distributions in order to convolve to obtain
a loss distribution. However before performing the n-fold convolution, the density
function f(x) of the severity distribution is adjusted to reflect the impact of scenar-
ios. Scenarios are collected with frequency estimates taking the form m÷ t where m
is the number of times the event is expected to occur in t years. Severity estimates
are collected with a loss range [a, b]. The methodology aims to answer the question,“
Given that the scenarios are tail events, how much does f(x) need to be adjusted so
that its probability for those events ‘match’ the probabilities implied by the scenario”.
The implied severity distribution incorporating the scenarios will have losses from the
range [a, b] occurring m times in t years. It is noteworthy to point out that further
clarification was given to the financial community in Babbel (2010) [12] that defended
the change of measure approach as a reweighting of the probability measure. That is,
the numerous ways to select a reweighting is accompanied by an objective – the au-
thours choosing to reweight historical probabilities of tail events to match those given
by scenarios. Cope (2012) [45] pointedly described the unique method to reweight
as not a method to integrate of scenarios per-se, but rather to override and replace
historical estimates of frequency with scenario estimates of frequency and an ensuing
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update of the severity distribution.
Ergashev (2012) [64] introduced a method of scenario integration that filters scenarios
whereby only worst-case scenarios influence capital estimates. Scenarios are collected
with a duration which represents the number of years during which a particular sce-
nario happens only once on average. A scenario is defined as a “once-in-a-M -year”
scenario if it has a duration of M years. The convention is that among two worst-
in-a-certain-year events, the one with a larger duration must be more severe than
the other. For a severity estimate, a scenario expert need only assign a lower bound
of an unknown loss amount. The scenario is envisioned to be a random realization
with unknown loss amount and duration where a scenario probability distribution
unifies all scenarios to have a common unobserved continuous distribution. Hence
Ergashev (2012) [64] differentiates between two probability distributions: one from
the base model which typically follows from the loss distribution approach and the
scenario probability distribution. The filtering method determines which scenarios
are “concordant” or “discordant” with the base model’s severity distribution. The
rule is essentially an inequality that is to be checked to see if at a particular quan-
tile, any adjustment is necessary. Scenarios that are concordant with the base model
are deemed uninformative in that no adjustments would be necessary to the base
model’s severity distribution at the corresponding quantile. Only scenarios that are
discordant with the base model signal a change in the institution’s risk profile and
the underlying loss distribution. The paper concludes by presenting five alternative
approaches to scenario integration which all rely on the scenario filtering rule: three
direct methods via a scenario-adjusted CDF and two direct methods via a closest-
curve type minimization technique.
Changing direction, there are an increasingly number of proposals to the industry
at using Bayesian inference methods for scenario integration. One such method has
been detailed in Shevchenko and Wu¨thrich (2006) [106]. The method proceeds by
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allowing expert opinions to be incorporated into the analysis by specifying prior dis-
tributions for model parameters. The prior is to be estimated via scenario analysis
using expert opinions and external data to guide the quantification. Bayes’ theorem
is used to weight the prior distribution accordingly in order to achieve a posterior
distribution. Finally the predictive distribution, both frequency and severity, of fu-
ture observations conditional on all present information is derived. The benefit of the
method is that there is a dynamic ability for experts to reassess prior distributions
as new information is brought online.
A Bayesian approach combined with a least square approximation has led to “the
greatest accuracy credibility theory”. A nice treatment of the topic is covered in
Klugman et al (2012) [81] arising from an insurance context. Therein, full and par-
tial credibility approaches are described. In brief, when faced with choices between
two estimators (e.g. expected value of a risk with sample mean X¯ and class mean
µ), it is possible to assign full weight to one element or a split between the two via
a credibility factor. A paper by Bu¨hlmann et al (2007) [37] shows an example of a
“toy” model where a credibility approach is adopted to estimate frequency and sever-
ity distributions for low frequency/high severity cells by using ILD/ELD data and
expert opinion. The tiered approach starts with MLE to calibrate parameters based
on data in a risk cell, followed by an improved credibility estimator using bank-wide
data and finally an improved credibility estimator using industry data. The expert
opinions are interpreted as scalars to parameter estimates which augment the risk
profile of the cells.
Yet another use of advanced credibility theory was shown in a paper by Agostini
et al (2010) [2]. This confirms that options are still being presented to the opera-
tional risk community in order for practitioners to chose among viable options. The
authours form VaR estimates based on historical loss data and another subjective
VaR using expert opinion collected during scenario workshops. The integration oc-
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curs at the frequency and severity parameter level whereby partial credibility is used
and the credibility weights are given by the Bu¨hlmann-Straub model. The parameter
estimates are driven by historical losses and corrected using information coming from
expert opinions. The frequency parameter, coming from a Poisson distribution, is
easily weighted using advanced credibility theory. The tail of the severity distribu-
tion is modeled by a Generalized Pareto Distribution which follows from Extreme
Value Theory over a stated threshold. The three parameter distribution is simplified
by setting both scale and threshold parameters to coincide with historical values and
the free shape parameter is thus back-out of a simple quantile relation. An obvious
short-coming of the method is that worst-case scenarios are defined to coincide to
the 99.9th percentile for which scenario experts would have a hard time comprehend-
ing. The authours do provide a case study based on an Italian banking group using
scaled loss data over five years. When focusing on a particular event type where 9
scenarios were available, only 7 provided sufficient information to calibrate the free
parameter for the severity distribution because expert opinions fell below the thresh-
old and hence fell in the body. Hence, calibrating the distribution requiring such a
high quantile proved difficult. Nonetheless, the final integrated VaR did provide a
trade-off between both historical VaR and subjective VaR by using the credibility
theory to weight each parameter and provide a single loss approximation to produce
an integrated VaR.
As another application using a Bayesian framework, Cope (2012) [45] suggests a
method of integrating data and scenarios at the loss-generating mechanism (LGM)
level by using Bayesian techniques and the Dirichlet process as a prior distribution.
In that sense, there is a two-fold introduction of “new concepts”: the LGM and the
Dirichlet prior. Cope (2012) [45] asserts that within the unit of measure, there are
heterogenous processes that are evident and are usually overlooked. Hence, there
are distinct underlying processes that, as a collective superposition, define the unit
of measure. This translates to taking the assumption that the severity of losses in
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(2.8), which are assumed to be independent and identically distributed according to
a common distribution Fi, are further represented as a mixture of severities from
each underlying LGM: Si =
∑
j∈LGMi
∑Ni,j
k=1 Xijk. In that sense, a scenario is defined
on a more granular scale where scenarios are linked to a given LGM. Next, priors
are formed which captures the uncertainty around a single parameter. For the loss
frequencies, a Poisson model is assumed with the associated conjugate prior being the
gamma distribution over the Poisson parameter λ. In terms of a nonparametric form
for the severity, the Dirichlet process is represented in terms of a base distribution
estimate and a scalar parameter. That is a scenario-based estimate of the severity
distribution, denoted Fˆ (x), is made together with a certainty parameter (measure) c.
The resulting posterior distribution is a weighted average of the prior estimate Fˆ (x)
with weight c
(c+n)
and empirical CDF of the data with weight n
(c+n)
. Nonetheless, an
implicit assumption when working with an LGM is that there exists an underlying
process governing a loss profile that does not vanish over time. Hence, no break would
be given to an organization implementing a control to mitigate a string of observed
operational losses.
3.4 Convolution to Integrate Scenarios
The previously discussed methods have varying degrees of difficulty in the sense that
a necessary goal of a modeler is to be able to get buy-in from non-technical experts
in addition to providing a robust method of scenario integration. At the core of our
proposed method is a simple take on scenario integration. Our method essentially is a
convolution between a loss density derived from frequency and severity estimates from
scenario opinions and the loss density obtained from the convolution of frequency and
severity distributions coming directly from operational loss data. That is, the process
of adding two continuous random variables is akin to the convolution of their proba-
bility densities. Hence, to quantify the effects of ILD/ELD and scenarios, summation
is the natural operation to obtain a model that incorporates all elements.
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We contrast our method with other techniques for scenario integration.
1. On the one hand, one may seek to refine or modify the parameters of the
underlying distributions used to build the loss distribution. For example, based
on the information gained using scenarios, frequency and severity parameters
are adjusted using Bayesian inference methods. Alternatively, the change of
measure method could be used to reweight the probability measure for the
severity distribution.
2. On the other hand, we propose that scenarios represent the missing piece of
information that must be added. For example when working with the loss dis-
tribution, we claim that the final loss distribution to be used for regulatory
capital = baseline LDA + “missing piece”. This may also work on the param-
eter level for which the convolution between two distributions may occur. For
example, final Poisson parameter = baseline λ + “missing piece”.
At a high level, the method satisfies a number of useful characteristics for scenario
integration:
• The convolution was already used in determining the loss function for a unit
of measure. That is, both frequency and severity distributions were combined
through a n-convolution of the severity distribution with itself, where N is a
random variable that follows a frequency distribution. Hence, the convolution
technique may be recycled again for scenario integration.
• Drawing on the analogy when working with deterministic L1 functions on Rn,
there exists the notion of “flip and drag” whereby one function is used to smooth
another via the convolution. When extending this concept to probability dis-
tributions, the intuition is still a mixing effect that has the visual effect of
smoothing as well. We will define this later.
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• Convolution is commutative. Hence there is no set ordering necessary to first
determine loss distribution based on loss data and then layer on scenarios. The
end result is a symmetric application of the convolution operator.
• There are many possibilities for using the convolution operator. For example, it
is possible to convolve three separate curves: (i) internal loss data, (ii) external
loss data, (iii) scenarios. In addition, it is possible to blend-in other types of
external loss data sets or other scenario libraries.
• The regulatory guidance surrounding scenarios calls for the need to avoid an-
choring of responses, bias or uncertainty through estimates. The convolution
resolves this problem in that we are not constrained to the baseline LDA para-
metric assumption.
3.4.1 Convolution Operation
Within the fields of signal processing and medical imaging, convolution is widely used
as a method of smoothing noisy signals. The concept of a filter is defined as any op-
eration that maps inputs to outputs, for which the convolution may also be classified
as a filter. A thorough treatment of signal processing, transforms and filtering are
described in Epstein (2008) [63]. An intuitive primer on convolution is detailed by
Osgood (2007) [99]. To motivate the application to scenario integration, we recall the
definition from a deterministic case.
Definition 3.4.1. (Convolution - deterministic) If f is an L1-function defined on Rn
and g is bounded, locally integrable function then the convolution product of f and g
is the function on Rn defined by the integral
(g ∗ f)(t) =
∫
Rn
g(t− x)f(x)dx. (3.3)
In the deterministic function sense, Osgood (2007) [99] points to the notion of “flip
58
and drag”. That is for a fixed value t, the graph g(x− t) has the same shape of g(x)
but shifted to the right by t. Hence g(t−x) flips the graph (left-right) about the line
x = t. Then the two functions g(t− x) and f(x) are multiplied and integrated with
respect to x. The result can be thought of a smoothing or averaging technique. That
is, g is used to smooth f in g ∗ f .
Definition 3.4.2. (Convolution - random) When X and Y are independent random
variables with probability densities fX and fY respectively and Z = X + Y , then the
density of fZ is given by the convolution
fz(Z) = fY ∗ fX =
∫ ∞
−∞
fY (z − x)fX(x)dx. (3.4)
Since the resulting convolved density will yield a corresponding CDF that stochasti-
cally dominates the baseline LDA model as seen in Levy (2006) [83] (adding a positive
random variable with non-degenerate distribution would have FZ > FX), there is al-
ways the ability to scale the LDA or scenario model to temper/moderate the effect.
This introduces an additional problem to calibrate the weighting coefficients. That is,
we can take a linear combination or scale any individual random variable. This detail
is required in order to perform the convolution and scale the associated PDF/CDF.
For this, we will also require the definition for scaling a random variable.
Definition 3.4.3. Let X be a continuous random variable with PDF fX(x) and CDF
FX(x). Let Y = θX with θ > 0. Then FY (y) = FX(
y
θ
), fY (y) =
1
θ
fX(
y
θ
).
Before moving on and having now formally defined the convolution operation for con-
tinuous random variables, we further justify this method. One take on interpreting
the problem occurs when Z represents the aggregate loss distribution incorporating
data X and scenarios Y , where X is known and Y is missing. One can view scenario
analysis as the “missing data” of the same distribution represented by the base case
or originated from a different sources. In the former, if both scenario and base case
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are from the same distribution, the question becomes what is the distribution? If
some scenarios have already occurred, we have already fit Z through the observed
data. In that case, X = Z − Y which gives scenario-free data.
However, we have approached this problem from the latter stance. The case Z =
X +Y where X and Y are originated from different sources is another interpretation
and resonates with the intent of producing scenarios that have not occurred. Cur-
rently banks have calibrated X, if based purely on internal loss data (ILD), on 10-15
years of data. The intent of Y is to help steer the risk quantification to align with
those 1 in a 1,000 year events. One may assume that both X and Y have some depen-
dence but based on the gap that is trying to be bridged and the uncertainty involved
in human judgement, independence (and hence summation of random variables) may
have merit.
Embrechts and Hofert (2011) [61] state that scenarios may provide a forward-looking
method for capturing tail events that may not have occurred in the bank’s loss his-
tory. By extension, rather than supplementing the same distribution to model the
tail, viewing our technique through another lens may have ILD modeling quantify a
backward-looking view and scenarios a forward-looking view. Cited within the same
context in Embrechts and Hofert (2011) [61] is the BCBS principles for sound stress
testing practices and supervision guidance (2009) [20] which is relevant for motivat-
ing this topic. Reproducing some of the guidance, we learn that stress testing should
provide a complementary and independent risk perspective to other risk management
tools such as value-at-risk and economic capital. In addition, as stress testing allows
for the simulation of shocks which have not previously occurred, it should be used
to assess the robustness of models to possible changes in the economic and financial
environment. As well, banks should also simulate stress scenarios in which the model-
embedded statistical relationships break down. Since we interpret scenarios to be the
stress testing element within the AMA model, by assuming independent shocks our
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scenario integration technique could be well served.
3.4.2 Scenario Distribution Formulation
The basis of using this method relies on the fact that a probability distribution can
be formulated based on the responses from a scenario workshop. That is the neces-
sary information to build a probability distribution would be a series of estimates of
frequency and severity. In its most general form, both parameters could be collected
with a range ([
1
t
,
1
u
]
, [a, b]
)
(3.5)
with an event occurring with a 1 in t or 1 in u year duration with magnitude [a,b].
From a modeling perspective, selecting the minimum frequency with the largest end
severity loss could add a layer of conservatism for which the ordered pair would be(
1
t
, b
)
. (3.6)
As seen from (3.2), a 1 in a t year event may be mapped to the quantile of an severity
distribution. As from Ergashev et al (2013) [65], elicitation to calibrate a symmetric
probability distribution may take the form of responses about the mean and stan-
dard deviation. It was pointed out that elicitation to arrive at a skewed distribution
is easier if expert opinion is sought on quantiles instead; for example, first quantile,
median, third quartile. In addition, for practical reasons, frequency estimates limited
to 1 in 30 to 1 in 40 year events are realistic and coincide with an employee’s career
within an institution. For human contributions to be of value, there is a need to
keep things simple. For reasons of stability, Dutta and Babbel (2010) [57] notice that
scenarios with short frequencies (between 20 and 25 years) cause for little concern
for the change of measure approach. It is when scenarios with long term frequency
estimates are used (e.g. 100 year), that complications arise in terms of an adequate
sample size needed to implement the change of measure approach.
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In terms of the number of scenarios required to calibrate a frequency distribution, a
Poisson distribution would require only an estimate of λ and the minimum number
of scenarios to calibrate a two-parameter severity distribution would require two loss
estimates to calibrate (e.g. µ, σ). While this does seem overly simplistic, we do see
in Frachot et al (2003) [70] a similar requirement in a worked-example. Therein,
three different scenarios were required to calibrate the three parameters λ, µ, σ. The
calibration proceeded via a quadratic criterion to be minimized which could also be
used when a system is over-determined.
To offer practitioners tasked to conduct workshops and collect suitable information to
calibrate scenario probability distributions, we offer additional references. Shevchenko
and Wu¨thrich (2006) [106] also needed the ability to estimate structural parameters
subjectively to determine the prior distributions for their Bayesian inference method
when combining loss data with expert opinion. To overcome this shortcoming, the
reference pointed out was that of Berger (1985) [31]. Applicable to our example, the
method of matching a given functional form was adopted. That is, finding scenario
parameters assuming some functional form to match subjective beliefs. Related to
this also would be the CDF determination technique that produces directly a smooth
curve. As well in Cruz et al (2015) [47], we see examples of how expert judgement
could be used to calibrate probability distributions. We see examples of fixing an
annual frequency and asking for likelihoods of losses exceeding certain thresholds to
calibrate a severity distribution. Conversely, opinions of loss frequencies in prede-
fined severity buckets allow for estimates of annual frequencies. Both methods could
be subjected to goodness of fit tests depending on the number of data points col-
lected. This would avoid the distributional assumption we have made from the onset.
Nonetheless, we made this simple assumption just to show the mechanics of our pro-
posed method.
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Comparing the frequency probability distributions between the distribution derived
from ILD/ELD and scenarios, more often than not the Poisson distribution may be
selected for simplicity and consistency. Hence when comparing severity distributions,
it is possible to also match the choice of severity distribution derived from ILD/ELD
(chosen from several goodness of fit statistical tests) and inferring the same, albeit
different parameters, severity distribution for the tail/scenario region. However, some
banks do make an ex-ante assumption that the scenarios follow a fat-tailed (eg, Log-
normal, Weibull,...) distribution in order to calibrate a severity distribution.
In the following example, we can see by using the quantile function of a corresponding
probability distribution that we may recover a calibrated distribution to the severities
of scenarios. We must stress that this is not a comprehensive method to calibrate
a probability distribution. We simply introduce such a method as a conversational
starting point to novice practitioners who would like to build-in sophistication once
the mechanics are understood. We acknowledge that additional methods exist that
yield smoother probability distributions. Timely to this discussion, in De Jongh et al
2015 [50] we see an investigation into two cases: the Generalized Pareto Distribution
(GPD) motivated from Extreme Value Theory (EVT) (a three parameter distribution
where one parameter serves as the EVT threshold) and the three parameter variant of
the Burr type XII distribution. Whereas the former case was motivated by modeling
the tail, the latter case was motivated by selecting a best fitting probability distribu-
tion based on data from the SAS OpRisk Global database. Once the foundation was
laid, we then see the discussion of using the minimum number of points for calibra-
tion: namely 1 in 7, 1 in 20 and 1 in 100 year loss estimates. Subsequently, we see
alternative methods of scenario integration in De Jongh et al 2015 [50]. We reiterate
that for our discussion, we required a continuous probability loss distribution and
hence needed some building block to begin with. Without the luxury of dealing with
a single financial institution with a particular risk profile, loss experience, scale and
geographical footprint, any example must be purely hypothetical and in that sense,
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we resort to the most simplest of starting points.
Example 3.4.1. Consider the case where a view is taken that the scenarios follow
a Weibull distribution. To make this more tractable, consider the case where the
shape parameter (k) is less than 1 to ensure that the distribution is representative of
a common heavy-tailed distribution. Recall that the PDF of a 2-parameter Weibull
distribution is given by
f(t) =
k
bk
tk−1exp(−( t
b
)k) t > 0,
with shape parameter k and scale parameter b. The corresponding quantile function
is given by
F−1(p) = b(−ln(1− p)) 1k 0 < p < 1.
Hence a scenario impact at a particular quantile is given by F−1(p). Then what is
left to solve if a system of two equations with two unknowns where p1 and p2 are
percentiles corresponding to severities v1 and v2 respectively
v1 = F
−1(p1) = b(−ln(1− p1)) 1k , (3.7)
v2 = F
−1(p2) = b(−ln(1− p2)) 1k . (3.8)
From (3.7) we have
b =
v1
(−ln(1− p1)) 1k
. (3.9)
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Then substituting (3.9) into (3.8) we have
v2 =
v1
(−ln(1− p1)) 1k
· (−ln(1− p2)) 1k
v2
v1
=
(−ln(1− p2)
−ln(1− p1)
) 1k
(v2
v1
)k
=
ln(1− p2)
ln(1− p1)
k ln
(v2
v1
)
= ln
( ln(1− p2)
ln(1− p1)
)
k =
ln
(
ln(1−p2)
ln(1−p1)
)
ln
(
v2
v1
) . (3.10)
So from (3.9) and (3.10) we have recovered the parameters for our density/cumulative
distribution function.
This example has shown a simple, idealized method to calibrate a probability density
function. This combined with the Poisson process allows for the characterization of
the loss distribution that may be used in the convolution method to integrate sce-
narios. For three or four parameter probability distributions, a similar method could
be used but more points along the curve would need to be extracted from scenario
respondents.
To see an alternate method using specific quantiles, we may again use a Monte Carlo
sub routine to produce a distribution. For example, for a given frequency, two opin-
ions would need to be collected regarding the quantiles of the severity distribution for
an assumed a-priori probability distribution fit. Assuming this time the Lognormal
distribution is used, then the median of the Lognormal distribution is given as eµ
where µ is associated with the mean/median/mode of the normal distribution. From
(3.6) we have
µ = ln(b0.5) (3.11)
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where b0.5 is an estimate of a median loss. To find σ, we use the definition that the
Lognormal quantile function is given by
F−1(p) = e(µ+σΦ
−1(p)) 0 < p < 1. (3.12)
Hence the loss at the third quartile implies b0.75 = F
−1(0.75). Solving for σ we have
b0.75 = e
(µ+σΦ−1(0.75))
ln(b0.75) = µ+ σΦ
−1(0.75)
ln(b0.75)− ln(b0.5) = σΦ−1(0.75)
ln(b0.75)
ln(b0.5)
Φ−1(0.75)
= σ. (3.13)
Having calibrated a frequency distribution and a severity distribution, the Monte
Carlo sub routine may be performed whereby for a given realization of the Poisson
process, a corresponding draw of that number could be taken from the severity dis-
tribution. The sum of realizations for a given draw would represent an annual loss
for a given year. Iterating for many times and plotting a histogram would show the
probability distribution of the scenario loss distribution.
3.4.3 Application of Convolution Method
We are now in a position to apply the convolution operator using our building blocks.
To recap, we have at our disposable Table 3.14 and outline the approach to integrate
scenarios as follows:
Convolution approach to integrate scenarios
1. From an internal/external data set, calibrate frequency probability mass func-
tion (PMF) and severity PDF p(x) and f(k) respectively.
2. Obtain aggregate lossG(x) from the n-fold convolution of severity and frequency
distributions
(
associated PDF is denoted as g(x)
)
.
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Building block Definition
p(k) Fitted frequency PMF for a unit of measure.
F (x) Fitted severity CDF for a unit of measure, with
corresponding PDF f(x).
G(x) Convolution of severity and frequency to obtain loss
distribution, with corresponding PDF g(x). The associated
random variable for this loss will be labelled X.
H(y) Fitted loss distribution to scenario data, with corresponding
PDF h(y). The associated random variable for this loss will
be labelled Y .
Table 3.14: Elements needed to perform baseline LDA and scenario convolution.
3. Calibrate scenario PDF h(y) based on responses from a scenario workshop.
4. Convolve g(x) and h(y) to obtain c(z) for which C(z) represents the aggregate
loss distribution including scenarios.
In our case we used a simple form of obtaining a fitted distribution to scenario data
by working with minimum number of points. However, the method is flexible enough
to work with any level of robustness in calculating the distribution. What we propose
is that the convolution of h(y) and g(x) given as
c(z) = (h ∗ g)(z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
hY (z − x)gX(x)dx (3.14)
allows for the quantification of the CDF C(z), which taken at the 99.9 percentile is
the VaR99.9.
While (3.14) conveys the method and the concept of independence between the two
loss distributions, we make the adjustment of taking the mean (X + Y )/2 while
maintaining independence.
c(z) =
1
2
(h ∗ g)(z) (3.15)
We observed the effect of scaling PDFs in Definition 3.4.3. We rationalize this by
noticing if Y ≡ X, we would want the loss quantified by X and not 2X. Again, the
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choice of the scalar is subject to debate and calibration. By taking the mean, we
obviously address the case where capital requirements would more than double if no
scalar were in place.
To provide the mechanics of this method, we provide a numerical illustration with pa-
rameters from Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez et al (2011) [78] and apply the technique above. We
reiterate by reminding readers that operational risk loss data is difficult to obtain.
Data consortiums such as ORX operate on a give-and-take basis whereby interna-
tional banks submit their loss data to ORX where it is anonymized and pooled to
be made available only to contributing members. IBM Algo FIRST contains a case-
study approach to operational risk loss events and provides a qualitative description
of publicly disclosed losses. Again, the data set is available at a cost and limited in
its distribution for research.
Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez et al (2011) [78] provide descriptive statistics of loss data from
a medium-sized Spanish bank that operates within the retail banking sector. The
sample is comprised of seven years of historical operational risk losses. The paper
provides a sensitivity analysis on varying levels of data collection thresholds of 25, 50,
100, 1000, 5000, and 10,000 Euros. The Poisson distribution is selected for frequency
calibration and candidate severity distributions are selected from Lognormal, Weibull,
and Pareto and calibrated using the MLE technique. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test is used as a goodness-of-fit test to choose severity distributions. The parametric
best fits are shown in the paper together with the parameter estimates.
For our purpose, we may collapse all loss data across event types and assign the
data to the retail banking business line as was done in the paper. The champion fit
from the paper is provided in Table 3.15. It is possible to recover the loss distribution
solely based on this data. Monte Carlo methods are used to construct the compound
distribution of using frequency and severity densities.
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Threshold Frequency Severity LDA VaR 99.9%
e10,000 PO (λˆ =16.73) LN (µˆ = 10.129, σˆ = 0.862) e1,542,567
Table 3.15: Champion fit with PO = Poisson and LN = Lognormal.
Next, hypothetical scenarios were formulated to be combined with the LDA model.
The way we form these estimates is we perturb the quantiles that are implied from
the underlying data. This idea was motivated from the paper by De Jongh et al
(2015) [50]. For instance, we use λˆ and Fˆ from Table 3.15. Using (3.2), we ask
ourselves for 1 in t year events where t = 5 and t = 35, what are the implied loss
amounts? We select these durations as they are within the range of what banks
typically use. We call these Lˆ5 and Lˆ35 which when backed out are e175,589 and
e312,580 respectively. We then perturb these loss amounts up and down and allow
ourselves to fit a new Fˆ . Note, since we are not limited to any a-priori family of
distributions, we may resort to the Weibull distribution. This could be based on a
variety of reasons: high severity losses as collected from ELD may be better suited
with an alternative distribution or a more robust scenario elicitation method could
be used for which the Weibull is a better fit. Nonetheless, we fix λˆ and the 1 in t year
events, although we could change these as well. We carry out the n-fold convolution
of frequency and severity to arrive at a loss distribution for scenarios. We use (3.15)
to produce a convolved capital requirement. These results are summarized in Table
3.16.
Comparing the VaR estimates in Table 3.15 and Table 3.16, we get a sense of the
contribution of each possible scenario. When shocking the first loss estimate, we see
the effect of reducing the loss amount by 30%, fitting a Weibull distribution and
using that as the severity distribution to determine capital requirements based on
the scenario estimates alone. However, when combined with the LDA model using
the independence and averaging assumption, we naturally see a bias downward due
to the contribution of the scenario. We then notice a general pattern of increasing
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1 in 5 year 1 in 35 year Scenario VaR(99.9%) Convolution VaR(99.9%)
0.7Lˆ5 Lˆ35 1,138,193 1,281,665
0.8Lˆ5 Lˆ35 1,081,799 1,284,248
0.9Lˆ5 Lˆ35 1,113,394 1,320,921
Lˆ5 Lˆ35 1,237,189 1,387,259
1.1Lˆ5 Lˆ35 1,438,433 1,484,045
1.2Lˆ5 Lˆ35 1,755,268 1,630,826
1.3Lˆ5 Lˆ35 2,214,494 1,848,069
Lˆ5 0.7Lˆ35 2,172,263 1,806,347
Lˆ5 0.8Lˆ35 1,575,216 1,531,662
Lˆ5 0.9Lˆ35 1,318,888 1,425,858
Lˆ5 Lˆ35 1,237,189 1,387,259
Lˆ5 1.1Lˆ35 1,233,446 1,381,631
Lˆ5 1.2Lˆ35 1,285,395 1,398,278
Lˆ5 1.3Lˆ35 1,422,416 1,436,329
Table 3.16: VaR due to scenarios alone and VaR from convolved baseline LDA and
scenario model.
VaR as we increase the 1 in 5 year loss estimate keeping everything else fixed. It is
noteworthy to point out that by using (3.1), a 1 in 5 year event and 1 in 35 year event
are scaled by the Poisson parameter (λˆ = 16.73). Thus, it is natural to see how im-
provements could be made to improve the calibration of the scenario loss distribution
by collecting losses at various quantiles. Finally, for the 1 in 35 year loss, we see a
peak capital requirement at the lower shock level due to this lower loss occurring at
the same percentile.
3.5 Summary
When using the AMA methodology to set regulatory capital requirements for oper-
ational risk, scenario analysis is a modeling element that is used to layer-in expert
judgement for exposure to high-severity events. We have proposed the use of con-
volution which has wide applications in the fields of signal processing, electrical en-
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gineering, mathematics and statistics. As a mathematical operation, one function is
used to smooth and average the other as it is translated through the domain.
There are many advantages to using the convolution to integrate scenarios. The
averaging effect is an easy method to convey the concept to non-experts. Moreover,
the mathematical operations are straightforward - a model that integrates scenarios
is simply a sum of two random events to produce one combined result with some
scaling to be determined. In addition, since we interpret the regulatory guidance
around scenario design with the goal to avoid anchoring and strive for independent
assessments, using independent probability distributions and not necessary the same
family of distributions and incorporating them into a baseline LDA model meets this
spirit. This may also be useful in stress testing exercises. Ever since the 2007/2008
financial crisis, there has been increased focus on stress testing. One such require-
ment is for banks to conduct a macroeconomic stress test either to meet a regulatory
requirement or an internal mandate of enterprise-wide stress tests. One such proposal
to evolve operational risk capital is to produce changes to operational risk capital over
a projected future time horizon. The inclusion of subsequent scenario curves may be
one such area that could be investigated and using unforeseen, regulatory prescribed
exogenous shocks would resonate well the independence assumption.
Nonetheless, this technique is not without its faults. The very core of the assump-
tion is also a contestable subject: the assumption of independence between scenario
and data-derived distributions. This assumption may be accepted if scenarios are
viewed as a stress testing element that are implemented for the very reason to aug-
ment underlying assumptions based on limited data. Also, the application of the
methodology fundamentally relies on the ability to calibrate a probability distribu-
tion to scenario data. While the frequency calibration has always been somewhat
simplistic, the calibration of severity and aggregate loss distributions could be sub-
ject to much improvement. The applications of optimization algorithms or statistical
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sampling to produce improved distributions around scenarios is an area for advanced
research. Then, any refinements may be easily incorporated as plug-and-play into
this framework.
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4 Enterprise-Wide Scenario Analysis
4.1 Overview
Up until now, we have seen scenarios been narrowly defined at the UoM level of
granularity. That is to say, scenarios are asked to be developed for a specific business
line and then depending on the nature of the scenario, slotted into a particular event
type. Hence, the scenario becomes associated with a particular cell in the 56 cell
matrix, as see in Table 2.6. Procedurally, this process has naturally evolved from the
functional requirement given to the operational risk management team within a bank.
The typical steps in a scenario analysis program have been outlined in Haackert and
Regling (2012) [73]. Tasked to hold workshops, assemble relevant internal loss data,
relevant external loss data, and key information on business strategy, political envi-
ronment and the economy as a whole, the scenario design team would systematically
proceed business line by business line. The siloed approach to scenario design does
not encourage enough collaboration among different experts from different business
lines to think of aggregate potential loss to a bank. This is partly to be blamed with
a lack of research in the area and lack of guidance. We have already seen various
proposed methodologies for scenario integration that provided the banking industry
with options to think of scenarios on the UoM level. Hence, this could have partly
steered the industry in a direction of cell by cell scenario design. However, in a few
instances, we do see some banks starting to develop enterprise-wide scenarios.
When banks do formulate enterprise-wide scenarios, we have not seen any structured
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process that details roles and responsibilities. Moreover, we see that enterprise-wide
scenarios are seen as something of an after thought. Preliminarily, we see that the
only use of an enterprise-wide scenario is to verify if the severity impact of the scenario
falls below the calculated operational risk capital requirement as stated by the OCC
(2012) [95]. As a hypothetical example, if an enterprise-wide scenario is thought to
effect the entire bank and has an impact of $800 million but the LDA model calculates
a capital requirement of $3 billion, then in this particular case the bank would not
have to alter the LDA model. The scenario usage could be seen as a validating tool
that has validated the capital requirement as being more than adequate of absorbing
the catastrophic loss. Although this seems somewhat elementary, these are the types
of simplistic interpretations banks are making.
While there is value in thinking of scenarios on the UoM level, by the very nature
of operational risk capital being highly sensitive to idiosyncratic, low frequency/high
severity events, devastating catastrophic scenarios spanning multiple cells is some-
thing to be taken into consideration. For example, we have already seen some low
frequency/high severity events in the past that have been mapped to single UoMs.
Examples are detailed in Table 4.17. Although referring to these types of large losses
and trying to formulate a potential impact to one’s host institution is part of scenario
analysis, there is a missing line of thinking.
If anything, catastrophic losses that systemically effect multiple areas of a bank are
possible and need to be explored. In the damage to physical assets event type, ex-
amples are listed in Basel II (2006) [19] such as human losses from external sources
(terrorism and vandalism) and natural disasters. The losses caused by the 9/11 ter-
rorist attack in 2001, hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the earthquake in Japan in 2011
are just some examples pointed out by Horkenko et al (2011) [75] that are classified
as operational risks. If focused directly on a financial headquarter, these events could
severely damage or wipe out multiple business lines. In addition, in the business
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December 2008
Loss Amount: $7.5 billion
Firm: Airfield Greenwich Group
BIS event type: Theft and fraud (ET2)
BIS business line: Asset management (BL7)
Airfield Greenwich Group lost as much as $7.5 billion due to Bernard Madoff’s
$50 billion Ponzi scheme. The US investment fund had the largest exposure
of the more than 50 banks and hedge funds affected by Madoff’s fraud. Other
financial institutions with exposures in excess of $1 billion included Banco San-
tander, Mass Mutual Financial Group, Access International Advisers, HSBC
Bank, Union Bancaire Prive´e and UniCredit.
June 2011
Loss Amount: $85 million
Firm: Wells Fargo
BIS event type: Internal fraud (ET1)
BIS business line: Retail banking (BL3)
The US Federal Reserve Board fined Wells Fargo $85 million for mortgage
fraud. Wells Fargo Financial, the firm’s former subsidiary, rewarded employees
who processed the most mortgages. Employees falsified mortgage documents
to help unqualified applicants receive loans and convinced borrowers to take
subprime loans even if they qualified for better rates. Wells Fargo closed the
subsidiary and agreed to compensate affected borrowers.
February 2013
Loss Amount: $325 million
Firm: Royal Bank of Scotland Group
BIS event type: Clients, Products and Business Practices (ET4)
BIS business line: Trading and Sales (BL2)
The CFTC fined RBS $325 million for manipulating London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR). Between 2006 and 2010, RBS traders shared confidential infor-
mation interdepartmentally and influenced interest rates both internally and
at other banks. When RBS employees discovered a pending internal investiga-
tion, they concealed their activities by making oral requests instead of written
ones. At least 21 RBS employees were involved in the scandal.
Table 4.17: Select large operational risk losses as reproduced from Operational Risk
and Regulation (2009, 2011, 2013) [96–98] respectively.
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ET1 ET2 ET3 ET4 ET6 ET6 ET7
BL1
BL2
BL3 scenario
BL4
BL5
BL6
BL7
BL8
(a) Single UoM scenario
ET1 ET2 ET3 ET4 ET6 ET6 ET7
BL1
BL2
BL3
BL4
BL5
BL6
BL7
BL8
scenario
(b) Multiple UoM scenario
Figure 4.4: Single vs. multiple UoM scenario.
disruption and system failures event type, we see examples of hardware, software,
telecommunications and utility outages. Such real life events were highlighted in Mc-
Connell and Blacker (2013) [84]. For instance, there were extended system failures
encountered by Royal Bank of Scotland in 2012 in which a software update turned
out to be corrupted and resulted in disrupted payments and other transactions. In
2010, the Development Bank of Singapore also experienced a massive IT failure which
impacted customers and business. Faced with other cyber risk or systemic IT failures,
multiple business lines could also be vulnerable to such risks and hence would impact
multiple UoMs.
This chapter aims to migrate from a single UoM scenario to a scenario that spans
multiple UoMs. This is graphically displayed in Figure 4.4. We develop the end-
to-end process that enables the development of enterprise-wide scenarios. This idea
of approaching scenario analysis on an aggregate level was formulated in the 2014
Fields-Mprime Industrial Problem Solving Workshop held in Toronto, ON. There,
open-ended questions were asked of participants such as:
• How best should scenario workshops be conducted in order to elicit necessary
and sufficient information to formulate scenarios for modeling?
• How should questions be framed?
• What are realistic questions to ask on frequency and severity?
• What sort of data should be referenced in order to guide scenario respondents?
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• How can scenarios be updated/refreshed over time to ensure their reasonable-
ness?
• Are scenarios a valuable element for AMA modeling?
The direction the group took the problem was that of scenarios spanning multiple
UoMs. The method detaches the requirement for bankers to quantify all aspects of
a scenario. Disaster planning experts are seen as experts in quantifying frequency
estimates of large-scale, low frequency events. Corresponding to each event would
be different intensity levels such as low, medium, high. Next, depending on the level
of intensity, severity distributions would need to be calibrated to quantify the loss
characteristics. This is where the banking experts could add value. Bankers would be
called upon to quantify financial impacts to their institution depending on the sever-
ity of the event. That is, different severity levels of loss conditioned on a particular
catastrophic event would impact a bank differently. In order to account for different
types of enterprise-wide scenarios materializing, a Monte Carlo routine was used to
cycle through different scenarios where samples were pulled from calibrated distribu-
tions and aggregate capital could be produced. Aggregate capital was calculated by
compounding frequency and severity to determine a capital requirement derived from
the various scenarios.
We build upon this framework and generalize the process. We contrast the work-
shop results and our contribution in Table 4.18. We build in areas for sophistication
where previous assumptions were overly simplistic. We generalize to allow for differ-
ent scenarios to have unique intensity levels with unique probability of occurrences.
Moreover, different scenarios would naturally effect different areas of the bank and
should not be limited to the same effected cluster of UoMs. Hence, increased gran-
ularity would be required. Whereas in the workshop multiple scenarios were allowed
to happen simultaneously (even with small probability), we take a different approach
so that different scenarios are treated independently. This changes the conditional
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Attribute Workshop Contribution
Frequency • Constant intensity • Constant intensity
• Allow for two scenarios • Discuss real disaster study
to extract intensity
• Develop theory for n type
of scenarios
• Reinforce with example
using two scenarios
Probability of
Occurrence
• Low, Medium, High inten-
sity levels
• Generalized for m inten-
sity levels
• Constrained to use same
three levels for different sce-
narios
• Allow flexibility for differ-
ent levels depending on sce-
narios
• Claim P (L > x) condi-
tioned on two scenarios plus
intersection of both events
• Reinforce with example
using (L,M,H) and (L,H)
levels
• Altered P (L > x) to en-
sure only one scenario can
happen at a time
Unit of Mea-
sure
• Same UoMs effected re-
gardless of scenarios
• Unique number of UoMs
effected per scenario
• Constant loss distribution
across all UoMs
• Generalize to allow unique
loss distribution per UoM
Scenario Inte-
gration Appli-
cation
None Reapply to convolution
method
Capital • Calculate aggregate loss
across all UoMs then take
VaR
• Calculate aggregate loss
across all UoMs then take
VaR
• No discussion of capital al-
location
• Introduce and apply capi-
tal allocation methodology
Table 4.18: Contrast between workshop and new contribution.
78
probability and results in a different framework. We also complete the problem by
proposing a partition methodology that disseminates capital to individual business
lines. To our knowledge, the methodology proposed to quantify enterprise-wide sce-
narios has not been covered in the literature. In addition, even though the capital
allocation discussion is not new, its application in an operational risk context resulting
from catastrophic scenarios to our knowledge has not received attention. This collec-
tive framework is something of value that could be offered to the financial community
in present day to complement operational risk modeling. We also note that once
formulated, the scenario loss distribution may be applied in the context of the inte-
gration method of the previous chapter. In that sense, this is yet another contribution.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 covers a literature review
of the developed area of scenario quantification on a single cell level. In addition, the
underlying motivation for the need of such enterprise-wide scenarios is shown through
a discussion of various references. Section 4.3 shows how disaster planning experts
may provide input into the frequency quantification of a scenario. A California earth-
quake study is investigated to show how to extract the relevant parameter estimates.
Section 4.4 discusses how to quantify the severities of the loss distribution. Section
4.5 generalizes the simulation algorithm using a Monte Carlo framework. Section
4.6 works through hypothetical catastrophic scenarios using all required parameters
for simulation. Section 4.7 links the results to an application of scenario integration
using convolution. Section 4.8 shows a different treatment by computing aggregate
loss and looks at capital allocation to contributing UoMs. Section 4.9 summarizes
the chapter.
4.2 Literature Review
When it comes to modeling and incorporating scenarios into an AMA model, it is
pointless if there is no proposed method to translate the story or details of a scenario
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into the quantitative model. However, a less structured approach could be taken for
what-if scenarios that add value in another way. Chapelle (2014) [39] differentiates
between two different types of scenarios: (i) capital scenarios and (ii) management sce-
narios. Capital scenarios are used as explicit inputs into the calculation of regulatory
capital and require precise quantification. These are relevant to our work. However,
management scenarios are not integrated into an AMA model. They require manage-
ment response and close monitoring without necessarily needing additional funding.
They typically relate to the absence of expected benefits or loss of upside potential.
Examples of management scenarios would be failure of a project or reputational dam-
age due to poor communication.
Since we are concerned with the modeling and methodology of capital scenarios, we
will simply refer to capital scenarios as just scenarios and exclude any further discus-
sion of management scenarios. As we have already noticed, the literature surrounding
scenario quantification is usually at the UoM level. Dutta and Babbel (2010) [57] de-
fine a scenario with frequency in the form of m
t
which means that m events are likely
to occur in a period of t years with corresponding severity range [a, b]. The change
of measure scenario integration methodology revises the historical probability distri-
bution so that the number of occurrences of the event in a sample equivalent to t
years of losses is equal to m. This method is applicable for a single scenario or a set
of scenarios to form an implied severity distribution. The methodology is reinforced
via a real-world example in Dutta and Babbel (2010) [57] where for a single UoM, a
scaled and anonymized set of 16 scenarios are used to revise a historical probability
distribution corresponding to five candidate severity distributions.
Ergashev (2012) [64] defines a scenario to have both a duration and a lower bound. For
a particular UoM, a set of scenarios is defined as S = (S1, . . . , Sk) where Si = (Mi, Li),
Mi is a natural number indicating that scenario Si is a once-in-a-Mi-year event, Li > 0
is the lower bound of the loss associated with the scenario and k is the total number
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of scenarios for a UoM. Hence the scenario integration methodology relies on filtering
the scenario set to arrive at the select few that shift the risk profile of the base model’s
severity distribution for a particular UoM.
Also, the use of Bayesian methods as detailed in Shevchenko and Wu¨thrich (2006)
[106], Lambrigger et al (2007) [82], and Cope (2010) [45] operate on the condition that
the parameters of the prior distribution can be estimated subjectively using expert
opinion and used to refine/update the posterior distribution. Since parameters of
probability distributions are unique for each UoM, the scenario integration method-
ology is again on a very granular level.
In the context of AMA modeling for regulatory capital quantification, there is only
high-level discussions of catastrophic scenarios with no formulaic approach to AMA
modeling. As discussed in McDermott et al (2012) [85], when an interview panel was
asked if the financial community would, “see any kind of convergence either in the
number and type of scenarios used or in the way they are being used, as well as the
goals that institutions are trying to achieve by using them”, McDermott states that
because of the diversity of natural catastrophes in the US, there does not appear to
be any convergence in the near future. Also, “it is still a fairly young discipline”. The
panel as a whole agreed that it might be natural to think of convergence at some point
in the future, but practitioners are just in the experimenting phase. We see in Tozer-
Pennington (2011) [109] the terminology of a multivariate scenario being introduced.
It was reasoned that assessing simple single variable scenarios by themselves does not
give insight to what may unfold in a multifaceted loss event. It was pointed out that
the 2011 devastating earthquake in Japan, ensuing tsunami and potential nuclear
crisis had been termed a one-in-a-thousand year event. The crisis started off with
a 9.0 earthquake off the Pacific coast of To¯hoku, which was followed by a tsunami
off the northeast coast of Japan, and then resulted in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster resulting in a nuclear meltdown of three of six nuclear reactors. Operational
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risk managers are now becoming increasingly aware that such devastations are be-
coming more common. It was also suggested in Tozer-Pennington (2011) [109] that
firms need to be better prepared to quantify impacts of extreme scenarios and per-
haps the risk management community as a whole could collaborate in its development.
Branching out to see if the concept of multivariate scenarios are being used in the in-
surance field, we see only limited discussion of using scenarios to aid in operational risk
capital quantification. The Solvency II Directive (2009) [66], referred to as “Basel”
for insurers, is somewhat similar to banking regulations of Basel II (2006) [19]. Like
Basel regulations, Solvency II has undergone revisions to take into account current de-
velopments in insurance, risk management, finance techniques, international financial
reporting and prudential standards. The revision has come into effect January 2016.
That being said, we see that within the insurance field there is talk about advancing
operational risk capital quantification using scenarios. Although the framework is
not the same as the AMA modeling, scenario analysis does provide the same forward-
looking risk assessment relevant for the insurance industry. In Meek (2012) [88], we
learn that at the Swiss general insurance group Zurich, the insurance industry is also
faced with the scarcity of loss data which implies that a curve-fitting methodology
used to quantify other risk types is not feasible for operational risk. Although the
capital rules may be different, banks/insurance companies usually run internal models
for risk management reasons to inform internal views of capital adequacy. These may
be similar or different to regulatory capital models. At Zurich, the scenario analysis
method runs through a set of 50 scenarios. The top-down scenario analysis program
runs the scenarios across the company and initiates discussions with a business head.
The brainstorming sessions, for instance, may look at specific fraud events or fines,
which yield a few data points. The data points are then passed onto the analytic
group which is tasked to convert data points via an undisclosed methodology into
parameters for quantification. The end goal is that the “mathematical curve” that is
used to quantify the risk may not align with the risk profile of the scenarios. Hence
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Zurich may then adopt any other type of loss curve that better fits the risk profile.
The reason this example was shown was two fold: 1) to show that the contribu-
tion to the development of a enterprise-wide scenario framework and methodology
will be new and 2) banking and insurance are concerned with the same problem
for operational risk capital quantification. Moreover, as our method calls for disas-
ter planning experts to input their view into scenario design and these experts are
naturally associated with the insurance and actuarial fields, the cross-over is natural.
4.3 Frequency Quantification
We concern ourselves with catastrophic scenarios that seldom occur, however when
they do, the severity level is high. Natural Resources Canada monitors natural haz-
ards in Canada and provides information about hazardous events, as well as provide
information to help Canadians understand, prepare and reduce losses due to haz-
ardous events. Examples of hazards that are reported include earthquakes, space
weather, marine geological hazards, floods and landslides. In the United States, the
United States Geological Survey (USGS) is a scientific agency of the US government
that also monitors natural hazards. The six science programs covered by USGS are
coastal and marine geology, earthquake hazards, geomagnetism, global seismographic
network, landslide hazards, and volcano hazards. Using the US as an example, one
such notable publication was a study done by Field et al (2009) [68] investigating
earthquake forecasts for the state of California called the Uniform California Earth-
quake Rupture Forecast (UCERF). A collection of scientists and engineers built a
series of four models, one of which was a probability model, that gave a probabil-
ity of occurrence for each earthquake during a specified (future) time interval. The
authours assume time-independence through a Poisson model in the sense that the
probability of each earthquake rupture was completely independent of the timing of
all others. This was in contrast to other potential modeling choices which assume
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time-dependence. Under a different framework, the time-dependent earthquake rup-
ture forecasts condition event probabilities on the date of the last rupture. Such
models were motivated by elastic rebound theory of the earthquake cycle and were
based on stress-renewal models in which probabilities drop immediately after a large
earthquake. The release of tectonic stress reduces the probability, whereas the proba-
bility of an earthquake rises as stress re-accumulates due to constant tectonic loading
of the fault line. However, luckily for us, the time-independence assumption aligns
well with our AMA modeling framework and will serve us in motivating our applica-
tion.
Results of probability calculations are taken from Field et al (2009) [68] and sum-
marized in Table 4.19. Interpreting the first entry, we see that an earthquake with
Magnitude (M) Frequency Probability of occurrence
M ≥ 6.7 1 in 30 year 99.7%
M ≥ 7.0 1 in 30 year 94.0%
M ≥ 7.5 1 in 30 year 46.0%
M ≥ 8.0 1 in 30 year 4.5%
Table 4.19: Summary frequencies and probabilities of earthquake predictions.
a magnitude greater than or equal to 6.7 on the Richter scale is virtually assured
in California during the next 30 years (with a 99.7% probability of occurrence). In
order extract the relevant information needed to run an LDA model, we recall the
basic properties of the Poisson probability distribution. We encountered the Poisson
distribution in Section 2.4.4 used for frequency modeling. We turn to the homoge-
neous Poisson process which is characterized by an intensity parameter λ such that
the number of events in time interval (t, t + τ ] follows a Poisson distribution with
corresponding parameter λt. The expression is given by
P [N(t+ τ)−N(t) = k] = e
−λτ (λτ)k
k!
k = 0, 1, . . . (4.1)
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Magnitude (M) Poisson parameter λ
M ≥ 6.7 0.12
M ≥ 7.0 0.094
M ≥ 7.5 0.021
M ≥ 8.0 0.0015
Table 4.20: Summary Poisson parameters for corresponding earthquake magnitudes.
where N(t + τ) − N(t) = k represents the number of events in the time interval
(t, t+ τ ]. Hence in our case, λ is the long-term rate of the earthquake rupture, t can
be set to zero, and τ = 30 represents the forecast duration. In the following example,
we show how to recover the necessary intensity value.
Example 4.3.1. Using (4.1), we find the associated λ from the first row in Table
4.19. Since the entries provide us with information of an earthquake in the next 30
years with a probability of occurrence, we can solve the complement
P [N(t+ 30)−N(t) ≥ 1] = P [N(t+ 30)−N(t) = 1] + P [N(t+ 30)−N(t) = 2] + . . .
= 1− P [N(t+ 30)−N(t) < 1]
= 1− P [N(t+ 30)−N(t) = 0]
= 1− e
−30λ(30λ)0
0!
= 1− e−30λ
=⇒ e−30λ = 0.03 or λ = 0.12. Hence we can say that we expect 0.12 earthquakes of
M ≥ 6.7 in a given year.
We solve the same expression and summarize the corresponding intensities parameters
in Table 4.20. To summarize, this frequency estimate represents the first necessary
piece of information required for the scenario analysis program. We have tasked the
disaster planning experts to use their expertise to provide best estimates to pass along
to the banking professionals to quantify a financial impact due to the catastrophic
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Figure 4.5: Cumulative probabilities for occurrence for one earthquake ranging over
various magnitudes.
scenario.
While this is one method to collect the frequency estimate, our methodology is a
slight modification of the above method. In Table 4.20 we had a different λ for differ-
ent magnitude levels. What was reported were cumulative probabilities. That is, the
arrival of a single earthquake during a 30 year period while cycling through various
magnitudes. Figure 4.5 takes a ‘traditional’ CDF plot and has increasing probabili-
ties from right to left where lower magnitude earthquakes are more likely. Moreover,
there is a hidden third dimension which is ‘typical’ of a CDF plot where for a Poisson
distribution, the possibility of k events happening are taken into account. However,
we propose to fix a λ and cycle through different severity options. That is, there are
distinct type of events that may occur that are mutually exclusive of one another.
We can achieve distinct type of events by simple subtraction. While M ≥ 8.0 with
probability 4.5 % is one type of earthquake, we may classify a different type of earth-
quake with magnitude 7.5 ≤ M ≤ 8.0 with probability 46% - 4.5 % = 41.5%. Hence
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Magnitude (M) Frequency Probability of occurrence
M ≤ 6.7 1 in 30 year 0.3%
6.7 ≤ M ≤ 7.0 1 in 30 year 5.7%
7.0 ≤ M ≤ 7.5 1 in 30 year 48.0%
7.5 ≤ M ≤ 8.0 1 in 30 year 41.5%
M ≥ 8.0 1 in 30 year 4.5%
Table 4.21: Summary by magnitude ranges.
we modify Table 4.19 and produce distinct earthquake events in Table 4.21. We in-
terpret earthquakes with magnitude less than 6.7 to be a catch-all segment.
We formalize our mathematical algorithm in three boxes (Frequency, Severity and
Monte Carlo framework) to follow. The generalization of this algorithm calls for
different disaster planning experts to quantify different scenarios (e.g. earthquake,
flood, hurricane) and hence allow for n possible scenario types.
Frequency framework: Let Ei represent a catastrophic scenario event where
there are i = 1, . . . , n different types of events. Let the corresponding frequency
estimate be represented by λi. For Ei, let there be j corresponding severity lev-
els where j = 1, . . . ,m. We append the index on Ei and write Ei,j to represent
the ith event with severity level j. For instance if j = 2, we would interpret
a catastrophic event occurring with either a low or high severity impact. We
then require given that event Ei has occurred, the conditional probability of a
specific severity level is given as P(Ei,j|Ei) = pi,j where
∑m
j=1 pi,j = 1.
The flexibility of this framework will be made clear later by virtue of an example.
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4.4 Severity Quantification
Having a frequency estimate in-hand for a particular scenario event with a specific
severity level, a banking professional would then be better suited to determine a
corresponding financial impact. It would still be up to the scenario design team to
research and translate the type of scenario and severity into a storyline. Using the
earthquake as an example with two severity levels (low and high), a remote low mag-
nitude earthquake may lead to a mild financial set-back effecting bank branches with
downed power lines and thus cause business disruption. However, a centralized high
magnitude earthquake focused in a financial headquarters may have multiple impacts:
(i) damage to physical assets for the office building and workstations, (ii) business
disruption for the capital markets, corporate and retail business, (iii) potential exter-
nal fraud in the form of opportunistic theft, (iv) workplace safety losses in the form
of general liability (slip and fall accidents).
Much like in equations (3.11) and (3.13), we can proceed by asking participants
two opinions regarding the median loss (50%) and third quartile (75%) of a candidate
severity distribution. In that example we chose, a-priori, a Lognormal distribution.
Although we need not necessarily limit ourselves to that distribution, we may select
from a host of two, three, or four parameter distributions. We rationalize that we may
limit our investigation to a select number of two-parameter distribution choices. As
an aside, it was stated in a publication from the BCBS, Operational risk - Revisions
to the simpler approaches (2014) [28], that the Basel working group has formulated an
Operational Risk Capital-at-Risk (OpCaR) calculator. The calculator is an in-house
model aimed to benchmark operational risk proxy indicators (like gross income) and
to calibrate coefficients for standardized approaches. The basis of the model is an
AMA model using the LDA approach using four candidate distributions used for
severity fitting. Two parameter Pareto, Lognormal, Loglogistic and Log-Gamma are
used. Hence we believe that since the BCBS is using two parameter probability dis-
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tributions for calibration and benchmarking, then by extension we may constrain
ourselves in the same manner and motivate our technique accordingly. Moreoever,
we elected to use a Lognormal distribution based on the range of practice observed
at scenario-based AMA banks as detailed in the publication from the BCBS, Op-
erational Risk - Supervisory Guidelines for the Advanced Measurement Approaches
(2014) [22]. There it was stated that banks used only a Lognormal curve to fit sce-
nario data regardless of the business, size and complexity of an UoM. Hence the use of
a single curve across all UoMs indicated that the only driver of variation in the oper-
ational risk exposure lied in the scenario-induced parameter estimates corresponding
to different Lognormal distributions.
Our goal here is to calibrate a severity distribution based on scenario responses stem-
ming from a single catastrophic event. The severity loss (or simply loss) is unique
for a single UoM that is part of the bigger picture. While we still are concerned
with a single scenario impacting multiple business lines and multiple event types, our
quantification starts at the individual cell level. Alternatively, it is also possible to
think in terms of one single aggregate loss and disseminate capital ex-post, however,
this simplification can be seen as a corollary to the more granular method.
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Severity framework: Let Li,j,k represent the loss corresponding to the i
th
scenario event with severity level j coming from UoM k. Recall we allow for
i = 1, . . . , n different types of scenarios, j = 1, . . . ,m different severity levels
and k = 1, . . . , 56 possible UoMs. If k = 56, this means that the scenario effects
every UoM in the bank. Usually we have k < 56 indicating that the effect is
localized to a portion of the bank. Each loss is then distributed according
to some probability distribution with parameters θ˜ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θh) where h
represents the number of parameters needed to be calibrated. The associated
quantile function for percents p˜ is solved where
Qθ˜(p˜) = inf{x˜ ∈ R : p˜ ≤ F (x˜)}. (4.2)
Since the dimension dim p˜ = dim θ˜ = h, we have a system of h equations with
h unknowns to solve.
Thus once θ˜ has been obtained, we are able to apply our Monte Carlo simulation to
find our aggregate loss impact.
4.5 Monte Carlo Simulation
Recall that the end goal is to compute the operational risk capital requirement which
is a VaR measure at the 99.9 percentile. Mathematically, we need to find the specific
quantile of the annual loss distribution. That is, our goal is to find the value x such
that
P(L > x) = 1− 0.999. (4.3)
Since this a VaR measure purely attributed to the use of scenarios, an approximation
can be made when computing the VaR attributed to the occurrence of each catas-
trophic event. Mathematically, conditioned on the possibility of multiple scenarios
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occurring we have
P(L > x) = P(L > x|E1E2 . . . En)P(E1E2 . . . En) +
P(L > x|Ec1E2 . . . En)P(Ec1E2 . . . En) +
P(L > x|E1Ec2 . . . En)P(E1Ec2 . . . En) + . . .+
P(L > x|E1E2 . . . Ecn)P(E1E2 . . . Ecn) + . . .+
P(L > x|Ec1Ec2 . . . En)P(Ec1Ec2 . . . En) + . . .+
P(L > x|Ec1Ec2 . . . Ecn)P(Ec1Ec2 . . . Ecn). (4.4)
From the law of total probability, we have the following
P(L > x) ≈ P(L > x|E1)P(E1) +
P(L > x|E2)P(E2) + . . .+
P(L > x|En)P(En). (4.5)
Hence (4.5) states that P(L > x) is equal to a weighted average of P(L > x|Ei), each
term being weighted by the probability of the event on which it is conditioned (see
Prop. 3.1, Ross (2002) [103]).
Having the problem phrased this way is conducive to solving using Monte Carlo
methods. This can be seen easily in the case of a single event (Ei ≡ E) where we are
left to solve
P(L > x) = P(L > x|E)P(E). (4.6)
For example, in the case where P(E) = 0.01, we know that we must have the VaR
condition of P(L > x) = 0.001. Hence we simply need to find the value x that makes
P(L > x|E) = 0.1
P(L > x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.001
= P(L > x|E)︸ ︷︷ ︸
find x that makes this = 0.1
P(E)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.01
. (4.7)
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To make this concrete, we summarize the Monte Carlo framework that generalizes
the routine for any number of scenarios. We then provide a two scenario example
that shows how the method may be used in practice.
Monte Carlo framework: Collect frequency estimates λi corresponding to
catastrophic scenario events Ei, i = 1, . . . , n. Corresponding to each unique
scenario are j severity levels where j = 1, . . . ,m. Then mapped to each sce-
nario is a calibrated loss Li,j,k which is representative of a loss that would be
realized for UoM k = 1, . . . , 56. To perform the Monte Carlo loop, initialize
a high number of simulations. Determine which scenario, if any, are realized.
Do this by generating uniformly distributed random numbers from the inter-
val [0,1]. Check, element by element, if each realization is less than λi. Note
that each λi discretizes the interval [0,1] into segments such that depending
on the realization from the random draw, only one scenario may occur. Going
down the decision tree, next determine which severity intensity level occurs.
Each severity intensity has an associated probability of occurrence such that
all probabilities sum to one. To determine which intensity occurs, a similar
random draw scheme used previously to determine the type of scenario may be
applied again. Finally, produce a realization from the unique loss distribution
across all effected cells. Sum across all cells and store. After running all sim-
ulations, take VaR at the 99.9 percentile (or in this case corresponding to the
conditional quantile on non-zero entries that is equivalent to the 99.9 percentile
of the full loss distribution). This VaR estimate represents the aggregate loss
corresponding to the possibility of n number of scenarios possibly occurring.
4.6 Example: Two Catastrophic Scenarios
To show the mechanics of the method, we provide a hypothetical example and run a
full simulation. We provide all required parameters to run the algorithm. The param-
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eters used are fictitious because depending on the footprint of a bank geographically
and the type of losses that may occur which are only known to its business line ex-
perts, the loss experience is very unique.
From disaster planning experts
We start with a hypothetical bank that has offices in both New York and California.
We propose two catastrophic scenarios events: a flood affecting New York and an
earthquake affecting California. The first choice of scenario was motivated from the
2012 Atlantic hurricane season that resulted in hurricane Sandy and caused flooding
of streets and subway lines and cut power around the city. The second scenario was
motivated by the previous UCERF study for the state of California and the recurrent
number of earthquakes characteristic of the state.
We define the two catastrophic events
• Event 1: New York flood, represented as E1,
• Event 2: California earthquake, represented as E2.
Corresponding to each event are different severity levels. For New York, we have
• Level 1: Low - represented as E1,1,
• Level 2: Medium - represented as E1,2,
• Level 3: High - represented as E1,3.
For California, we have
• Level 1: Low - represented as E2,1,
• Level 2: High - represented as E2,2.
Hence we are left with the mutually exclusive set of scenarios {E1,1, E1,2, E1,3, E2,1, E2,2}
as defined by the disaster planning experts. We note that we are not limited to hav-
ing the same severities levels across different scenarios. We envision more choices for
severity levels in New York as given by the experts in that a greater density of finan-
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cial offices are located there and hence could attract different types of losses. Next,
we require frequency estimates from the experts. To keep inline with our reasoning
for career-spanning estimates for frequency, we assign the New York flood to be a 1
in 20 year event and the California earthquake to be a 1 in 30 year event. For each
catastrophic event, each severity level occurs with different probabilities. Hence we
have
P(E1,j|E1) = p1,j j = 1, 2, 3 (4.8)
P(E2,j|E2) = p2,j j = 1, 2. (4.9)
Again, the probability of each severity level occurring must sum to 1. The information
gathered from the experts is summarized in Table 4.22 and Table 4.23.
Frequency λ = 0.05
Severity Level Low Medium High
Probability (p1,j) 0.5 0.4 0.1
Table 4.22: New York flood parameters.
Frequency λ = 0.0333
Severity Level Low High
Probability (p2,j) 0.6 0.4
Table 4.23: California earthquake parameters.
From banking experts
Passing along this information to the banking experts, it is reasoned that different
events may occur with different probabilities of severity levels and experts within the
institution are in the best position to assign a financial impact to the bank in their
level of expertise and then aggregated to the bank as a whole. For example, if an
earthquake hit California, that may result in a shut down to a particular part of a
bank. Depending on the damage to physical assets or business disruptions causing
lost revenues, a banker may be able to quantify a reasonable estimate of financial loss
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due to the operational risk event. Hence, in our example, we have different UoMs
effected in each scenario
UoME1,j ,k j = 1, 2, 3, k = 1, 2, . . . , 10 (4.10)
UoME2,jk j = 1, 2 k = 1, 2 . . . , 5. (4.11)
Not only do we allow for 10 UoMs in the first scenario and 5 UoMs in the second sce-
nario, we also allow for unique loss distributions to be calibrated for each UoM under
each scenario type and severity level. Using the same line of reasoning from the pre-
vious chapter, we may take a view that scenarios follow a Lognormal distribution and
the minimum number of points need to calibrate such as curve are two points. More-
over, rather than elicit answers regarding the moments, we seek responses in the form
of quantiles: namely median (50%) loss and third quartile (75%) loss. We provide
hypothetical values for each case in order to show the mechanics of the method. The
combined information received from disaster planning experts and banking experts
for a single UoM are given Table 4.24 and Table 4.25.
Frequency λ = 0.05
Severity Level Low Medium High
Probability (p1,j) 0.5 0.4 0.1
Median $100,000 $500,000 $1,000,000
75th percentile $300,000 $1,000,000 $2,000,000
Table 4.24: New York flood full information for single UoM.
Frequency λ = 0.0333
Severity Level Low High
Probability (p2,j) 0.6 0.4
Median $50,000 $300,000
75th percentile $150,000 $700,000
Table 4.25: California earthquake full information for single UoM.
We reiterate that we generalize this process to allow different UoMs being impacted
and thus having individual loss profiles. For example, if a flood was to occur, we
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could reasonably expect that two event types would occur: ET5 (damage to physi-
cal assets) and ET7 (execution, delivery and process management). That is, losses
arising from the flood directly causing damage to infrastructure and then losses from
failed transactions processing respectively. For arguments sake, we can then say that
these ETs occur in the first five business lines: BL1 (corporate finance), BL2 (trad-
ing and sales), BL3 (retail banking), BL4 (commercial banking), BL5 (payment and
settlement). Hence, this forms the 10 UoM structure (2ET*5BL). Then, to make
this example more realistic, we require an individualized loss assessment in each UoM
from a business line expert. To this end, we take each 50th and 75th percentile loss and
add white Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance 10%. Once the noise is added,
we round each value to the ten thousandth as we would expect business line experts
not to provide estimates to the dollar level. This information is summarized in Table
4.26 and Table 4.27. This mimics the effect of an individualized loss assessment.
Finally, once we have loss amounts for each UoM, we fit individualized Lognormal
distributions using (3.11) and (3.13). To be explicit, from Table 4.26, the first entry
median loss of $100,000 together with 75th percentile estimate of $300,000 produces
the Lognormal distribution with parameters µ = 11.51 and σ = 1.63 to coincide with
the first entry in Table 4.28. The calibrated probability distributions corresponding
to the loss estimates are summarized in Table 4.28 and Table 4.29.
Frequency λ = 0.05
Severity Level Low Medium High
Probability (p1,j) 0.5 0.4 0.1
Quantile Median 75th percentile Median 75th percentile Median 75th percentile
UoM1 $100,000 $300,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $2,000,000
UoM2 $120,000 $170,000 $590,000 $1,230,000 $1,170,000 $2,450,000
UoM3 $160,000 $590,000 $790,000 $940,000 $1,580,000 $1,870,000
UoM4 $130,000 $290,000 $140,000 $960,000 $290,000 $1,920,000
UoM5 $110,000 $370,000 $640,000 $1,470,000 $1,270,000 $2,940,000
UoM6 $60,000 $280,000 $550,000 $1,450,000 $1,100,000 $2,890,000
UoM7 $90,000 $290,000 $290,000 $1,450,000 $590,000 $2,900,000
UoM8 $110,000 $440,000 $430,000 $1,210,000 $860,000 $2,420,000
UoM9 $210,000 $430,000 $550,000 $620,000 $1,110,000 $1,240,000
UoM10 $190,000 $430,000 $1,070,000 $1,230,000 $2,130,000 $2,450,000
Table 4.26: New York flood UoM loss estimates.
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Frequency λ = 0.0333
Severity Level Low High
Probability (p2,j) 0.6 0.4
Quantile Median 75th percentile Median 75th percentile
UoM1 $50,000 $150,000 $300,000 $700,000
UoM2 $60,000 $170,000 $350,000 $780,000
UoM3 $80,000 $320,000 $470,000 $1,490,000
UoM4 $60,000 $90,000 $380,000 $400,000
UoM5 $60,000 $290,000 $330,000 $1,370,000
Table 4.27: California earthquake UoM loss estimates.
Frequency λ = 0.05
Severity Level Low Medium High
Probability (p1,j) 0.5 0.4 0.1
Parameter µ σ µ σ µ σ
UoM1 11.51 1.63 13.12 1.03 13.82 1.03
UoM2 11.70 0.52 13.29 1.09 13.97 1.10
UoM3 11.98 1.93 13.58 0.26 14.27 0.25
UoM4 11.78 1.19 11.85 2.85 12.58 2.80
UoM5 11.61 1.80 13.37 1.23 14.05 1.24
UoM6 11.00 2.28 13.22 1.44 13.91 1.43
UoM7 11.41 1.73 12.58 2.39 13.29 2.36
UoM8 11.61 2.06 12.97 1.53 13.66 1.53
UoM9 12.25 1.06 13.22 0.18 13.92 0.16
UoM10 12.15 1.21 13.88 0.21 14.57 0.21
Table 4.28: New York flood UoM parameter estimates.
At this point, we have all the information we need to run the Monte Carlo simu-
lation. The method by which we achieve this listed below.
1. Each scenario (flood or earthquake) once it occurs, will impart a unique loss in
each effected UoM.
2. The Monte Carlo loop is performed multiple times creating a unique distribution
of losses for each UoM.
3. A VaR at the 99.9 percentile is taken from the corresponding loss distribution
for each individual UoM. Again, the 99.9 quantile needs to be adjusted to be
taken over only those realizations that were non-zero. The VaR representing a
high quantile aggregate loss due to the scenario is obtained from the aggregate
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Frequency λ = 0.0333
Severity Level Low High
Probability (p2,j) 0.6 0.4
Parameter µ σ µ σ
UoM1 10.82 1.63 12.61 1.26
UoM2 11.00 1.54 12.77 1.19
UoM3 11.29 2.06 13.06 1.71
UoM4 11.00 0.60 12.85 0.080
UoM5 11.00 2.34 12.71 2.11
Table 4.29: California earthquake UoM parameter estimates.
loss distribution corresponding to the multivariate probability density (obtained
from convolution in the independent case).
n =100,000
Scenario 1: New York flood VaR 99.9
UoM1 $5,829,676
UoM2 $7,551,260
UoM3 $2,522,637
UoM4 $51,138,068
UoM5 $10,862,853
UoM6 $14,184,212
UoM7 $50,407,975
UoM8 $13,094,804
UoM9 $1,484,313
UoM10 $3,063,496
(a) New York UoM VaR
n =100,000
Scenario 2: California earthquake VaR 99.9
UoM1 $2,181,451
UoM2 $2,203,969
UoM3 $7,357,474
UoM4 $429,267
UoM5 $8,775,085
(b) California UoM VaR
Table 4.30: Individual UoM VaR.
Having run our Monte Carlo simulation, we produce the results in Table 4.30. During
our simulation, we had independent random draws from each loss distribution across
each affected UoM. In order to compute the aggregate VaR, we took the VaR of
the corresponding aggregate loss distribution. That is, after simulation we obtained
a unique loss distribution for each UoM that may be associated with a PDF fi(x).
Since the UoMs were assumed to be independent, the PDF of the aggregate loss was
given by the convolution of the impacted PDFs and stated in Osgood (2007) [99] as
fagg(x) = f1 ∗ f2 ∗ . . . ∗ fk. (4.12)
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The VaR was then found by inverting the CDF at the associated quantile q and given
as F−1agg(q). In that sense, if a flood was to occur in New York, the aggregate loss to
the effected parts of the bank would be $121,489,665. If an earthquake was to occur in
California, the aggregate loss to the effected parts of the bank would be $17,198,999.
We pause to highlight an important point. It is widely beneficial of having an es-
timated numeric value due to the possibility of catastrophic scenarios. We explore
the concept of risk transfer and for the potential of offsetting risk using insurance.
Pointing to Basel II (2006) [19], we refer to paragraph 677 under the section of risk
mitigation for operational risk which says that a bank will be allowed to recognize the
risk mitigating impact of insurance in the measurement of operational risk used for
regulatory minimum capital requirements. The recognition of which would be limited
to 20% of the total operational risk capital charge under AMA.
By narrowing down the potential list of disasters and also by focusing on the quan-
tified impact, an appropriate insurance policy could be purchased to realize a capital
savings. Importantly, there is a transparency in the modeling that allows for senior
management and independent regulators the ability to judge adequacy and appro-
priateness of insurance coverage. From Ames et al (2015) [3] we learn that no US
bank has successfully claimed any credit for regulatory capital relief due to insurance.
However by contrast, several European banks have successfully achieved capital relief
from insurance, but not the full 20%. Thus providing a mechanism as we have done
could change this behaviour.
4.7 Scenario Integration Application
Before we continue onto the discussion of deciding what to do with the aggregate
capital value, we point that this catastrophic scenario could be integrated into the
AMA model by one of the many scenario integration methods as a point estimate
or probability distribution. That is, for a particular UoM, the catastrophic scenario
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could be just one of the many scenarios developed for the cell. The caveat would be
that this scenario is not stand-alone in that other UoMs would be effected simulta-
neously resulting from the same catastrophic loss.
For example, consider a two UoM banking universe where for UoM1, we have five
scenarios developed specifically for the UoM and a sixth scenario which was a catas-
trophic scenario that was developed in conjunction with UoM2. For UoM2, we con-
sider two stand-alone scenarios and a third scenario that was a catastrophic scenario
developed in reference to UoM1. While we could take the sixth scenario in the first
case, combine it with the third scenario in the second case and look at the aggregate
risk, we could simply leave them subject to scenario integration techniques on a cell-
by-cell basis. We refer the reader to Dutta and Babbel (2013) [57] where an example
is shown in the change of measure context where for a particular UoM, 16 scenarios
were developed. The change of measure approach is also amendable to incorporate
multiple scenarios for a single UoM.
Referring back to our convolution technique from the previous chapter, we operated
under the context of having a unique loss distribution characterizing each scenario.
Hence, looking at this enterprise-scenario framework, we may include a catastrophic
scenario on a cell level by again performing the convolution. Thus we believe the
unique application of the convolution scenario integration technique in the enterprise-
wide scenario framework is an added extension that has not been covered before.
4.8 Capital Allocation
This last section views the catastrophic scenario as a stand-alone element subject
to insurance offset or other risk mitigating strategies. Then it would be of interest
to see the effect on the enterprise and also each contributing UoM. Hence as a final
step to the formalization, quantification and solution to this problem, we investigate
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the effects of capital allocation. Capital allocation could be used as a mechanism to
incentivize better risk management or if not possible, at least highlight vulnerabili-
ties/weaknesses in an organization.
In this section, we adopt the convention that we have a collection of risks X =
X1, X2, . . . , Xn where each Xi is an independent random variable that is distributed
according to a continuous probability distribution and hence uniquely defines the
loss profile for each ith UoM. Whereas before in (2.10) Xi was an individual severity,
for ease when talking about capital allocation and associated risk measures, sim-
ply referring to aggregate X instead of S is more common. Now having adopted
a risk measure ρ[·] and having this collection of risks X = X1, X2, . . . , Xn, we may
determine risk capital for each UoM as ρi = ρ[Xi]. Since we are concerned with
aggregate risk for the enterprise, we may combine them to determine total capital as
ρ[X1 + X2 + . . . + Xn] ≤ ρ[X1] + ρ[X2] + . . . + ρn[Xn], then we have subadditivity.
When aggregate capital is calculated using ρ[·], the natural question arises as to how
much risk does the ith UoM contributes to the total capital and hence how much
should be allocated to it?
In general, allocation of capital into risk cells is done is such a way that
ρ[X] =
n∑
i=1
Πi, (4.13)
where Πi denotes the capital allocated to the i
th UoM. To formalize this, we define
the principle below and introduce a popular method as listed in Cruz et al (2015) [47].
Definition 4.8.1. (Allocation principle) An allocation principle is a mapping of a col-
lection of risks Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n into unique allocations Πi = Πi[X1, X2, . . . , Xn], i =
1, 2, . . . , n such that ρ[X] =
∑n
i=1 Πi.
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A popular way to allocate capital is based on marginal risk contribution and given as
ρmargi = ρ[X]− ρ[X −Xi], (4.14)
which is the aggregate risk minus the aggregate risk without cell i. According to
Tasche (2008) [108]
n∑
i=1
ρmargi ≤ ρ[X], (4.15)
and hence to ensure that allocated capital sums to ρ[X], we may have
Πmargi =
ρmargi∑J
j=1 ρ
marg
j
ρ[X]. (4.16)
Thus the allocation principle will be satisfied as ρ[X] = Πmarg1 +Π
marg
2 +. . .+Π
marg
n . We
will explore various capital allocation principles in greater detail in the next chapter.
Hence for now, applying the marginal risk contribution method to our example we
obtain the following allocation in Table 4.31.
n =100,000
Scenario 1: New York flood Allocated capital
UoM1 $2,401,784
UoM2 $2,009,652
UoM3 $1,667,319
UoM4 $5,2287,804
UoM5 $1,478,391
UoM6 $2,891,061
UoM7 $5,2141,388
UoM8 $4,078,614
UoM9 $963,932
UoM10 $1,569,720
Total $121,489,665
(a) New York allocation
n =100,000
Scenario 2: California earthquake Allocated capital
UoM1 $889,057
UoM2 $1,006,604
UoM3 $7,028,155
UoM4 $274,154
UoM5 $8,001,029
Total $17,198,999
(b) California allocation
Table 4.31: Capital allocated per UoM.
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4.9 Summary
In this chapter we explored the idea of catastrophic scenarios effecting the multiple
business lines simultaneously. The idea of an enterprise-wide scenario was a departure
from the typical scenario formulation that has traditionally been focused on a single
cell level. In order to work with such scenarios, we segregated the frequency estimation
of the event to disaster planning experts that normally would be external to the bank.
We explored a specialized case of an empirical California earthquake study that fit
into the AMA framework and leveraged the work of scientists to better predict the
occurrence of an earthquake. Next, we relied on banking experts to quantify the loss
conditional on the intensity of scenario and the specific business line for which they
work in. We generalized the framework and worked through a hypothetical example.
A connection was made with the previous chapter whereby the scenario could also
be subject to convolution integration on a granular level. We concluded by looking
at the aggregate risk and determined one method to allocate capital to the effected
UoMs.
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5 Optimal Capital Allocation to Sub-portfolios with
Dependency
5.1 Overview
As we have seen thus far the complex set of operations to precisely quantify risk
commensurate with the activities a bank undertakes is a daunting task in of itself.
While we have focused on operational risk and the concept of UoMs, we may broaden
our scope into market risk activities where individual trading desks require precise
risk quantification that are diversified and rolled-up to an aggregate market risk. Al-
ternatively from a credit risk perspective, individual loans/mortgages or even pools
of exposures are aggregated and diversified to form an aggregated credit risk. Hence
to be explicit, we draw the similarities in that varied risky activities take place on
a segmented level across all market, credit and operational risk types and then are
naturally thought-of in an aggregate basis. While much attention of advanced quan-
titative modeling techniques have been discussed and used to reach the top of the
mountain (so to speak), the problem of coming back down and reallocating the risk
to the contributing sub-portfolios is an equally important discussion that needs to be
had. As articulated by Denault (2001) [53], the partitioning problem arises when there
is an offsetting in the form of a diversification effect observed in the measurement of
financial portfolios. The allocation problem is thus to apportion the diversification
advantage in such a way that each portfolio is treated in a fair manner. The benefit
of conducting such an exercise is that it allows for comparisons to take place. That is,
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knowing the profit/loss generated and the risk taken by the sub-portfolios of a bank
allows for a much more relevant comparison than knowing just the profit/loss. This
concept is conveyed by the term risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC).
In James (1996) [77] we learn of the RAROC system developed by Bank of America
along with the economic rational for allocating capital in a diversified organization.
The view was adopted that the capital budgeting process was a useful exercise be-
cause it suggested that a businesses’ contribution to the overall variability of the cash
flows of the bank was an important factor in evaluating the risk of (and therefore
the capital allocated to) a specific business unit. A useful tool of RAROC is that
the platform may be used for both capital budgeting and management compensation.
Said concisely, James (1996) [77] stipulates that RAROC systems allocate capital for
two basic reasons: (i) risk management and (ii) performance evaluation. Thus, we see
the direct application in an operational risk management setting where the overriding
goal of conducting the exercise to allocate capital would be to determine the optimal
capital structure for each business unit commensurate with the risk. Loosely, we
proceed to develop the case that the process involves estimating how much volatility
each business unit contributes to the total risk of the bank and thus the aggregate
capital requirement.
Another point may be made here with respect the difference between regulatory capi-
tal and economic capital. On the one hand, regulatory capital represents a mandatory
capital requirement imposed by regulators for which top-of-the-house adequacy is of
greater importance. The sufficiency of capital is thus important under the Pillar I and
Pillar III construct as seen in BCBS (2006) [19] and BCBS (2011) [24]. The three Pil-
lar framework was introduced in Section 2.1. For economic capital which is calculated
with the intent to assess capital reasonability of a worst-case scenario, the output is
used to directly allocate the cost of maintaining a desired capital structure. Thus
this ties into a Pillar II requirement and from a bank’s perspective, will always be an
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important aspect of internal risk management. Thus added research is required in the
allocation of operational risk capital and this is chapter explores possible applications.
While we have focused on the VaR risk measure and the regulatory-prescribed sum
or both expected and unexpected losses that is required to be capitalized, we may
approach the subject from a generic risk measure perspective. The literature tends
to follow the same path. Later on however, we will concern ourselves with a special
case when we are just concerned with the expected loss and the capital required to
offset those losses that are to be expected. The active, day-to-day oversight into cap-
ital used to offset expected loss is immediately of great importance for regulation of
internal risk taking activities.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 covers a literature re-
view of methodologies used to partition aggregate capital to sub-portfolios. Section
5.3 introduces a risk measure defined in terms of shortfall risk and shows the convex
optimization problem that seeks to minimize capital allocated to sub-portfolios. The
formulation and subsequent analysis is heavily motivated by Armenti et al (2015) [7].
Section 5.4 replicates results from Armenti et al (2015) [7] and establishes a path
to follow for an extension. Section 5.5 provides an application of the already devel-
oped theory to an empirical data set but seen in a new context. Section 5.6 takes
the work by Armenti et al (2015) [7], which includes inter-dependent (systemic) risk
between sub-portfolios through a specialized loss function, and extends the problem
by allowing for a diverse set of dependencies through the use of copulas. The exten-
sion allows for highly customizable stress testing capabilities. The output on optimal
sub-portfolio capital requirements is analyzed and discussed. Section 5.7 summarizes
the work.
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5.2 Literature Review
A thorough treatment of a wide variety of capital allocation techniques is covered
in Urban et al (2004) [110]. The context is that from the insurance industry where
risk capital is held to assure policyholders that claims can be paid in the event that
claims are larger than expected. A useful takeaway from the paper is that insolvency
concerns a company as a whole and while bankruptcy is not defined on sub-portfolios
of the insurer, it is useful to think of risk capital as being allocated to different busi-
ness units or sub-portfolios. Urban et al (2004) [110] is a good starting point in that
a linkage is drawn between the choice or risk measure and the allocation methodol-
ogy. Within the paper five risk measures were defined and five allocation methods
introduced leading to 25 allocation principles. We define the nuances that must be
introduced in an insurance context but soon realize that the problem, once formu-
lated, is applicable in different settings.
The claims for the next period (usually one year) of the different positions of an
insurance portfolio were represented by random variables S1, S2, . . . , Sn. Under the
assumption that cost, commission and interest of risk capital were paid in advance,
the premiums were understood to be equal to E[S1], E[S2], . . . , E[Sn]. Future income
for each claim was represented by Xi = E[Si]− Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , n where the problem
was to take a quantified risk capital and allocate it in a fair way to the different
positions of the portfolio. Again, a risk measure ρ was defined as a mapping
ρ : L→ R, (5.1)
where L was a set of real-valued random variables defined on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P). The same discussion of coherence of a risk measure still applied as seen
previously in Definition 2.4.2. The paper was concerned with centered random vari-
ables Xi, i.e. the restriction of the space L to the space L
0, which consists of all
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real-valued centered random variables. With the added clarification that for a ran-
dom variable X and α ∈ (0, 1), the upper α-quantile was denoted by Qα(X) =
sup{x ∈ R | P [X ≤ x] ≤ α} and for x ∈ R, x+ = max(x, 0) and x− = (−x)+, the
following five risk measures were defined:
1. Variance: ρvar(X) = var[X] = E[X
2]− (E[X])2,
2. Standard deviation: ρsd(X) = σ[X] =
√
var[X],
3. Semi-variance: ρsvar = E[
(
(X − E[X])−
)2
],
4. Value-at-Risk(VaR): ρV aR(α)(X) = −Qα(X),
5. Expected shortfall(ES):
ρES(α)(X) = − 1α
(
E[X1{X≤Qα(X)}] +Qα(X)(α− P [X ≤ Qα(X)])
)
.
To provide some context, ρvar and ρsd are common risk measures used in statistics
and insurance pricing and portfolio optimization. Semi-variance (ρsvar) is a down-
ward risk measure in that only events below a certain target value are considered
as risky. The consideration of the expectation as the target value for ρsvar will suit
our analysis later on in that we will be concerned with the expected value. In this
paper, the expectation results in ρsvar = E(X−)2 since we are dealing with centered
random variables. Finally, we have already seen ρV aR(α) and ρES(α) in (2.16) and
(2.17) respectively where the later is still the average in the tail of the distribution.
For a random variable with continuous distribution function, the second term is zero.
To provide a wider array of allocation methodologies, Urban et al (2004) [110] ac-
counts for the size of a portfolio position. This arises from the necessity that small
risk capital may be considered to represent a less risky position compared to a po-
sition that has assigned high risk capital. Hence the idea is to scale each port-
folio position by its size and thus allocate risk capital to each portfolio on a per
unit basis. The random vector X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) of incomes is scaled by size
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λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) to yield X =
(
X1(λ1), X2(λ2), . . . , Xn(λn)
)
where the aggregate
loss is given by Z = X1(λ1) + X2(λ2) + . . . + Xn(λn). For example, the size may be
determined by the premium volumes which could be seen as an exogenous parameter.
Hence it is then possible to scale each portfolio position by a size metric which allows
for the allocation of capital to each portfolio position per unit premium.
Using this foundation, we may expand upon Definition 4.8.1 and focus the discussion
on the set R of risk measures for centered random variables. Then we may define a
capital allocation methodology Φ as a mapping
Φ : R× (L0)n → Rn, (ρ,X1, X2, . . . , Xn)→
( Φ1(ρ,X1, X2, . . . , Xn)
...
Φn(ρ,X1, X2, . . . , Xn)
)
, (5.2)
where
∑n
i=1 Φi = 1 and Φi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Thus Φi are viewed as allocation
coefficients that partitions risk capital K. Under this expanded scope of portfolios
scaled with size, Urban et al (2004) [110] introduces five allocation methods that lead
to their respective coefficients.
Definition 5.2.1. (Allocation coefficients) Define Z : Rn → L0 with Z(λ) = ∑ni=1Xi(λi)
and ρ a risk measure whose partial derivative with respect to λi exist for all i ∈ N .
We define various allocation coefficients for i ∈ N :
1. Proportional: Φp,ρi =
ρ(Xi)∑
j∈N ρ(Xj)
,
2. Merton and Perold: ΦMP,ρi =
ρ(Z)−ρ(Z−Xi)∑
j∈N [ρ(Z)−ρ(Z−Xj)] ,
3. Myers and Read: ΦMR,ρi =
∂ρ(Z(λ))
∂λi
/
∑n
j=1
∂ρ(Z(λ))
∂λj
,
4. Shapely: ΦS,ρi =
1
ρ(Z)
∑
S⊆N
(|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!
n!
(
ρ(
∑
j∈S Xj)− ρ(
∑
j∈S\{i}Xj)
)
,
5. Aumann and Shapely: ΦAS,ρi =
λi
ρ(Z(λ))
∫ 1
0
∂ρ(Z(tλ))
∂λi
dt.
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The proportional method is by far the most straightforward which is just the indi-
vidual contribution compared to the total. The Merton and Perold (1993) [90] and
Myers and Read (2001) [93] allocation methods are based on the option pricing model
of a firm where risk is measured by the price of an insolvency put option. The put
option is the loss to policyholders given that the insurer defaults. The Merton and
Perold method is simply the marginal risk capital whereby the risk capital required
for the firm without a business is subtracted from the risk capital required for the
full portfolio and placed over the total marginal impacts. Within Myers and Read
(2001) [93], the context is taken from insurance companies and the paper shows how
option pricing methods can be used to allocate required capital across lines of insur-
ance. Within the insurance business, capital is referred to as surplus. The allocation
method depends on the marginal contribution of each insurance line to default value.
That is, the present value of the company’s option to default. Also, the marginal de-
fault values add up to the total default value hence the capital allocation are unique
and not arbitrary. The benefit of the uniqueness of the solution is that if insurance
companies have surplus allocations that are wrong, then in a competitive setting,
allocation errors may lead firms to write unprofitable businesses and lose profitable
businesses to the market. The derivation of the allocation method proceeds by a gen-
eral expression for marginal default values and obtained by taking derivatives with
respect to line-by-line liabilities. The paper shows a general formalization where there
is no assumption about the joint probability distribution of line-by-line losses and re-
turn of the company’s portfolio of assets. The second formulation walks through an
example in which the probability distribution of losses and asset values are joint Log-
normal and again derives the formula for marginal default values by line of business.
Shapley (1953) [105] and the Aumann and Shapley (1974) [11] method arise from
co-operative games in a game theoretic context, the latter of which will be explored
a bit more later as it is a commonly used method. The first of these methods has the
risk measure ρ denoting the worth of the coalition or rather the total expected sum
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of payoffs the members (denoted by S) can obtain by cooperation. Thus for brevity,
according to the Shapley value, the amount that player i receives given a coalitional
game with value ρ and set N with n players (ρ,N) is given by ΦS,ρi . The sum extends
over all subsets S of N not containing player i. The formula can be interpreted as
imagining the coalition being formed by one player at a time, with each player de-
manding their contribution
(
ρ(
∑
j∈S Xj) − ρ(
∑
j∈S\{i}Xj)
)
as a fair compensation,
and then for each player to take the average of this contribution over the possible dif-
ferent permutations in which the coalition can be formed. The Aumann and Shapley
(1974) [11] method is the most commonly used method and is often referred to as the
Euler method. The allocation can be summarized as the average of the marginal cost
of the ith-portfolio as the level of activity increases uniformly for all portfolios.
Returning back to the discussion in Urban et al (2004) [110], the paper is again
of the utmost importance because it takes the various risk measures and risk alloca-
tions and proceeds via an example. Seven different claim distributions represented by
random variables Si, i = 1, . . . , 7 were specified. Again, this structure can be seen as a
seven sub-portfolio structure with each sub-portfolio having a unique loss profile. The
first four claims were characterized by a compound Poisson model with Pareto claim
sizes (similar to the LDA approach). Hence, the parameters produced were based
on realistic calibrations to business data: (i) storm, (ii) earthquake, (iii) engineering
(major loss) and (iv) fire (major loss) events. The last three claims were modeled
via a Lognormal distribution (representing the loss distribution with no preliminary
specified compound process) and characterized as (v) general liability (basic losses),
(vi) engineering (basic losses) and (vii) fire (basic losses). While the losses were as-
sumed to be independent, the basic losses (last three claims) were assumed to have a
dependency. The dependency was a Gaussian copula with pairwise rank correlation
0.14. Hence having specified loss distributions, tables of allocation coefficients for the
proportional, Merton and Perold, and Shapley method could be computed for each of
the five risk measures. The Myers and Read and Aumann and Shapley methods were
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not computed because of the instability of the derivative approximations for small
∆. As well, in the final section of the paper when interpreting results, it was found
that under certain combinations for certain claims, expecting that pairwise positively
correlated processes should always yield higher allocation coefficients did not always
hold. As we will see later on, this type of analysis with dependency and resulting
capital allocation will form the extension from Armenti et al (2015) [7].
As promised, the most popular capital allocation method of Aumann and Shapley will
be discussed further. Much like the work by Artzner et al (1999) [9] which took an
axiomatic approach to defining what properties a “good” risk measure should have,
Denault (2001) [53] follows the same approach to define what “good” properties an
allocation principle should have. Denault provides an axiomatic description of what
an allocation principle should follow, labels this as a coherent allocation and then
shows that the Aumann and Shapley value is both coherent and a practical alloca-
tion method. As an aside, Kalkbrener (2005) [80] also takes an axiomatic approach
to capital allocation and builds upon the theory to include discussions on complete-
ness, existence and allocation formulae for particular classes of risk measures. Before
reproducing the properties for a coherent allocation from Denault (2001) [53], for
completeness we introduce some terminology: N represents the set of all portfolios of
the firm, A is the set of risk capital allocation problems where pairs (N, ρ) are com-
posed of a set of n portfolios and a coherent risk measure ρ. The mapping Π : A→ Rn
is the allocation principle that maps each allocation problem (N, ρ) into a unique al-
location. Finally, K = ρ(x) represents the risk capital of the firm. Then the following
definitions follow.
Definition 5.2.2. (Coherent Allocation Principle) An allocation principle Π is co-
herent if for every allocation problem (N, ρ) with N , the allocation Π(N, ρ) satisfies
the three properties:
• No undercut: ∀ M ⊆ N, ∑i∈M Ki ≤ ρ(∑i∈M Xi),
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• Symmetry: If by joining any subset M ⊆ N \{i, j}, portfolios i and j both make
the same contribution to the risk capital, then Ki = Kj,
• Riskless allocation: Kn = ρ(αrf ) = −α where the nth portfolio is a riskless
instrument.
Formally this does not rule out negative allocations where if there is a requirement
for Ki ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N , then this is referred to as a non-negative coherent allocation. The
interpretation of the above is as follows. The no undercut properties rules out the case
when an undercut occurs which results when a portfolio’s allocation is higher than
the amount of risk capital it would face as a separate entity separate from the bank.
So if a portfolio joins the bank, the total risk capital increases by no more than the
portfolio’s own risk capital. Hence the portfolio can not justifiably be allocated more
risk capital than it could possibly have brought to the bank. The symmetry property
ensures that a portfolio’s allocation depends only on its contribution to risk within
the bank. The riskless property indicates that a portfolio should be allocated exactly
its risk measure. Thus a portfolio that increases its cash offset should see its allocated
capital decrease by the same amount. This can be seen from the translation invari-
ance property where for all α ∈ R and random variable X, ρ(X + αrf ) = ρ(X) − α
where rf is the price, at some point in the future, of a reference, riskless investment
whose price is 1 today.
The remaining paper continues on casting the problem in a game theoretic frame-
work where the capital allocation problem is modeled as a game between portfolios.
The notion is extended to fuzzy games (here fuzzy implies divisibility of players and
hence the allowance for fractional players) and thus the optimal allocation principle
is the Aumann-Shapley value (Euler allocation) which results in a coherent allocation
methodology. In a game setting framework, portfolios are akin to players and a risk
measure is akin to a cost function.
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Definition 5.2.3. (Coalitional game) A coalitional game with fractional players (N,Λ, r)
consists of
• a finite set N of players with |N | = n,
• a positive vector Λ ∈ Rn+, each component representing for one of the n players
involvement,
• a real-valued cost function r : Rn → R, r : λ→ r(λ) such that r(0) = 0.
Hence the ratio λi
Λi
denotes an activity level for player i. The random variable Xi
represents the net worth of the portfolio i at a future time T . Then the cost function
r is identified with the risk measure ρ through
r(λ) = ρ
(∑
i∈N
λi
Λi
Xi
)
, (5.3)
so that r(Λ) = ρ(N). Thus Xi
Λi
represents the per-unit future net worth of portfolio
i. Introducing a vector k ∈ Rn to represent the per unit allocation of risk capital to
each portfolio, the total capital allocated to each portfolio is obtained by Λk = K
componentwise. As one final terminology introduction, we call f a k−homogeneous
function, i.e. f(γx) = γkf(x), then ∂f(x)
∂xi
is (k − 1)− homogeneous. Thus the stated
optimal Aumann-Shapley allocation result is given by
kASi =
∫ 1
0
∂r
∂λi
(γΛ)dγ, (5.4)
for player i of N . The per-unit cost kASi is thus the average of the marginal costs
of the ith-portfolio, as the level of activity increases uniformly for all portfolios. As
our cost function is r 1-homogeneous
(
r(γλ) = γr(λ)
)
, we simply write ∂r
∂λi
(Λ). Thus
Aumann-Shapley prices are traditionally referred to as
kKS = ∇r(Λ). (5.5)
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Our intent is not to go through the full derivation. However, one added clarification is
that this method is also commonly referred to as Euler’s allocation because of Euler’s
theorem which states that if F is a real, n−valued homogeneous function of degree
k, then x1
∂F (x)
∂x1
+ x2
∂F (x)
∂x2
+ . . .+ xn
∂F (x)
∂xn
= kF (x).
While aspects of the Euler method has been discussed separately in many differ-
ent papers, a comprehensive overview of the method has been covered in Tasche
(2008) [108]. The presentation of the method reinforces that the technique may be
applied to any risk measure that is homogenous of degree one and differentiable in
an appropriate sense. Moreover, it is stated the Euler’s method is well-suited as a
tool for the detection of risk concentrations and the treatment goes as far as defin-
ing a marginal diversification index. In addition, Tasche (2008) [108] summarizes six
ways at which different authours discuss and critique the Euler method. In terms of
application, formulae that are needed to calculate Euler contributions were also intro-
duced for standard deviation, VaR, and ES risk measures. In a specialized example,
a new approach was also introduced that identified the contributions of underlying
names to expected losses of collateralized debt obligation (CDO) tranches using the
Euler method. In a final application of the Euler method, non-linear risk impacts on
portfolio-wide risks were further analyzed by virtue of a toy portfolio using a set of
factors.
As we have seen, the Euler method is a versatile tool in the discussion of capital
allocation. If we allow to further expand our universe to include a new notion of a
convex measure of risk, this opens up the discussion to a new problem of solving for
a concept called the bounded shortfall risk which is in essence an optimization prob-
lem. This idea was developed in depth in the seminal paper by Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2002) [69]. Actually, Dhaene et al (2003) [55] also discuss risk measures based on
convex functions and formulate the similar optimization to be solved but do so in a
less rigorous manner. As we will need to fully develop the notation and theory in
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the next section, we briefly describe the necessary ingredients and their contribution
to the optimization problem. We start by assuming we have a financial position X
which represents the discounted net worth at the end of a given period. We then
apply a convex loss function (to be defined later which overweighes losses) of X. This
ensures we have a certain form which allows for the determination of the optimal
amount of capital. This is done in such a way that the expected loss is bounded.
The convexity allows us to use the theory of convex analysis in that local minimums
are actually a global minimums. The shortfall risk is defined as the expectation risk
measure applied to the convex loss function on the value X. The bounded condition
is an imposed condition to ensure that the risk is not exceeded by some fixed value.
This problem has been extended by Armenti et al (2015) [7] to solve the multivari-
ate shortfall risk and hence can be viewed as a multivariate extension of Fo¨llmer
and Schied (2002) [69]. However, the extension goes further to include systemic risk
among different portfolios and continues to solve a modified optimization problem
under different loss functions. Our work will further build on the systemic risk com-
ponent and hence extend the concept further.
As a final note on the coverage of capital allocation, we stay away from the dis-
cussion on the dynamic and multi-period problems of capital allocation. That is,
Cheridito et al (2006) [41] study dynamic monetary risk measures that depend on
bounded discrete-time processes of financial values. The paper shows in a very techni-
cal manner how time-consistent dynamic risk measures can be constructed by pasting
together one-period risk measures. It points out the obvious limitation of Fo¨llmer
and Schied (2002) [69] where the setting is static in the sense that the risk of financial
values are only measured at the beginning of the time-period and an allocation is
made. In the multi-period setting, cash-flow streams or financial processes model the
evolution of financial values and risk measurements can be updated as new informa-
tion becomes available over time. An extension is further made by Cherny (2009) [43]
in that the discrete-time coherent risk measure is extended to included unbounded
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processes.
5.3 Shortfall Risk Allocation
In this section, we introduce the necessary terminology and background needed to
solve our impending capital optimization problem. The necessary material will be re-
produced from Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) [69] and where the multivariate extension
is necessary, the material will be reproduced from Armenti et al (2015) [7]. We do
not claim any originality when reproducing the necessary background. However, we
will annotate and summarize concepts in order to facilitate a simpler interpretation
where needed.
We start with the inherent interest in a quantitative assessment of the risk attributed
to a financial position. In a univariate setting, we may describe the position as the
discounted net worth at the end of a give period which is represented by a real-valued
function X on some set Ω of possible scenarios. That is, X : Ω → R where X(ω) is
the net worth if scenario ω ∈ Ω is realized. Then the measure of risk is given by the
mapping ρ from a certain space X of functions on Ω to R. Actually, the risk ρ(X)
of the financial position X can be thought of as the minimal amount of capital that
should be added to the position in order to make that position acceptable. We have
seen in Artzner et al (1999) [9] the properties for a coherent measure of risk. This
was introduced previously in Definition 2.4.2 where we had translation invariance,
monotonicity, subadditivity and positive homogeneity. A coherent measure of risk ρ
arises from a family Q of probability measures on Ω by computing the expected loss
under Q ∈ Q and then taking the worst results as Q varies over Q
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈Q
EQ[−X]. (5.6)
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Having established the risk measure, we account for the case where the risk of a
position might increase in a nonlinear way with the size of a position. The example
provided is a liquidity shock that may arise if a position is multiplied by a large factor.
Thus, the coherent risk measure properties of subadditivity and positive homogeneity
may be relaxed and instead get substituted by the weaker property of convexity
ρ
(
λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(Y ) λ ∈ [0, 1]. (5.7)
The convexity property implies that diversification does not increase risk and is less
than or equal to the linear weighted average of the individual risks.
Extending the concept of a convex risk measure, a representation theorem can be
made. That is, sets of acceptable positions can be shown to be isomorphic to a
convex risk measure. This notion has been fully developed in Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2002) [69] in section 2 of the paper. To start things off, we may define such sets.
Definition 5.3.1. (Acceptance set) Let X be a linear space of functions on a given set
Ω of possible scenarios. Assume X contains all constant functions. Any risk measure
ρ : X → R induces an acceptance set Aρ defined as
Aρ := {X ∈ X | ρ(X) ≤ 0}. (5.8)
Conversely the way to go back is that for a given class A of acceptable positions, the
associated risk measure ρA is defined as
ρA(X) := inf{m ∈ R | m+X ∈ A}. (5.9)
With this relation in hand, we can now state the representation theorem for convex
measures of risk. We first consider the special case in which X is the space of all
real-valued functions on some finite set Ω.
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Theorem 5.3.1. Suppose X is the space of all real-valued functions on a finite set
Ω. Then ρ : X → R is a convex measure of risk if and only if there exists a penalty
function α : P → (−∞,∞] such that
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈P
(
EQ[−X]− α(Q)
)
. (5.10)
The function α satisfies α(Q) ≥ −ρ(0) for any Q ∈ P, and it can be taken to be
convex and lower semicontinuous on P.
For the proof, see Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) [69]. As we will see, this problem admits
a dual representation as is possible in convex optimization problems. We will state
this in a theorem later on.
5.3.1 Risk Measures Represented as Shortfall Risk
In order to facilitate a solution to (5.6), we resort to not just loss of X but convex
representations of X. Suppose that ` : R → R is an increasing convex loss function
which is not identically constant. For a position X ∈ L∞(Ω,F ,P) we introduce the
expected loss
EP [`(−X)], (5.11)
and refer to this as shortfall risk. Note that we constrain ourselves to the practical
application where X is given by the space L∞(Ω,F ,P) of bounded functions on a
general probability space. At this stage, we may fix a point c in the range of ` (or
rather c > inf `) and define the acceptance set. That is, a position X ∈ L∞(Ω,F ,P)
is acceptable if the expected loss is bounded by the threshold c and denoted by
A := {X ∈ L∞(Ω,F ,P) | EP [`(−X)] ≤ c}. (5.12)
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The set A is thus convex and the convex risk measure corresponding to A is ρ := ρA.
The corresponding minimal penalty function α0(·) can be expressed in terms of the
Fenchel-Legendre transform of ` given by
l∗(z) := sup
x∈R
(zx− `(x)). (5.13)
This is sometimes referred to as the convex conjugate. Geometrically, this means
we seek a point x on the function `(x) such that the slope of the line z passing
through
(
x, `(x)
)
has a maximum intercept on the y axis. Thus, this is the point
on the curve that has a slope z which is tangent at the point z = `′(x). Again the
transformation maps the (x, `(x)) space to the space of slope and conjugate
(
z, `∗(z)
)
.
Finally, the main result of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) [69] is given by the follow-
ing theorem, the proof of which is very lengthy and we choose to omit. It showcases
the dual problem and the optimization problem.
Theorem 5.3.2. Suppose that A is the acceptance set given by (5.12). Then, for
Q P , the minimal penalty function of ρ = ρA is given by
α0(Q) = sup
X∈A
EQ[−X] = inf
λ>0
1
λ
(
c+ EP
[
`∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)])
. (5.14)
This theorem thus states that the infimum over all allocation used for defining ρ(X)
is real valued and has the desired properties of a risk measure. The questions of
existence and uniqueness are covered in the multivariate setting.
5.3.2 Multivariate Shortfall Risk Allocation with Systemic
Risk
While the seminal paper by Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) [69] laid the foundational
work for the convex measure of risk and the notion of shortfall risk, Armenti et al
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(2015) [7] extends and presents the concepts while focusing on two main issues rele-
vant for systemic risk: (i) the computation of an overall reverse level for a financial
network to overcome unexpected stress or default and (ii) the reserve allocation to
different sub-portfolios according to their systemic involvement. The structure of the
presentation had four main goals: (i) develop a class of systemic risk measures, (ii)
assess the impact of the dependence structure of the system on risk allocation, (iii)
analyze the sensitivity of the allocation with respect to exogenous shocks and (iv) test
efficient numerical schemes. The applied nature of the problem and the treatment of
the topic gave an intuitive sense of the wide applicability for further investigation.
We may envision a bank, for instance, for real time monitoring purposes wanting
to channel to each trading desk a cost reflecting its responsibility in the overall cap-
ital requirement. A central clearing counterparty (CCP), also known as a clearing
house, is interested in quantifying the size of the so-called default fund and allocating
it in a meaningful way among the different clearing members. The importance of the
CCP has drawn a lot of attention since the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. The
CCP interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more fi-
nancial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and
thereby ensuring the future performance of open contracts. A CCP becomes coun-
terparty to trades with market participants through novation, an open offer system,
or another legally binding arrangement. The shift to using CCPs has the intended
impact to clear a lot of over the counter (OTC) derivative trading through CCPs for
the purpose of regulatory capital relief. However, non-centrally cleared contracts are
still permitted but subject to higher capital requirements. For the purposes of the
capital framework, a CCP is a financial institution.
In order to set the groundwork for a multivariate extension, we define some ba-
sic notation. Let xk denote the generic coordinate of a vector x ∈ Rd. By ≥ we
denote the lattice order on Rd, that is, x ≥ y if and only if xk ≥ yk for every
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1 ≤ k ≤ d. We denote by ‖ · ‖ the Euclidean norm and by ±,∧,∨, | · | the lat-
tice operations on Rd. For x, y ∈ Rd, we write x > y for xk > yk componentwise,
x · y = ∑xkyk, xy = (x1y1, . . . , xdyd) and x/y = (x1/y1, . . . , xd/yd).
Let (Ω,F , P ) denote a probability space, where P represents the objective proba-
bility measure, with related expectation denoted by E. We denote by L0(Rd) the
space of F -measurable d-variate random variables on this space. The space L0(Rd)
inherits the lattice structure on Rd, hence we can use the above notation in a P -
almost sure sense. For instance, for X, Y ∈ L0(Rd), we say that X ≥ Y or X > Y
if P [X > Y ] = 1, respectively. Since we mainly deal with multivariate functions or
random variables, to simplify notation we drop the references to Rd in L0(Rd), writ-
ing simply L0 unless a particular dimension is meant, mainly for L0(R) in the case of
univariate random variables.
Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ L0 represent a random vector of financial losses, that is,
negative values of Xk represent actual profits. This is different than in (5.6) where
previously we imposed a minus sign on the net positive net worth. It is just a matter
of convention that will make simulation more intuitive in that we will need to think
in terms of losses. We want to determine an overall monetary measure ρ(X) of the
risk of X as well as a sound risk allocation Πk(X), k = 1, . . . , d of ρ(X) among the d
risk factors.
As we will see, by virtue of considering a flexible class of risk measures defined by
means of loss functions and sets of acceptable monetary allocations, there are result-
ing properties that allow for the discussion on risk allocation. Inspired by the shortfall
risk measure introduced by Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) [69] in the univariate case, we
will require the use of the loss function ` defined on Rd, used to measure the expected
loss E[`(X)] of the financial loss vector X. This was introduced in (5.11) however
now we define some additional properties.
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Definition 5.3.2. (loss function) A function ` : Rd → (−∞,∞] is called a loss
function if
1. ` is increasing, that is, `(x) ≥ `(y) if x ≥ y,
2. ` is convex, lower semi-continuous and finite on some neighbourhood of 0,
3. `(0) = 0 and `(x) ≥∑xk on Rd.
A risk neutral assessment of the losses corresponds to E[
∑
Xk] =
∑
E[Xk]. This
implies that the third property expresses a form of risk aversion, whereby higher loss
are worse and weighted more than compared to a risk neutral evaluation. The first
two properties express the concept that for more losses the risk is increased and that
diversification should not increase risk. In the next example, we will see examples of
loss functions used on R and then extend them to higher dimensions. To our knowl-
edge aside from this reproduction, little emphasis has been placed on various forms
of loss functions. By introducing some interesting examples, it opens up a discussion
for numerical analysis and also highlights the potential for systemic risk derived from
the form of the loss function.
Example 5.3.1. Let h : R → (−∞,∞] be a one-dimensional loss function which is
convex, increasing, lower semi-continuous such that h(0) = 0 and h(x) ≥ x for every
x ∈ R and h(x) ≥ (x) for every x ∈ R. Classical examples of loss functions are
h(x) = βx+, β > 1, (5.15)
h(x) = x+
(x+)2
2
, (5.16)
h(x) = ex − 1. (5.17)
Referring to (5.15), recall x+ = max(x, 0) and we orient our convention such that
positive values of x are losses and hence negative values of x are profits. It is easy to
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see this is convex, increasing and even continuous. The scaling by β penalizes losses
but not as much as (5.17) by comparison. We will eventually use a variant of (5.16)
as it is related to a mean-variance penalization of the losses, is smoother than (5.15)
while being less abrupt than (5.17), hence yielding a good trade-off for optimization
routines.
Using h(x) as building blocks, we obtain the following classes of multivariate loss
functions.
`(x) = h(
∑
xk), (5.18)
`(x) =
∑
h(xk), (5.19)
`(x) = αh(
∑
xk) + (1− α)
∑
h(xk),where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (5.20)
`(x) =
∑
xk +
1
2
∑
(x+k )
2 + α
∑
j<k
x+j x
+
k ,where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (5.21)
=
∑
xk +
1− α
2
∑
(x+k )
2 +
α
2
∑
(x+k )
2. (5.22)
Armenti et al (2015) [7] uses (5.21) for investigating numerical simulation in two ways.
As we will see, if we set α = 0, we zero out the co-mingled term and just focus on
independent sub-portfolios and solve for the optimal capital allocation problem. If we
let α vary, then in essence this dictates a degree of inter-dependence. We note that in
the (5.21), the term
∑
j<k
x+j x
+
k implies that loss functions are permutation invariant.
Hence, this addresses the requirement that loss functions should not discriminate some
factors against others. Thus the loss function should be invariant under permutation
of its variables. We will show the equivalence of (5.21) and (5.22) later in a three-
portfolio case that will make working with either representation equivalent. One
other clarification that has been pointed out is that for integrability and topological
reasons, loss vectors are restricted to the following multivariate Orlicz heart
M θ = {X ∈ L0 | E[θ(λX)] <∞ ∀ λ ∈ R+}, (5.23)
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where θ(x) = `(|x|), x ∈ Rd. We will not focus on this requirement, but provide
some motivating arguments. We learn in Cheridito and Li (2009) [42] that the study
of such (−∞,∞]-valued coherent, convex and monetary risk measures on maximal
subspaces of Orlicz classes are referred to Orlicz hearts. Loosely, if a Banach space
Lp is a vector space of all measurable functions f for which ||f ||p is finite, then if
F : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is non-decreasing and convex with F (0) = 0, then an Orlicz
space LF contain measurable functions f for which ||f ||F is finite. The benefit of
restricting the analysis within the Orlicz heart is that it includes all Lp spaces for
1 ≤ p <∞ which allow for the duality theory without additional continuity assump-
tions. Focusing on the notion of acceptable sets of the dual problem, we recast (5.12)
and the notion of acceptability in Rd.
Definition 5.3.3. (Acceptable monetary allocation) A monetary allocation m ∈ Rd
is acceptable for X at the loss level c > 0 if
E[`(X −m)] ≤ c, (5.24)
and
A(X) := {m ∈ Rd : E[`(X −m)] ≤ c}, (5.25)
is the set of acceptable monetary allocations.
The link in the multivariate setting is much more intuitive. That is, given an accept-
able monetary allocation m ∈ A(X), the aggregate capital requirement (or liquidity
cost depending on the context) is
∑
mk. Hence, the smaller the requirement, the bet-
ter it is from a capital savings perspective. This then leads to the very problem we
will concern ourselves with throughout the chapter which is the multivariate shortfall
risk of X ∈M θ
ρ(X) = inf
{∑
mk : E[`(X −m)] ≤ c
}
. (5.26)
In the most simplest of terms, we aim to minimize all the mk such that the aggregate
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money m offsets the losses X in E[`(X−m)] under the penalty function `. We do this
so that we are under c dollars as required by some risk officer or regulator. For some
more context, in a centrally-cleared trading setup, each clearing member k is required
to post a default fund contribution mk in order to make the risk of the clearing house
acceptable with respect to a risk measure. The default fund contribution can be used
in the case of liquidation of any member. For the determination of the default fund
contributions, the methodology can be applied to the vector X defined as the vector
of stressed profit-and-losses of the clearing members. Hence this can also be used as
a stress testing risk management tool.
We restate the duality theorem but in the multivariate setting which aids in the
next theorem that guarantees optimal portions of mk. The theorem will be akin to
taking derivatives and solving under certain conditions.
Theorem 5.3.3. The function
ρ(X) = inf
{∑
mk : m ∈ A(X)
}
, X ∈M θ, (5.27)
is real valued, convex, monotone and translation invariant. In particular, it is con-
tinuous and sub-differentiable. It admits the dual representation
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈Qθ∗
{EQ[X]− α(Q)}, X ∈M θ, (5.28)
where Qθ∗ is the set of measures Q on the product space Ω× {1, . . . , d} with density
Y in Lθ
∗
normalized to d in the sense E[1 · dQ
dP
] = d, and where the penalty function
is given by
α(Q) = inf
λ>0
1
λ
(
c+ E
[
`∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)])
, Q ∈ Qθ∗ . (5.29)
A final restriction on the loss function helps with the existence of a risk allocation.
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Definition 5.3.4. (zero-sum allocation) A zero-sum allocation is a monetary alloca-
tion u ∈ Rd such that ∑uk = 0. Also for any zero-sum allocation u
`(0) = 0 =
∑
uk ≤ `(u). (5.30)
Definition 5.3.5. (unbiased) A loss function ` is unbiased if for every zero-sum
allocation u, `(ru) = 0 for any r > 0 implies that `(−ru) = 0 for any r > 0.
Theorem 5.3.4. If ` is an unbiased loss function, then for every X ∈ M θ risk
allocations m∗ exist. They are characterized by the first order conditions
1 ∈ λ∗E[∇`(X −m∗)] and E[`(X −m∗)] = c, (5.31)
where λ∗ is a Lagrange multiplier. In particular, when ` has no zero-sum direction of
recession except 0, the set of solutions (m∗, λ∗) to the first order condition (5.31) is
bounded. If ` is strictly convex outside Rd− along zero-sum allocations, then the risk
allocation is unique.
We refer the reader to Armenti et al (2015) [7] for the proofs of the last two theorems.
However, since this theorem allows us to find optimal allocations, we provide an
example in a bivariate case. The paper jumps to cover a two portfolio case but lacked
in its description of the steps to follow. We add that in multivariable Calculus terms,
the method of Lagrange multipliers indicates that in order to find max/min values of
f(x, y) subject to g(x, y) = c, we find values of x, y, λ such that
∇f(x, y) = λ∇g(x, y) (5.32)
g(x, y) = c. (5.33)
Adapting this to our notation, f(m) = m1 + m2, g(m) = E[`(X − m)] where
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X = (X1, X2) are vector profit-losses distributed according to some probability dis-
tribution and m = (m1,m2). Differentiation denoted by ∇ is with respect to m1 and
m2 so we are solving fm1 = λgm1 and fm2 = λgm2 . The constraint imposed is at a
level c.
We also make a remark in that the positivity of the risk allocation is not required.
That is, we may have instances were in the optimization routine, we achieve negative
values of mk. Stated differently, if the losses observed in the sub-portfolios are not too
high or the threshold c set by the overseeing body is generous and high, we may yield
a capital surplus in the form of mk that could be allocated to another sub-portfolio or
carried over to the next period. However, if positivity or any other convex constraint
is imposed, it can easily be embedded in the set up. In case of positivity, this would
modify the definition of ρ(X) into
ρ(X) = inf{
∑
mk : E[`(X −m)] ≤ c and mk ≥ 0 for every k}. (5.34)
Before we move onto our unique application and set of numerical simulation in the
next section, we break down an example from Armenti et al (2015) [7] in order to
gain comfort with applying the first order conditions while applying additional com-
mentary and clarity. Also, we get a sense at how the systemic risk component is
embedded in the loss function.
Example 5.3.2. Consider a bivariate framework with the following loss function
`(x1, x2) =
(x+1 )
2 + (x+2 )
2
2
+ αx+1 x
+
2 + x1 + x2, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. (5.35)
To solve the problem of determining optimal capital allocations under this loss penalty
function, we must use (5.31). We have the liquidity constraint f(m) = m1 +m2 which
is on the left hand side. Thus using the method of Lagrange multipliers in (5.32), we
must compute ∇f(m). The right hand side contains E[`(X − m)] for which the
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derivative passes through the expectation and we must compute λE[∇`(X −m)]. The
constraint term (5.33) is simply E[`(X − m)] = c. Thus we will determine the
allocation given by (m1,m2) =
(
Π1(X),Π2(X)
)
. Thus the first equation is given by
∂
∂m1
(m1 +m2) = λ
∂
∂m1
E
[
((X1 −m1)+)2 + ((X2 −m2)+)2
2
+
α(X1 −m1)+(X2 −m2)+ +X1 −m1 +X2 −m2
]
1 = λ
[
− E[(X1 −m1)+]− αE[(X2 −m2)+1X1≥m1]− 1]
1
λ
− 1 = E[(X1 −m1)+]+ αE[(X2 −m2)+1X1≥m1]. (5.36)
By symmetry we have the other first order condition and the constraint equation which
is set equal to c
1
λ
− 1 = E[(X2 −m2)+]+ αE[(X1 −m1)+1X2≥m2] (5.37)
c =
1
2
[
((X1 −m1)+)2 + ((X2 −m2)+)2
]
+ αE
[
(X1 −m1)+(X2 −m2)+
]
+
E[X1] + E[X2]−m1 −m2. (5.38)
Thus our system is composed of (5.36)-(5.38). While we can not attempt solve this
analytically until some assumptions are made on the distributions of X, we may
dissect the first component (5.36). We see that the term E
[
(X1 −m1)+
]
involves the
loss X1 exceeding its liquidity requirement m1 and the second term weighted by α on
the loss X2 in excess over the liquidity requirement m2 conditioned on the case that
the loss X1 also exceeds its own liquidity requirement m1 as indicated by the term
αE
[
(X1 − m1)+1X2≥m2
]
. The reason this was highlighted was that the second term
clearly shows the need to account for the dependency structure between X1 and X2
which was induced from the loss function.
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5.4 Numerical Replication
The in-depth numerical analysis covered in Armenti et al (2015) [7] focused on the
loss function (5.21). To make the discussion focused around d-variate sub-portfolios,
we make this explicit
`(x) =
d∑
k=1
xk +
1
2
d∑
k=1
(x+k )
2 + α
∑
1≤j<k≤d
x+j x
+
k ,where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. (5.39)
As an inroads in the paper, a bivariate case was first investigated. Gaussian dis-
tributions with µ1 = µ2 = 0 and σ1 = σ2 = 1 were first assumed with the inter-
dependency term zeroed out by setting α = 0. Analytic representations could
be achieved and optimal capital levels calculated. Monte Carlo methods also con-
firmed the same result as the analytic method. Adding complexity, the systemic
factor was set to α = 1 and then correlation sensitivities analyzed for the cases
ρ = {−0.9,−0.5,−0.2, 0, 0, 2, 0.5, 0.9}. From there, a trivariate case was investigated
under α = 0 and α = 1 but using a modified covariance matrix. Our walk through
will follow a similar path.
Our extension will use the same loss function as in (5.39) where we will build in
systemic dependencies between the historical returns/losses of xk. This may either
naturally arise due to an observed effect arising from the natural linkage between
portfolios or enforced as a stress testing tool to perform what-if analysis. In order to
apply Theorem 5.3.4, we define the following functions
ek(m) = E[(Xk −m)],
fk(m) = E[(Xk −m)+],
gk(m) = E[
(
(Xk −m)+
)2
],
hj,k(m,n) = E[(Xj −m)+(Xk − n)+] (needed when α 6= 0),
lj,k(m,n) = E[(Xj −m)+1{Xk≥n}] (needed when α 6= 0).
(5.40)
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Then our first order conditions yield the following system to be solved
λfk(mk) + αλ
d∑
j=1,j 6=k
lj,k(m,n) = 1− λ for k = 1, . . . , d
d∑
k=1
{
ek(mk) +
1
2
gk(mk)
}
+ α
∑
1≤j<k≤d
hj,k(m,n) = c.
(5.41)
In order to solve this system, a numerical method is needed to solve the expectations
together with a root finding procedure. We select to use Monte Carlo methods to
compute the functions in (5.40). The main advantage is a variety of models may
be considered such as models with copulas. The Monte Carlo method proceeds by
generating all M realizations of the random vector X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xd) used in
the estimation of (5.40) for arbitrary m,n during the root finding procedure. The
estimators provided are typical of Monte Carlo methods by taking the arithmetic
mean over M iterations
IMCM [ek(m)] =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(X ik −m),
IMCM [fk(m)] =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(X ik −m)+,
IMCM [gk(m)] =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(
(X ik −m)+
)2
,
IMCM [hj,k(m,n)] =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(X ij −m)+(X ik − n)+,
IMCM [lj,k(m,n)] =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(X ij −m)+1{Xik≥n}.
(5.42)
Operationally, this is done in MATLAB using anonymous functions and the function
fsolve to solve the roots of the system.
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Method m∗1
Analytic -0.1731
Monte Carlo 2 million -0.1724
Monte Carlo 10 million -0.1730
Table 5.32: Bivariate case with systemic risk α = 0.
Before we continue with our extension, we provide some intuition by explaining some
examples covered in Armenti et al (2015) [7] but run our code as a replication exer-
cise. We start by considering the case d = 2 with a bivariate Gaussian distributions
with µ1 = µ2 = 0 and σ1 = σ2 = 1 and α = 0. We set the bound to be c = 1. To
provide some context, we assume that the mean loss of the two sub-portfolios are
zero with variance equal to a dollar. By setting the bound to be 1, we would like to
then determine how much capital to set aside (a static amount at the beginning of the
period) such that the expected performance of the two sub-portfolios remain bounded
from above. In Table 5.32, we only report the first optimal capital value because the
allocation is symmetric. We provide the analytic derivation of the functions required
to solve equations (5.41) with α = 0. We can simplify fk(x) and gk(x) in analytical
form
fk(m) = E[(Xk −m)+] = σk√
2pi
e
−m2
2σ2
k −mΦ
(−m
σk
)
, (5.43)
gk(m) = E[((Xk −m)+)2] = (m2 + σ2k)Φ
(−m
σk
)
− mσk√
2pi
e
−m2
2σ2
k . (5.44)
To see how we get (5.43), we can solve this step by step. After the first step, we drop
the k index with the understanding that this applies up to k = d portfolios
132
fk(m) = E[(Xk −m)+]
=
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
(x−m)+e−x
2
2σ2 dx
=
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
m
(x−m)e−x
2
2σ2 dx
=
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
m
xe
−x2
2σ2 dx − m
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
m
e
−x2
2σ2 dx
=
−σ2
σ
√
2pi
e
−x2
2σ2
∣∣∣∣∞
m
− m
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
m
e
−x2
2σ2 dx
=
−σ2
σ
√
2pi
[
0− e−m
2
2σ2
]
− m
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
m
e
−x2
2σ2 dx
=
σ√
2pi
e
−m2
2σ2 − mΦ
(−m
σ
)
.
Note the last term was obtained by:
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
m
e
−x2
2σ2 dx
⇒ P{X > m}
= 1− P{X ≤ m}
= 1− P
{x− 0
σ
≤ m
σ
}
= 1− Φ
(m
σ
)
where Φ denotes the CDF of a standard normal random variable
= Φ
(−m
σ
)
.
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A similar method is used to derive gk(m)
gk(m) = E[
(
(Xk −m)+
)2
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
(x−m)+)2p(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
m
(x−m)2p(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
m
(x2 − 2xm+m2)p(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
m
x2p(x)dx− 2m
∫ ∞
m
xp(x)dx+m2
∫ ∞
m
p(x)dx
=
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
m
x2e
−x2
2σ2 dx− 2m
(σe− m22σ2√
2pi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from before
+m2 Φ
(−m
σ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from before
.
Note
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
m
x2e
−x2
2σ2 dx =
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
m
x · xe−x
2
2σ2 dx
u = x, du = dx, dv = xe−
x2
2σ2 , v = −σ2e− x
2
2σ2
=
1
σ
√
2pi
[
uv −
∫
vdu
]
=
1
σ
√
2pi
[
− xσ2e− x
2
2σ2
∣∣∣∣∞
m
+
∫ ∞
m
σ2e
−x2
2σ2 dx
]
=
1
σ
√
2pi
[
0 +mσ2e−
m2
2σ2 + σ2
∫ ∞
m
e
−x2
2σ2 dx
]
=
mσe−
m2
2σ2√
2pi
+ σ2Φ
(−m
σ
)
.
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Sim. (M) 100,000 200,000 500,000 1,000,000 2,000,000 5,000,000 10,000,000
Mean -0.1737 -0.1729 -0.1736 -0.1730 -0.1731 -0.1731 -0.1731
5th % -0.1819 -0.177 -0.1762 -0.1743 -0.1745 -0.1739 -0.1738
95th % -0.1693 -0.1681 -0.1704 -0.1716 -0.1720 -0.1720 -0.1725
Std. Dev. 0.0036 0.0024 0.0018 0.0011 0.0008 0.0006 0.0004
CV (%) 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2
Time (sec) 4.84 9.91 24.09 47.16 93.06 225.69 461.01
Table 5.33: Bivariate case with systemic risk α = 0 averaged over N = 30 runs.
Continuing we have
gk(m) =
mσe−
m2
2σ2√
2pi
+ σ2Φ
(−m
σ
)
− 2m
(σe− m22σ2√
2pi
)
+m2Φ
(−m
σ
)
= (m2 + σ2k)Φ
(−m
σk
)
− mσk√
2pi
e
−m2
2σ2
k .
This form of analytical fk(m) and gk(m) checks out in MATLAB with Monte Carlo
simluations. We also see with approximation methods such as Monte Carlo, we can
easily seek convergence to the analytical form by increasing the number of simulations.
To provide some more detail on convergence and confidence intervals, we summarize
some statistics in Table 5.33. We notice that running M = 2, 000, 000 simulations
and averaging over 30 runs, that the mean matches the analytic value. Moreover,
even if we select to only run 100, 000 simulations, the 5th and 95th contain the opti-
mal value. We also compute the Coefficient of Variance (CV) which is also known
as relative standard deviation and is a measure of dispersion. It is computed as the
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean and may be reported as a percentage. On
a relative basis by running 2,000,000 simulations, we obtain a CV less than 0.5%. It
is also advantageous to understand when using only 200,000, that we obtain a wider
confidence interval but still manage a CV less than 2%. When we move away from a
stylized example and utilize an empirical data set with systemic risk and correlated
portfolios, our computation time increases substantially. However, we may hope to
achieve a similar CV that yields results that are still have relatively low dispersion.
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Referring back to Table 5.32, we interpret a negative m∗1 to mean there is slack in the
allocation. That is, there is excess resource allocated over the minimum necessary to
accomplish the task. Said differently, there is a savings of sort that need not be used
and could be used elsewhere throughout an organization. We see how this changes
directly by successively lowering c as shown in Table 5.34 and the linear relationship
as shown in Figure 5.6.
Bound Method m∗1
c = 1 Analytic -0.1731
c = 0.8 Analytic -0.1052
c = 0.6 Analytic -0.0355
c = 0.5 Analytic 0
c = 0.4 Analytic 0.0360
c = 0.2 Analytic 0.1093
Table 5.34: Bivariate case with systemic risk α = 0 with varying bounds c.
Figure 5.6: Linear relationship for m* vs. c.
136
What we are observing when we decrease bound c is that our risk manager has set
more punitive restraints and hence has become more risk adverse. Thus we see the
sign change of m∗ from negative to positive which then in turns means that capital
must be set aside to cover expected losses and can not be used elsewhere.
The next attribute to investigate would be to see the effect of the systemic factor.
In this case, we may set α = 1. Moreover, we may add complexity by varying the
correlation ρ. Note that to simulate correlated variates from our Monte Carlo routine,
we simulate from the following covariance matrix
Σ =
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]
. (5.45)
The results of this procedure are detailed in Table 5.35. To keep inline with the repli-
cation exercise, we limit ourselves to 2 × 106 simulations as was done in the paper.
When comparing the case α = 0 from Table 5.32 and α = 1 with corresponding ρ = 0
from Table 5.35, we have values -0.1724 and -0.103 respectively. We interpret this to
mean that with a systemic risk component, there is less slack in the allocation in the
latter case. When we allow for interconnected risk through the α weight, we have
different directional behaviour as we vary the correlation value. In this simple two
sub-portfolio case, it is easy to see that if we have anti-correlated values (negative
correlation) between two sub-portfolios, then we will have a lower capital requirement
(more slack). However if we have positive correlation between for two sub-portfolios,
then there is more capital is required. As we will see later on in an empirical example
using operational risk data, we observe only positive correlation. Hence when we
toggle between α = 0 and α = 1, we see an increase in capital requirements.
Moving on to a trivariate example, we return to the loss function (5.39) and write out
the terms of the series when d = 3 and hence by doing so, show the equivalence of
(5.21) and (5.22). We do this as it is not immediately obvious of the terms involved
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ρ m∗1
-0.9 -0.167
-0.5 -0.143
-0.2 -0.120
0 -0.103
0.2 -0.085
0.5 -0.056
0.9 -0.012
Table 5.35: Bivariate case with α = 1 using Monte Carlo with M =2 million.
in the first order equations. Hence the ability to replicate the values in Armenti et
al (2015) [7] lays the foundation and allows for comparison for an extension. From
(5.39) we have
`(x) = x1 + x2 + x3 +
1
2
(
(x+1 )
2 + (x+2 )
2 + (x+3 )
2
)
+ α(x+1 x
+
2 + x
+
1 x
+
3 + x
+
2 x
+
3 ). (5.46)
The claim is that this is equivalent to (5.22) and hence when d = 3 we have
`(x) = x1 + x2 + x3 +
1− α
2
(
(x+1 )
2 + (x+2 )
2 + (x+3 )
2
)
+
α
2
(
x+1 + x
+
2 + x
+
3
)2
. (5.47)
Working with the right side of (5.47) we have
`(x) = x1 + x2 + x3 +
1− α
2
(
(x+1 )
2 + (x+2 )
2 + (x+3 )
2
)
+
α
2
(
x+1 + x
+
2 + x
+
3
)2
= x1 + x2 + x3 +
1
2
(
(x+1 )
2 + (x+2 )
2 + (x+3 )
2
)
− α
2
(
(x+1 )
2 + (x+2 )
2 + (x+3 )
2
)
+
α
2
(
(x+1 )
2 + (x+2 )
2 + (x+3 )
2 + 2x+1 x
+
2 + 2x
+
1 x
+
3 + 2x
+
2 x
+
3
)
= x1 + x2 + x3 +
1
2
(
(x+1 )
2 + (x+2 )
2 + (x+3 )
2
)
+ α(x+1 x
+
2 + x
+
1 x
+
3 + x
+
2 x
+
3 ).
Having written down the loss function for the three portfolio case, the first order
conditions follow from simple differentiation. This then allows for more interesting
cases to be investigated. The study then migrates from the study of three risk factors
where two sub-portfolios have the same risk profile, are correlated and compared
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alongside a third stand-alone sub-portfolio. The portfolio losses still have mean zero
however have the following variance-covariance matrix
Σ =

0.5 0.5ρ 0
0.5ρ 0.5 0
0 0 0.6
 (5.48)
and ρ varied as before. The higher marginal risk as indicated by 0.6 compared to the
other two sub-portfolios imparted interesting dynamics on capital allocations. When
α = 0, it is expected that the sub-portfolio should attract a higher capital require-
ment simply due to its increased volatility. However, when ρ is allowed to vary and
α = 1, the interconnectedness of the first two sub-portfolios are expected to attract
a more extreme capital requirement based on the sign and magnitude of ρ. As be-
fore, we start with the case where α = 0. The results are summarized in Table 5.36.
The next case would be to set α = 1 and let ρ vary. We see that despite the first
m∗1 = m
∗
2 m
∗
3
-0.165 -0.120
Table 5.36: Trivariate case with α = 0 using Monte Carlo with M =2 million.
two sub-portfolios having lower variances, the result of their interdependency causes
for increased capital requirements for certain values of ρ. Thus the interdependency
relationship trumps the smaller individual variances. This is shown in Table 5.37.
Up until this point we do not claim any originality and the only value-add has been
a sanity check on the replication of results. However having seen a simple build-up,
we may nicely transition to an application of the methodology using an empirical
data set. This would give a sense of the utility of computing multivariate shortfall
optimal risk allocations in addition overlaying systemic risk. As well, we may offer
an extension in the form of using various copula models. What we have covered thus
far are normally-distributed P&Ls of sub-portfolios with linear dependence. However
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ρ m∗1 = m
∗
2 m
∗
3
-0.9 -0.190 0.094
-0.5 -0.133 0.018
-0.2 -0.100 -0.031
0 -0.076 -0.059
0.2 -0.055 -0.088
0.5 -0.023 -0.128
0.9 0.026 -0.173
Table 5.37: Trivariate case with α = 1 using Monte Carlo with M =2 million.
without debate we constantly hear of non-normality of financial returns/performance
and also of dependency structures falling apart in stress scenarios. Taking the con-
cept of systemic risk from Armenti et al (2015) [7] and rather than building in fixed
dependencies through α, we may uncover natural, inherent dependencies through the
P&Ls themselves. This opens up the discussion on such copula models such as the
Student t which models joint fat tail events. This could be viewed as a stress testing
tool as well where capital allocation could be assessed under a range of conditions.
A further extension may look at Archimedean copulas such as the asymmetric Gum-
bel copula which exhibits greater dependence in the positive tail rather than in the
negative.
5.5 Application to Operational Risk Losses
An application of the previous methodology is transferrable to the management of op-
erational risk as well. As mentioned before, modeling is conducted on a sub-portfolio
basis which in this case may be viewed as an arbitrary cut of an operational loss
database. Usually we are concerned with modeling on a UoM level which is at the
intersection of a unique business line and unique event type. However, technically if
we are interested on an aggregate basis, we could also collapse data cells and look
at losses on an aggregate business line (any one of eight) or any event type (any
one of seven). The caveat would obviously be that losses are not homogenous but
140
rather from a management perspective, either a certain line of business or event type
is of greater interest than the contributing elements. Nonetheless, we will constrain
ourselves to modeling on any one of the unique 56 UoMs.
The analogy is then as such. In the market risk space, an application arises in the
context of a trading floor with a risk manager wanting to use the shortfall risk allo-
cation optimization technique to determine optimal expected capital offsets based on
the P&L distribution of a trading desk. In the credit risk space, a CCP is concerned
with optimal margin requirements to ensure the solvency of the default fund of its
contributing members. To apply this in the operational risk space, the lens for which
we view operational risk losses would need to be bifurcated. A common segregation
of an operational risk loss database for initial exploratory data analysis is the split
between cells which are either low frequency or high severity. For example, credit
card fraud which occurs on a daily time horizon is easily seen as a high frequency
loss. One may even say losses are to be expected. In Canada, the Canadian Bankers
Association provides credit card fraud and Interac debit card statistics which con-
firms the high frequency of losses. Others cells however experience infrequent losses.
For example, any event type in the agency services business line which is akin to
the corporate trust or custodial duties tend to be low frequency events. That is, the
business where a bank acts has as a trust or in the lending of securities experiences
low frequency losses. Rather than base this purely on speculation, we may confirm
this by turning to the SAS OpRisk Global Data.
We make note that the SAS OpRisk Global Database contains losses in financial
banking, insurance and even non-financial businesses in 20 such areas from accom-
modation and foodservices, agriculture, construction, health care, real estate rental
and leasing, to utilities and wholesale trade. The data records are publicly reported
and collected over a threshold of USD $100,000. The losses are also provided in a
separate column with an annual adjustment based on the consumer price index (CPI)
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obtained from the US Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor Statistics. Hence losses
are brought up to their current loss value. Since we are interested in a Basel pre-
scribed 56 cell structure, we filter and report this level of granularity. We summarize
the number of losses in Table 5.38. We have at our disposable record level data and
have only disclosed high level descriptions of the data. We now build the case that
BL/ET IF EF EPWS CPBP DPA BDSF EDPM Total
CF 50 24 38 540 0 0 8 660
TS 177 25 41 902 3 10 197 1,355
RB 1,867 1,946 103 1,493 60 35 169 5,673
CB 610 995 31 498 20 5 62 2,221
PS 31 26 1 142 1 15 46 262
AS 28 37 0 103 1 0 20 189
RBR 275 45 63 828 1 2 137 1,351
AM 129 50 13 484 1 2 41 720
Total 3167 3,148 290 4,990 87 69 680 12,431
Table 5.38: Number of losses in SAS OpRisk Global Database up to January 2016
release date for Basel 56 cell structure.
BL/ET IF EF EPWS CPBP DPA BDSF EDPM
Total
($mill)
CF 3,328 3,447 2,366 101,155 0 0 214 110,510
TS 30,808 5,235 627 170,230 56 1,227 8,412 216,594
RB 39,402 19,851 3,000 251,670 1,327 1,012 1,703 317,965
CB 81,472 25,877 416 89,119 3,951 336 803 201,975
PS 761 469 1 20,589 2 400 458 22,680
AS 683 5,012 0 12,643 2 0 1,170 19,510
RBR 4,154 264 2,310 20,707 4 3 278 27,719
AM 6,169 18,472 196 66,532 97 3 1,133 92,602
Total
($mill)
166,776 78,627 8,916 732,645 5,439 2,980 14,171 1,009,555
Table 5.39: Aggregate loss amounts (USD million) CPI adjusted in SAS OpRisk
Global Database up to January 2016 release date for Basel 56 cell structure.
aside from regulatory capital purposes which is the use of the VaR risk measure at
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the 1 year 99.9 percentile which is usually reported to regulators and for public dis-
closure on a quarterly basis, there is value from a risk management perspective to
get a handle on losses that occur at high frequency and hence could benefit from
dynamic risk oversight. Hence moving from a VaR (high quantile risk measure over a
one year horizon) and focusing on the expectation brings the focus to a more central
and active form of risk management. Fine tuning the amount of capital required to
offset expected losses may serve as a way to optimize capital. Moreover, it is possible
to analyze in-depth new marketing campaign strategies in retail banking or trading
and sales strategies from an operational risk loss perspective. From a credit card per-
spective, perhaps a new offering may have an anticipated increased business exposure
but coincide with a higher amount of internal or external fraud. In that sense, having
a feedback mechanism on the expectation of losses may be beneficial. Also from a
market risk perspective, we do see an interesting take on operational risk of option
hedging as covered by Mitra (2013) [91]. In this context, we see a model injecting an
operational cost in rebalancing a replicating portfolio for option hedging. A proxy
is used whereby operational costs reflect the scale of operational activity and risks.
For instance, as the number of shares traded increase, this would increase operational
costs (settlement costs) which in turn would be associated with increased operational
activities (e.g. checking trades have been executed) and ultimately increased opera-
tional risks (e.g. failed trades). For if a trading strategy calls for an increased volume
of trades, perhaps then activities involved such as data entry, checking new market
data, accounting reconciliation all increase and may pose more operational risk.
Thus our application of the allocation method will focus on high frequency loss cells.
Instead of using the entire database, we use a subset of the data. We affirm this
assumption by pointing out that Badescu et al (2015) [13] has addressed a different
problem but still used high frequency loss data. There we learn the authours test a
correlated frequency model which requires sufficient data for model fitting. They use
four Basel business lines (Trading and Sales, Commercial Banking, Retail Brokerage
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BL/ET EDPM EF
TS 12,738 546
CS 4,620 3,501
CB 1,176 9,433
RBR 2,494 342
Table 5.40: Anonymous North American Bank operational loss count data from April
2007 to March 2012 from Badescu et al (2015).
and specifically Card Services, which is an sub category level 2 of Retail Banking)
across two event types (Execution, Delivery and Process Management and External
Fraud). The count of data points from the paper are summarized in Table 5.40.
The data was collected by a North American financial institution from April 2007
until March 2012, including recognition data and net loss. The recording threshold
was USD $30,000. For confidentiality, the authours modified the original data by
resampling from it while still keeping the same sample size. By doing so the main
characteristics of the original data were preserved. From Table 5.40, it is apparent
that internal loss data can be very rich in its loss experience when compared to vendor
external loss data sets which are discovered through the public domain. Also, this
supports our analysis by only using a subset of the available operational risk data
in order to test out next methodologies. Comparing Table 5.40 with our available
data set in Table 5.38, we see that we may also investigate four business lines: TS,
RB (Retail Banking which will serve as a proxy for Card Services), CB and RBR.
However, we adapt our event types to IF and CPBP as there are more prevalent
losses. Hence our UoM structure is detailed in Table 5.41 with the frequency count
shown. A numeric itemizing of each UoM is detailed in Table 5.42. We make note
that we are not comparing methodologies in any sense but rather simply building the
argument to work with a subset of operational loss data and provide us with a sanity
check on the types of business lines that undergo frequent losses.
Having narrowed down the cells to focus on, the next crucial step would be to se-
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BL/ET IF CPBP
TS 177 902
RB 1,867 1493
CB 610 498
RBR 275 828
Table 5.41: High frequency operational loss count data from March 1971 - December
2015 from SAS OpRisk Global Data.
BL/ET UoM
TS/IF 1
RB/IF 2
CB/IF 3
RBR/IF 4
TS/CPBP 5
RB/CPBP 6
CB/CPBP 7
RBR/CPBP 8
Table 5.42: Mapping BL/ET to UoM sub-portfolios.
lect relevant frequency and severity distribution for which to model the compound
loss distribution. For example, Badescu et al (2015) [13] in their method model fre-
quency via a multivariate mixed Poisson distribution and assume that severities are
mixed Erlang distributed which is a two parameter continuous probability distribu-
tion. Goodness of fit was examined by virtue of histograms, probability-probability
plots (P-P), quantile-quantile plots (Q-Q plots), empirical vs fitted moments. Other
forms of empirical operational risk research on different topics see simple formula-
tions of frequency and severity modeled across an aggregate UoM using Poisson and
Lognormal distributions such as in Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez et al (2011) [78]. Therein,
goodness of fit was assessed purely on the Kolmogorov Smirnov body test. Lever-
aging off the analysis by De Jongh et al (2015) [50], they too use the SAS OpRisk
Global database. Over a 23 year horizon, 53 UoMs were tested for best-fit parametric
representation. Poisson was used to model frequency and choices for severity covered
Burr, Exponential, Gamma, Pareto, Lognormal,Weibull, GPD and Inverse Gaussian.
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Each of these distributions were fitted conditional on the left truncation of the data
at USD $100,000. Best-fitting distributions were ranked by three goodness-of-fit test
statistics, namely Anderson-Darling (AD), Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Crame´r-
von Mises (CVM) in each UoM. The results of the testing showed that the Burr
distribution was the best choice overall obtaining a top three position in 83% (KS),
96% (AD) and 92%(CM) among all 53 UoMs. The closest second place contender of
the distributions considered was the Lognormal. The three parameter Burr type XII
distribution function is given as
FB(x; η, τ, α) = 1−
(
1 + (
x
η
)τ
)−α
for x > 0. (5.49)
The parameters have the requirement η > 0, τ > 0, α > 0 where η is a scale pa-
rameter and τ and α are shape parameters. Hence, we adopt the same parametric
representations across our eight cell framework but recalibrate new Poisson and Burr
distributions.
We too use a 23 year time horizon but starting from January 1993 - December 2015
inclusive. Since our focus is not on an annual time horizon, we select to use the most
granular time horizon and calibrate a Poisson process over a monthly time horizon.
That is, our intensity parameter represents the mean number of losses to be expected
in a given month. Independent of the time component, we fit Burr continuous proba-
bility distributions to the size of the losses. For both frequency and severity, we follow
De Jongh et al (2015) [50] and fit truncated versions of the distributions. As the de-
tails were not provided, we referred to Cruz et al (2015) [47] to make this adjustment.
We learn in practice that often the missing data below the threshold are completely
ignored. This could potentially lead to an underestimation or overestimation of capi-
tal. Since we have the luxury of an empirical data set and base these results on it, we
should account for this adjustment. Take for instance losses originating from severity
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with PDF f(x|β) where β are the calibrated parameters of the severity density and
frequency with PMF p(n|λ) with single parameter λ. If losses come from a data set
above a known reporting truncation level L, then the density of the losses above L is
a left-truncated density
fL(x|β) = f(x|β)
1− F (L|β) L ≤ x <∞. (5.50)
The events of the losses above L follow the so-called thinned Poisson process with
intensity
θ(γ, L) = λ(1− F (L|β) (5.51)
and hence the number of events above the threshold is distributed from Poisson(θ).
As there is little discussion on how to perform this method, we point out that the
method of importance sampling may be used to simulate from the modified distribu-
tions.
Upon making this adjustment, we are able to simulate from our truncated distribu-
tions. Unlike a trading desk that has a P&L everyday, an operational loss database
may not have a loss in any given day/month - even if it is a high frequency cell.
This then the leads us to still consider the compound loss distribution of frequency
and severity but we may alter the time horizon so that we are looking at monthly
losses instead of annual. Then we may apply Theorem 5.3.4 where X calibrated is the
calculated compound loss distribution for each UoM from our structure in Table 5.41.
The final requirement would be to place a realistic bound c in Theorem 5.3.4. For
starters, we may play the role of the risk manager and allow for a loss of 109 in each
of the eight UoMs. Then for conservatism, double it to arrive have a threshold of
c = 16× 109. Later on we will look at sensitivities to the the threshold value to yield
insight into an appropriate amount depending on the purpose. Given that we will
still use the convex loss function (5.39) which penalizes losses, this may conservative
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from a risk management standpoint. At this point, we are in a position to determine
the minimum amount of capital required (m∗) for each sub-portfolio such that the
expected value of the monthly aggregate loss under the penalty function ` is bounded
by c dollars. We utilize 200,000 Monte Carlo simulations as the higher dimensions
adds much more computation time. Before we show the numerical simulation results,
we provide a road map of the type of sensitivities that may be of interest to a risk
manager.
1. Systemic risk weight α = 0, c = 16× 109;
2. α = 0, c varies;
3. α = 1, c = 16× 109, use empirical correlation matrix from loss simulation;
4. α = 1, c varies, use empirical correlation matrix from loss simulation;
5. Repeat 2. but look backwards at how the allocation changes at three lag inter-
vals. Note that the probability distributions and correlation matrix may only
be calibrated on data that is available at the quarter end.
1. With no systemic risk component, each sub-portfolio attracts a capital requirement
based on its individual risk profile. This is summarized in Table 5.43. We see the
UoMi m
∗
i in $million
1 117.5
2 401.9
3 373.2
4 -0.3
5 610.9
6 591.6
7 324.4
8 255.9
Total 2,675.1
Table 5.43: Systemic risk α = 0, bound c = $16 billion.
effect of the loss function creating a gap between the aggregate capital requirement
and that of the bound. Since we are not simply concerned with expected loss, but
expected losses that are penalized by `, this further contributes to the gap. However,
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what this does do is give the risk manager some ability to determine what bounds
may be better suited to their tolerance. What we also observe is that there is slack
in UoM4 in Table 5.43. That is, there is a capital benefit that may be carried over or
spread across to other portfolios. Up to this point, we have proceeded by hypothetical
cases (Standard Normal portfolios) to showcase the utility of the algorithm. Depend-
ing on the context, we may or may not permit a UoM to observe a negative allocation.
From Panjer (2002) [100], we also see a method in the allocation of solvency capital
in multi-line financial businesses. The TailVaR risk measure is extended to allocate
capital to each business unit. Using real company data, two out of ten business lines
observe a negative capital allocation using TailVaR-based proportional allocation.
Alternatively, we may envision the case where reporting to senior management or an
independent regulator may not permit negative allocation despite the aggregate sum
still being positive. This may be principle-based and hence we may also accommo-
date this requirement in our algorithm. That is, we set a lower bound constraint
on all UoMs that they must be non-negative. We may then re-run our algorithm
and produce results accordingly. This happens in two instances and we provide a
comparison. The first comparison is seen in Table 5.44. Hence comparing Table 5.43
and Table 5.44, we see an aggregate increase of 0.4 or $400,000 (rounded). Also what
was once optimal for each UoM in one construct, has shifted allocations in various
UoMs. This is again expected under the objective to minimize the sum of allocations.
2. What we notice from Table 5.45 is that by successively lower the bound c, we
are required to set aside more and more capital for each sub-portfolio. What we also
notice is that specifically for UoM4, the existing slack disappears in the case when
the bound is halved. This is useful if we want to meet the requirement of (5.34).
What is also of importance is to notice that when our initial bound is multiplied by
10, UoM5 and UoM6 still require a positive amount of capital. This makes intuitive
sense in that the Trading and Sales business line in the Clients Products & Business
Practices event type attract heavy fines and lawsuits. Such notable examples would
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UoMi m
∗
i in $million
1 125.6
2 398.1
3 370.4
4 2.0
5 608.5
6 589.5
7 323.9
8 257.5
Total 2,675.5
Table 5.44: Systemic risk α = 0, bound c = $16 billion, non-negative allocation.
UoMi
m∗i m
∗
i m
∗
i m
∗
i m
∗
i
c =$2B c =$4B c =$8B c =$16B c =$160B
1 354.0 302.9 223.0 117.5 -52.4
2 600.6 562.3 498.6 401.9 -31.5
3 581.9 541.2 474.2 373.2 -34.6
4 90.3 57.3 21.5 -0.3 -57.5
5 752.0 726.2 681.7 610.9 3.5
6 737.7 710.5 664.2 591.6 4.9
7 540.0 496.9 426.6 324.4 -37.9
8 488.4 441.3 365.7 255.9 -44.1
Total 4,144.9 3,838.6 3,355.5 2,675.1 -249.6
Table 5.45: Systemic risk α = 0, varying bound c.
be lawsuits related to mortgage back securities and market manipulation. On the
Retail Banking side within the same event type, we see fines and lawsuits settled in
relation to tax evasions and failure of banks to keep their customer well informed on
particulars of retail products.
Again for completeness, we may enforce a non-negativity requirement for an alloca-
tion scheme. Since we observe several negative entries when we increase the threshold
c to 10 times the baseline value, we re-run Table 5.45 and get Table 5.46 and replace
the last two columns. As expected, since there is so much slack in the allocation corre-
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UoMi
m∗i m
∗
i m
∗
i m
∗
i m
∗
i
c =$2B c =$4B c =$8B c =$16B c =$160B
1 354.0 302.9 223.0 125.6 0
2 600.6 562.3 498.6 398.1 0
3 581.9 541.2 474.2 370.4 0
4 90.3 57.3 21.5 2.0 0
5 752.0 726.2 681.7 608.5 0
6 737.7 710.5 664.2 589.5 0
7 540.0 496.9 426.6 323.9 0
8 488.4 441.3 365.7 257.5 0
Total 4,144.9 3,838.6 3,355.5 2,675.5 0
Table 5.46: Systemic risk α = 0, varying bound c, non-negative allocation.
sponding to the last column, we can not realistically put aside capital in this instance.
3. Taking the analysis a step further, we may add in the systemic risk component
and see the effect on capital allocation. We recall back from Section 2.4.6 the possible
ways to analyze correlations according to Frachot et al (2004) [71]. When considering
two cells with annual frequencies N1 and N2 that are correlated, they may not be
considered independent variables. It is reasoned that both frequencies N1 and N2
share common dependence with respect to some variables such as gross income, eco-
nomic cycle, size of business etc. As suggested in Frachot et al (2004) [71], empirical
frequency correlation may be evidenced by computing historical correlation between
past frequencies of operational loss events if a long time series is available. Hence we
adopt this approach as well.
We avoid trying to capture severity correlation that would imply a loss X in one
cell is high (low) when a loss Y in another cell is also high (low). Hence writing this
in a compact way, we mimic Frachot et al (2004) [71] and suppose that aggregate loss
correlation (between losses L1 and L2) is fundamentally conveyed by the underlying
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correlation between frequencies
corr(N1, N2) 6= 0
corr(X, Y ) = 0
 =⇒ corr(L1, L2) 6= 0. (5.52)
It is reasoned this is a simple way to add correlation between aggregate losses, that is
the correlation is conveyed through the compounded process by virtue of the frequency
correlation. However in Frachot et al (2004) [71], it is also stated that corr(L1, L2) ≤
corr(N1, N2). This indicates that a strong frequency correlation may be mellowed-out
under convolution with the severity distribution and hence would manifest itself in
lower loss correlation. Again, this ability to investigate frequency correlation on the
impending loss correlation is unique to operational risk loss modeling and is different
from the market/credit risk application where we directly model correlation at the
P&L level.
We provide the pairwise linear correlation coefficient matrix resulting from the em-
pirical data based on frequency counts. Since we are concerned with a monthly time
horizon, we focus on the frequency monthly correlation matrix in Table 5.47. The
extraction of the correlation matrix is an attempt to investigate the existence of any
significant linear correlation. The matrix of p-values tests the hypothesis of no corre-
lation against the alternative that there is a nonzero correlation. Each element in the
matrix of p-values corresponds to an element of ρ. If p(i, j) is small, in this case less
than 0.05, then ρ(i, j) is significantly different from zero. We produce the associated
p-value matrix in Table 5.48 and the significant pairs in Table 5.49. Although we did
not focus on an annual time horizon, we provide the annual correlation matrix for
completeness. The matrix of annual frequency correlations, p-values, and statistical
significant correlations are located in Tables 5.50-5.52. We note that in the monthly
matrix, we calibrated the values based on 23*12 = 276 realizations whereas in the
annual matrix, we just had 23 values. We do see a different matrix of values between
monthly and annual count of losses.
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1 0.37 0.35 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.12
0.37 1 0.49 0.26 0.41 0.53 0.24 0.28
0.35 0.49 1 0.17 0.29 0.32 0.27 0.17
0.04 0.26 0.17 1 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.12
0.08 0.41 0.29 0.11 1 0.39 0.12 0.16
0.16 0.53 0.32 0.11 0.39 1 0.1 0.31
0.08 0.24 0.27 0.07 0.12 0.1 1 0.08
0.12 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.31 0.08 1
Table 5.47: Monthly frequency correlation matrix.
1 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.24 0.01 0.2 0.06
0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.61 0.01 0.01 1 0.09 0.08 0.27 0.07
0.24 0.01 0.01 0.09 1 0.01 0.07 0.02
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 1 0.14 0.01
0.2 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.07 0.14 1 0.19
0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.19 1
Table 5.48: Matrix of p-values (two-tailed, significance = 0.05) corresponding to
monthly correlation matrix.
0.37 0.35 0.16
0.37 0.49 0.26 0.41 0.53 0.24 0.28
0.35 0.49 0.17 0.29 0.32 0.27 0.17
0.26 0.17
0.41 0.29 0.39 0.16
0.16 0.53 0.32 0.39 0.31
0.24 0.27
0.28 0.17 0.16 0.31
Table 5.49: Monthly frequency correlation matrix filtering for statistical significance
with p < 0.05.
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1 0.76 0.83 0.25 0.38 0.44 0.66 0.32
0.76 1 0.85 0.54 0.78 0.82 0.5 0.54
0.83 0.85 1 0.57 0.68 0.68 0.6 0.6
0.25 0.54 0.57 1 0.66 0.6 0.24 0.53
0.38 0.78 0.68 0.66 1 0.8 0.26 0.68
0.44 0.82 0.68 0.6 0.8 1 0.36 0.79
0.66 0.5 0.6 0.24 0.26 0.36 1 0.47
0.32 0.54 0.6 0.53 0.68 0.79 0.47 1
Table 5.50: Annual frequency correlation matrix.
1 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.15
0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
0.01 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.26 0.01 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.02
0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.01 0.24 0.01
0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.1 0.01
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.29 0.24 0.1 1 0.03
0.15 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 1
Table 5.51: Matrix of p-values (two-tailed, significance = 0.05) corresponding to
annual correlation matrix.
0.76 0.83 0.44 0.66
0.76 0.85 0.54 0.78 0.82 0.5 0.54
0.83 0.85 0.57 0.68 0.68 0.6 0.6
0.54 0.57 0.66 0.6 0.53
0.78 0.68 0.66 0.8 0.68
0.44 0.82 0.68 0.6 0.8 0.79
0.66 0.5 0.6 0.47
0.54 0.6 0.53 0.68 0.79 0.47
Table 5.52: Annual frequency correlation matrix filtering for statistical significance
with p < 0.05.
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Referring back to Table 5.49 we notice several statistically significant correlated cells.
In both the monthly and annual matrices, business lines 2 and 3 (Retail Banking
and Corporate Banking) with event type 1 (Internal Fraud) show positive correla-
tion across all cells. It could be reason that these are large divisions with far reach
throughout an organization that could be associated the an increase in losses else-
where. Retail Banking encompasses (i) retail banking (retail lending and deposits,
banking services, trust and estates), (ii) private banking (private lending and deposits,
banking services, trust and estates, investment advice) and (iii) card services (mer-
chant/commercial/corporate cards, private labels and retail). Commercial Banking
encompasses project finance, real estate, export finance, trade finance, factoring, leas-
ing, lending, guarantees, and bills of exchange. Internal Fraud also covers a wide range
of activities that arises from losses intended to defraud, misappropriate property, cir-
cumvent regulations or company policy which involves at least one internal party. It
may be realistic to expect directional behaviour with Trading and Sales in that the
business line covers everything from sales, market making and treasury businesses.
Also, Retail Brokerage accounts for both execution and full service capabilities which
is again wide-spread throughout the organization. The Clients, Products and Busi-
ness Practices covers all aspects of losses arising from failure to meet a professional
obligation to specific clients or from product flaws. Hence the two events overlap in
various forms of unauthorized activities.
Hence since there are many forms of positive correlation present, we should account
for this in our frequency simulation. We provide the output due to systemic risk
between portfolios in Table 5.53. When comparing Table 5.43 with α = 0 and Table
5.53 with α = 1, we see a monotonic increase of capital required for all sub-portfolios.
This ordering holds in that there are no negative correlations present and only posi-
tive correlations. This shows that introducing an interaction between sub-portfolios
is a relevant exercise. Although we have introduced this relationship through α and
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UoMi m
∗
i in $million
1 139.6
2 427.3
3 392.8
4 23.1
5 644.4
6 625.4
7 350.5
8 278.0
Total 2,881.1
Table 5.53: Systemic risk α = 1, bound c = $16 billion.
UoMi
m∗i m
∗
i m
∗
i m
∗
i m
∗
i
c =$2B c =$4B c =$8B c =$16B c =$160B
1 356.9 306.4 231.0 139.6 0.8
2 614.4 577.3 516.3 427.3 67.6
3 580.1 542.4 482.2 392.8 61.3
4 91.6 66.4 40.7 23.1 1.8
5 762.4 740.9 703.3 644.4 147.2
6 752.8 728.3 688.2 625.4 155.6
7 549.3 509.7 442.9 350.5 49.9
8 490.6 445.2 375.1 278.0 23.5
Total 4,198.1 3,916.6 3,479.7 2,881.1 507.7
Table 5.54: Systemic risk α = 1, varying bound c.
a full weight of 1, the different combinations of interacting sub-portfolios introduced
through the last term in the loss function in equation (5.21) should give some sense
of the connectedness of the network and be informative to a risk manager.
4. We may also repeat the same exercise by varying the bound c but keeping α = 1.
This is located in Table 5.54. As expected, we see a monotonically decreasing require-
ment as the threshold is expanded for increasing c. Surprisingly, even with a bound
of $160B, we still require capital to be set aside to offset losses and hence there is no
slack in the allocation.
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UoMi m
∗
i (Q4) m
∗
i (Q3) m
∗
i (Q2) m
∗
i (Q1)
1 139.6 138.0 151.7 142.9
2 427.3 428.6 430.0 437.6
3 392.8 390.9 391.8 390.8
4 23.1 24.2 22.4 23.2
5 644.4 642.0 637.0 612.8
6 625.4 627.9 619.1 616.2
7 350.5 349.9 349.1 346.7
8 278.0 283.7 261.2 249.2
Total 2,881.1 2,885.2 2,862.3 2,819.4
Table 5.55: Systemic risk α = 1, bound c = $16 billion, calibrations at quarter end.
5. As a final investigation, we may take the results of Table 5.53 and compare how
the allocation changed from previous time horizons. That is, since we used 23 years
of data from January 1993 - December 2015, we may see what sort of requirement
we would have come up with having rolled back successive quarters (three month
intervals rolling back three, six, nine, months prior to the reference date of December
2015). Although we did not have future information say at quarter end Q1, Q2, Q3
we do get a sense of how the allocation changes as new data is brought online up
until the final calibration at Q4 end. To be explicit, we would calibrate probability
distributions for simulation using all the data available to us at any given time. The
purpose of conducing this exercise for high frequency losses would be to provide a
dynamic response to the changing environment and potentially manage capital re-
quirements more actively.
Looking at the results in Table 5.55, we see that the total capital requirement is
tied in a range of $65.8 million over 2015 which is approximately 2% of the total cap-
ital requirement. This is reassuring given that we would appreciate some certainty
around the expected value of the losses for high frequency cells. Also this provides a
monitoring mechanism and the frequent updating could serve well if new strategies
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are launched and the output on losses examined following quarters.
5.6 Extension using Copulas
Before we continue on the journey to exploring the extension of the multivariate short-
fall risk allocation optimization problem using copulas, we must ask ourselves why
is this necessary, what do we gain from adding this modeling element, and also how
do we implement such a method? Recapping from the start of the chapter, we first
covered various risk measures that could be used to quantify the risk of some random
process. Then being able calculate the riskiness of a position, we could aggregate
the risk (which is a form of required capital) among all contributing members of a
portfolio. However, we were then were faced with the problem how to allocate capital
requirements back to the contributing sub-portfolios in a fair manner. There, we saw
five such methods to allocate back to sub-portfolios. We then framed the problem in
terms of a shortfall problem whereby we were more concerned with the expectation
of the loss profile and the capital allocation methodology used to allocate sufficient
capital to sub-portfolios. To aid in the solution of the problem we used convex rep-
resentations of the loss random variable in order to formulate an optimal minimum
amount of capital to set aside. In order to greater emphasize the connectedness of
the system, we added a scalar systemic term that controlled the way dependencies
between losses among portfolios would contribute to aggregate capital.
However, an intermediate step was sort of glazed over in the pursuit of the goal -
that of the dependencies on the return or losses themselves. From Aas (2004) [1] we
learn that the linear correlation coefficient which is by far the most used measure to
test dependence in the financial community is a measure of linear dependence only.
This assumption may hold true if asset returns are well represented by an elliptical
distribution such as the multivariate Gaussian or multivariate Student t probability
distributions, then the dependence being linear makes sense. However, venturing
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outside elliptical distributions, a linear correlation coefficient to measure dependency
may lead to misleading conclusions. Thus the ability to decompose a model into the
marginal distributions and the dependence structure may provide flexibility.
An example was given in Aas (2004) [1] of modeling the joint distribution of a stock
market index and exchange rate. Both data sets could be fit reasonably well to sep-
arate univariate Student t distribution but fitting a bivariate Student t distribution
had the restriction of imposing the same tail heaviness. Hence the natural conclu-
sion to model with the bivariate Student t distribution was not reasonable. The use
of a copula was seen as providing the solution to this modeling nuance. By virtue
of this example, we note it was both necessary and had much to gain in terms of
flexility by still being able to fit marginal distributions but leave open the discussion
of dependency through a copula. We intentionally focused on Monte Carlo imple-
mentation methods that allowed for such copula structures to be computed. For our
implementation, the ability to compute estimators from the set of equations seen in
(5.42) could be achieved when the underlying random variables are simulated from
copulas.
We must also ask ourselves before we start introducing which copulas to investigate
and performing simulations, does our optimization method work under such condi-
tions? Referring back at Theorem 5.3.4, our focus in not to prove the extension rather
to point out factors that support the extension. Most notably, differentiation is with
respect to mi and hence there is no requirement for differentiation with respect to any
random portfolio Xi nor copula incorporating Xi. The original proof put restrictions
on the loss function by virtue of Definition 5.3.5 and since we are using the same
unbiased loss function, we have not introduced this uncertainty. To give a sense of
the proof, it starts with looking a set C ⊆ Rd and defining m 7→ δ(m,C) as 0 if
m ∈ C and ∞ otherwise. The function f(m) = ∑mk + δ(m,A(X)) (where A(X) is
the set of monetary allocations) is increasing, convex, lower-semi-continuous, proper
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and such that R(X) = inf{f(m) : m ∈ Rd}. In order to prove the existence of a
risk allocation, if suffices to show that f is constant along its direction of recession.
This is precisely where the unbiasedness of ` is used to show the existence of a risk
allocation m∗. The uniqueness follows from the convexity property. Hence since we
have the dual problem formalization, we focused on the smoothness property of f
and hence our extension using copulas is applicable. Again for proof of the original
theorem, we refer the reader to Armenti et al (2015) [7].
The natural question arises when using copulas is which one should you use? It
has been stated in Embrechts (2009) [59] that this question has no obvious answer.
Moreover, even Blum et al (2002) [32] draws the parallel that selecting the correct
copula is as difficult as estimating the joint distribution F in the first place. In a multi-
dimension framework, Aas (2004) [1] does cover some formal and informal goodness
of fit tests for copula selection. However what Aas (2004) [1] offers and in essence
forms the outline for our investigation is the introduction of two parametric families
of copulas: the copulas of normal mixture distributions and Archimedean copulas.
What we will see is that if we want to implement a simple model with linear depen-
dence, then the Gaussian copula is sufficient. To emphasize extreme co-movements,
then one should use a Student t copula. If we envision asymmetries in returns, then
Archimedean copulas can be used. The Clayton copula shows greater dependence in
the negative tail and the Gumbel shows greater dependence in the positive tail.
We turn to Aas (2004) [1] for a necessary introduction for the copulas that we will
investigate. However, we believe the Student t and Gumbel copula are the relevant
choices in a our shortfall risk allocation simulation study and just highlight the Clay-
ton copula for comparison purposes. The reason being, when we draw realizations
from our CDFs, we think in terms of simulating losses where a negative value denotes
a profit. Hence with this convention, we are more concerned with positive tail depen-
dence which coincides with joint losses.
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We introduced copulas in Section 2.4.6 in a generic setting. From McNeil et al
(2005) [87], we learn that copulas may be divided into three categories: fundamental,
implicit and explicit. Fundamental copulas represent a number of important special
dependence structures. We will not cover these but such examples are independence,
comonotonicity, and countermonotonicity copulas. Implicit copulas are extracted
from well-known multivariate distributions using Sklars Theorem but do not neces-
sarily possess simple closed-form expressions. We recall that Sklars Theorem states
that for any joint distribution function, there is a unique copula that satisfies (2.35).
Explicit copulas have simple closed-form expressions and follow general mathemati-
cal constructions known to yield copulas. Hence we will study the implicit Student t
copula and the explicit Clayton and Gumbel copulas. We also introduce the implicit
Gaussian copula just for reference.
In a two dimensional setting, we define the following copulas.
Definition 5.6.1. (Gaussian copula) The Gaussian copula (central) is given by
Cρ =
∫ Φ−1(u)
−∞
∫ Φ−1(v)
−∞
1
2pi(1− ρ2) 12 e
−x2−2ρxy+y2
2(1−ρ2) dxdy (5.53)
where ρ is the correlation parameter and Φ−1(·) is the inverse of the standard normal
distribution function.
Relative to the Gaussian copula, the Student t copula allows for joint fat tail events
and hence a greater number of joint extreme events.
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Definition 5.6.2. (Student t copula) The central Student t cumulative distribution
function is given as
tν(x) =
∫ x
−∞
Γ
(
(ν+1)
2
)
√
piνΓν
2
(
1 +
s2
ν
)− ν+1
2
ds, (5.54)
where Γ is the gamma function, and ν represents the degrees of freedom. The bivariate
distribution corresponding to tν is given by
tρ,ν(x, y) =
∫ x
−∞
∫ y
−∞
1
2pi(1− ρ2) 12
(
1 +
s2 + t2 − 2ρst
ν(1− ρ)2
)− ν+2
2
dsdt. (5.55)
Then the Student t copula is given as
Ctρ,ν (u, v) = tρ,ν
(
t−1ν (u), t
−1
ν (v)
)
. (5.56)
Increasing ν decreases the extreme co-movements and hence decreasing ν increases
the realization of joint extreme events in both positive and negative directions.
Turning to explicit copulas, we achieve simple closed forms.
Definition 5.6.3. (Clayton copula) The Clayton copula is given by
Cδ(u, v) =
1
(u−δ + v−δ − 1) 1δ (5.57)
where 0 < δ < ∞ is a parameter controlling dependency. Perfect dependence is
achieved if δ → ∞ and independence is achieved if δ → 0. This asymmetric copula
has greater dependence in the negative tail.
Definition 5.6.4. (Gumbel copula) The Gumbel copula is given by
Cδ(u, v) = e
−
(
(− lnu)δ+(− ln v)δ
) 1
δ
(5.58)
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where 0 < δ ≤ 1 is a parameter controlling dependency. Perfect dependence is
achieved if δ → 0 and independence is achieved if δ = 1. This asymmetric copula has
greater dependence in the positive tail.
When using copulas, we have alternatives to Pearson linear correlation to summarize
dependence measures. According to McNeil et al (2005) [87], rank correlations are
simple scalar measures of dependence that depend only on the copula of a bivariate
distribution and not on the marginal distributions, unlike linear correlation, which
depends on both. When working with data, the standard empirical estimators of rank
correlation may be calculated by looking at the ranks of the data alone, hence the
name. That is, we only need to know the ordering of the sample for each variable of
interest and not the actual numerical values. We will exploit this characteristic when
looking at rank correlations in order to calibrate copulas to empirical data. There are
two types of rank correlations: Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho for which we will
focus on the former.
Kendall’s tau rank correlations can be understood as a measure of concordance. That
is if we have a set of observations (x1, y1), (x2, y2) . . . , (xn, yn) of joint random vari-
ables X and Y , then any pair of observations (xi, yi) and (xj, yj) for i 6= j are said
to be concordant if the ranks for both elements agree: that is, if both xi > xj and
yi > yj or if both xi < xj and yi < yj. They are said to be discordant, if xi > xj and
yi < yj or if xi < xj and yi > yj. If xi = xj or yi = yj, the pair is neither concordant
nor discordant. Thus Kendall’s tau rank correlation is given by
τ =
(number of concordant pairs)− (number of disconcordant pairs)
1
2
n(n− 1) . (5.59)
As we will see, since the copula of a multivariate distribution characterizes its depen-
dence structure, it would be logical to use measures of dependence that are copula-
based. From McNeil et al (2005) [87], we recall the following.
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Proposition 5.6.1. Suppose X and Y have continuous marginal distributions and a
unique copula C. Then Kendall’s tau rank correlations is given by
ρτ (X, Y ) = 4
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
C(u, v)dC(u, v)− 1. (5.60)
Now for Gaussian and Student t copulas, the relationship between the linear coefficient
and Kendall’s tau is given by
corr(X, Y ) = sin(
pi
2
ρτ ), (5.61)
where corr(X, Y ) is the linear correlation coefficient. For the Clayton copula, if
we want to associate the single copula parameter from (5.57) with the Kendall tau
parameter, we have
ρτ (X, Y ) =
δ
δ + 2
. (5.62)
For the Gumbel copula, if we want to associate the single copula parameter from
(5.58) with the Kendall’s tau parameter, we have
ρτ (X, Y ) = 1− 1
δ
. (5.63)
Now here in lies the benefit of (5.61) - (5.63); we have all the necessary ingredients to
calibrate our copulas. Using empirical data, we may infer the correlation coefficient
and also produce the necessary degrees of freedom for the implicit copulas. If we
would rather focus on rank correlation, we may do that as well. In that case, we have
necessary relationships to calibrate the single parameter for the explicit copulas.
In Section 5.4, we covered a case from Armenti et al (2015) [7] where we looked
at two sub-portfolios each normally distributed with mean zero and covariance ma-
trix stated in (5.45). We allowed ρ to vary between -0.9 to 0.9 and kept the systemic
weight at one. Since we believe copulas help paint a different dependence picture, we
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choose to analyze various copulas alongside this baseline. We do this to not model
the best fitting dependence structure, but rather show directionally if using different
copulas directionally the anticipated output. Under the various copula schemes, we
compute optimal m∗ and compare and contrast.
What we propose to do is start by simulating M random P&Ls from X = (X1, X2) ∼
N(0,Σ) for a fixed diagonal ρ. That is, we may use the simulated data as given and
from it calibrate all the required parameters necessary to calibrate our copulas and
solve our optimization problem. Although we know precisely what the dependence
structure is, we may choose to investigate the situations where we believe there to
be more joint fat tailed events or even asymmetric events. Why - one reason may
be that this is a method of stress testing. That is, if we believe that there is an on-
set of macroeconomic stress, then we may want to stress the underlying dependence
structure. What we should be able to do is rank the baseline, Student t, Clayton and
Gumbel outputs based on increased capital requirements. Alternatively, we could
have simulated from any one copula first and used it as a baseline to rank other
outputs. We also point out that for the Student t copula, we can infer a suitable
degree of freedom parameter from the data itself. However, we may also override
this parameter and set the value at a conservative value of ν = 3. This is a common
practice when imposing a conservative dependence structure.
Our copula extension takes Table 5.35 and adds various copula dependency struc-
tures for comparison. This is summarized in Table 5.56. We may analyze Table 5.56
by going down each column. We notice that using the Student t copula with a high
negative or positive correlation parameter is close to the baseline value. This is in-
tuitive in that we expect both portfolios to display this behaviour if the are highly
correlated/anti-correlated. The departure occurs when there is low correlation and
the Student t copula forces a higher joint extreme movement. Hence we see smaller
m∗1 near the middle correlation values relative to the baseline values. We interpret
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ρ ρτ
m∗1
Baseline(Gaussian) Student t (ν = 3) Clayton Gumbel
-0.9 -0.713 -0.167 -0.166 N/A (δ > 0 N/A (δ > 0)
-0.5 -0.333 -0.143 -0.137 N/A (δ > 0 N/A (δ > 0)
-0.2 -0.123 -0.120 -0.113 N/A (δ > 0 N/A (δ > 0)
0 0 -0.103 -0.096 -0.104 -0.104
0.2 0.123 -0.085 -0.080 -0.094 -0.078
0.5 0.333 -0.056 -0.053 -0.075 -0.045
0.9 0.713 -0.012 -0.012 -0.032 -0.009
Table 5.56: Bivariate case with α = 1, Monte Carlo with M =2 million, various copula
dependencies.
this to mean there is less slack in the allocation (smaller negative numbers). The case
for ρ = 0 being lower under the Student t copula is because this was forced for ν = 3
as we did not empirically calculate the inferred value from the data. For the Clayton
copula, we have the restriction from (5.57) of the non-negativity of the parameter
hence we could not fit the copula. Again, we see the expected trajectory in that we
have more slack in the optimal allocation for all non-negative correlation cases relative
to the baseline. Actually, the Clayton copula has the greatest slack compared to all
cases for a given correlation case. This is expected since the Clayton copula is known
to show greater dependency in the negative tail. That is because our loss function
penalizes losses more in the positive tail. Again, the Gumbel has the same restriction
from (5.58). Also, since we are simulating losses for our sub-portfolios and a positive
value indicates a loss, this in turn means that the Gumbel copula exacerbates this
penalty on losses and hence we have the least slack.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter we were motivated to explore the problem of disseminating an ag-
gregate amount of capital fairly to sub-portfolios. This led to the exploration of a
related problem of calculating shortfall risk whereby an optimization problem was
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formulated. The convex minimization problem was positioned to determine the min-
imum amount of capital required to be applied towards individuals sub-portfolios
distributed according to unique loss distributions such that the expected loss of the
aggregate remained bounded. The same formulation was applied in an operational
risk context to high frequency cells whereby the ability to manage capital dynamically
would be beneficial. An extension was provided alongside the original framework of
multivariate shortfall risk allocation with systemic risk but accounting for advanced
dependency structures through copulas. We confirmed under stylized cases that the
Student t and Gumbel copula produced less slack in an allocation network compared
to the Gaussian and the Clayton copula.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have explored problems of relevance to the regulation of operational risk models
used within financial institutions. We took an essay style approach for each topic
whereby there was a natural flow from the first essay to the last. At each step, a new
problem revealed itself through an introspective analysis of the issue at hand.
Our first essay started with the intent to dissect operational risk and focus on the
area of scenario analysis. With little guidance on how to collect and incorporate such
input into a loss distribution approach model, we proposed a new methodology of
incorporating business foresight into the model. Using frequency and severity esti-
mates obtained from business line experts, we proposed to build an aggregate loss
distribution. We then turned to an area of signal processing and recycled the con-
volution operator as a method to blend two probability distributions. We adopted
the same view and used the data-derived loss distribution to smooth out the loss dis-
tribution obtained from human judgement. The resulting convolved loss distribution
then characterized a model incorporating both modeling elements which could then
be could then be used to set capital requirements.
Our second essay revisited the idea of scenarios and looked at the type of scenar-
ios that would be derived if a catastrophic risk occurred at a bank. Rather than
isolate the line of thinking to specific business experts working in a particular busi-
ness line for which particular type of losses may occur, we sought to quantify risks that
effect the bank at the enterprise level. Still drawing upon expert input, we divided
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the quantification of certain parameters to different experts. One such example of
an earthquake study was taken to show how disaster planning experts could provide
input into the scenario design process. Thereafter, a generalized framework based on
a flexible number of scenarios, intensities and loss profiles was formulated to outline
a catastrophic scenario algorithm. The output was also shown to be useable in the
convolution integration method seen previously. When viewed in aggregate terms,
we allocated capital using the marginal contribution method to associate a portion
of capital to each contributing UoM.
Our third essay applied an established framework of multivariate shortfall risk capital
allocation with systemic risk in an operational risk setting. Using high frequency loss
data, an analysis was undertaken to solve the minimal capital optimization prob-
lem among contributing UoMs. The framework was then extended in a generalized
setting to include systemic risk on a secondary level using copulas. Joint fat-tailed
events and asymmetries between sub-portfolios were used to see the effect on capital
requirements.
The intent of each essay was to investigate a new area of research while leaving
room for further analysis for the next generation. For the first essay on scenario in-
tegration, the method to obtain a smooth continuous distribution from responses is
open to debate. Bucketing responses based on answers to probability of losses exceed-
ing a certain thresholds is just a single textbook technique used to build a piece-wise
smooth curve. We also see in the industry proprietary methods to map scenario re-
sponses to a suitable candidate of distributions based on a line of questioning. This
line of research has been mentioned through the CIRANO research institute. By
collecting the percentage of losses expected to occur relative to multiples of a median
loss, a decision-tree could be built to filter out certain continuous candidate severity
distributions and help determine a suitable fitting distribution. Also once a scenario
curve is obtained, the coefficient used for convolving both distributions could be sub-
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ject to much scrutiny. We feel that by using actual bank data and actual scenario
responses for a particular bank, various types of averages/weighting functions could
be explored to combine both sets of information.
In the second essay, a survey of various probabilistic models could be analyzed for
various types of catastrophic events. We looked at one such example through Cali-
fornia earthquakes. In addition, the ability to produce a loss curve based on expert
judgement from essay one could be reused in this context as well.
Lastly, we covered a single type of convex loss function when various types could
have been used. For the application to operational risk, again empirical internal loss
data which is confidential and not publicly disclosed would help quantify relevant
capital requirements for certain UoMs. We also looked at an extension of depen-
dency in the form of copula models. We studied only a subset of possible dependency
structures available for which more options could be investigated. We wish the next
generation the best of luck in their research aspirations!
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8 Appendix A: Probability Distributions
8.1 Frequency Distributions
The following definitions for all probability distributions were taken from Klugman
et al (2012) [81].
Definition 8.1.1. (Poisson) A Poisson distribution is a discrete distribution. The
probability density function pk denotes the probability that exactly k events (in this
case losses) occur. Let N be a random variable representing the number of such events.
Then
pk = Pr(N = k) =
e−λλk
k!
, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . (8.1)
The mean and variance are equal and given as E(N) = V ar(N) = λ.
Definition 8.1.2. (Negative Binomial) A Negative Binomial distribution is a discrete
distribution. The probability density function is given as
pk =
(
k + r − 1
k
)(
1
1 + β
)r(
β
1 + β
)k
, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , r > 0, β > 0. (8.2)
The mean is given by E(N) = rβ and the variance given by V ar(N) = rβ(1 + β).
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8.2 Severity Probability Distributions
Definition 8.2.1. (Lognormal) The Lognormal distribution is a continuous two-
parameter distribution (µ, σ). The probability density function is given as
f(x) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
e
−z2
2 , z =
lnx− µ
σ
. (8.3)
The mean is given by E[X] = eµ+
1
2
σ2 and the variance given by V ar[X] = (eσ
2 −
1)e2µ+σ
2
, or in general the moments given by E[Xk] = ekµ+
1
2
k2σ2.
Definition 8.2.2. (Log-Gamma) The Log-Gamma distribution is a continuous two-
parameter distribution (α, θ). We state the probability density and moments for X ∼
Gamma(α, θ) where is understood that X = logY ∼ Gamma, then eX = Y ∼ Log-
Gamma
f(x) =
(x
θ
)αe
−x
θ
xΓ(α)
. (8.4)
The moments are given by E[Xk] = θ
kΓ(α+k)
Γ(α)
, k > −α.
Definition 8.2.3. (Weibull) The Weibull distribution is a continuous two-parameter
distribution (α, τ). The probability density function and moments are given as
f(x) =
τ(x
θ
)τe−(
x
θ
)τ
x
(8.5)
and E[Xk] = θkΓ(1 + k
τ
) k > −τ .
Definition 8.2.4. (Generalized Pareto) The Generalized Pareto distribution is a con-
tinuous three-parameter distribution (α, θ, τ) - beta of the second kind. The probability
density function and moments are given as
f(x) =
Γ(α + τ)
Γ(α)Γ(τ)
θαxτ−1
(x+ θ)α+τ
(8.6)
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and E[Xk] = θ
kΓ(τ+k)Γ(α−k)
Γ(α)Γ(τ)
, − τ < k < α.
Definition 8.2.5. (Burr) The Burr Type XII distribution is a continuous three-
parameter distribution (α, θ, γ). The probability density function and moments are
given as
f(x) =
αγ(x
θ
)γ
x[1 + (x
θ
)γ]α+1
(8.7)
and E[Xk] =
θkΓ(1+ k
γ
)Γ(α− k
γ
)
Γ(α)
, − γ < k < αγ.
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9 Appendix B: Loss Aggregation
9.1 Single Loss Approximation
Bo¨cker and Klu¨ppelberg (2005) [35] show that when loss data is heavy-tailed, a simple
closed-form approximation for operational VaR can be obtained. A key result needed
is that for a standard LDA model with subexponential severities, one has under weak
regularity conditions, for every fixed t > 0
G¯t(x) ∼ EN(t)F¯ (x), x→∞, (9.1)
where EN(t) is the expected frequency and F¯ (·) = 1 − F (·) and G¯t(·) = 1 − Gt(·)
are the tail distributions of severity and aggregate loss, respectively. The sym-
bol ∼ indicates that the quotient of right hand and left hand side tends to 1; i.e.
limx→∞
G¯t(x)
F¯t(x)
= EN(t) for every fixed t > 0. Using this result, we have the following
asymptotic formula.
Theorem 9.1.1. Consider the standard LDA model for fixed t > 0 and a subexponen-
tial severity with distribution function F . Assume, moreover, that the tail estimate
(9.1) holds. Then, the V aRt(κ) satisfies the approximation
V aRt(κ) = F
←
(
1− 1− κ
EN(t)
(
1 + o(1)
))
, κ→ 1, (9.2)
where F← denotes the generalized inverse of F and o(1) stands for a function which
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tends to 0 if its arguments tends to a boundary (in our case if κ→ 1 or x→∞).
It is noteworthy to point out that a slight improvement to (9.2) is seen in Bo¨cker
and Sprittulla (2006) [35] and referred to as the ’mean-corrected’ version. Thus the
modified finite mean single loss approximation is given as
V aRt(κ) = F
←
(
1− 1− κ
λ
(
1 + o(1)
))
+ (λ− 1)µ, κ→ 1, (9.3)
where λ = EN(t) denotes frequency expectation and the severity distribution F has
finite expectation µ = E(Xi). This ensures that the aggregate operational loss has
finite expectation given by ES = λµ. For an analytical justification of (9.3), we
refer the reader to Degen (2010) [52]. Moreover, (9.3) has even been adopted as the
preferred method to compute capital in the BCBS’s benchmark operational capital
model (2014) [28].
9.2 Panjer Recursion
Alternative measures of loss aggregation are nicely covered in Panjer (2006) [101] and
adapted here. One such method improves upon the direct method to compute an
integral by using a recursive method. When attempting to evaluate the convolution
of the severity distribution
F ∗kX (x) =
∫ x
0−
F
∗(k−1)
X (x− y)dFX(y), (9.4)
numerical integration methods must be used. A simplification may be used by replac-
ing the severity distribution by a discrete distribution defined at multiples 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
of some monetary unit such as $1,000. This simplifies (9.4) as
F ∗kX (x) =
x∑
y=0
F
∗(k−1)
X (x− y)fX(y), (9.5)
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with PDF
f ∗kX (x) =
x∑
y=0
f
∗(k−1)
X (x− y)fX(y). (9.6)
Even when the severity distribution is defined on nonnegative integers 0, 1, 2, . . . , cal-
culating f ∗kX (x) requires x + 1 multiplications. Then carrying out this operation for
all possible values of k and x up to m requires multiplications on the order of m3 or
O(m3). The introduction of Panjer recursion (1981) reduces the number of compu-
tations to O(m2)
The method requires that the severity distribution is discretized according to some
monetary unit and that the frequency distribution, pk is a member of the (a, b, 1)
class which implies that
pk =
(
a+
b
k
)
pk−1, k = 2, 3, 4, . . . . (9.7)
Hence this recursion starts at p1 rather than p0 which has the same shape as a (a, b, 0)
class with remaining probability at k = 0. Then the following result holds.
Theorem 9.2.1. (Extended Panjer recursion) For the (a, b, 1) class, the aggregate
loss, fS, PDF may be calculated as
fS(x) =
[p1 − (a+ b)p0]fX(x) +
∑min(x,m)
y=1 (a+ by/x)fX(y)fS(x− y)
1− afX(0) . (9.8)
Corollary 9.2.1. (Panjer recursion) For the (a, b, 0) class, (9.8) reduces to
fS(x) =
∑min(x,m)
y=1 (a+ by/x)fX(y)fS(x− y)
1− afX(0) . (9.9)
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As a special case, for the Poisson distribution, (9.9) reduces to
fS(x) =
λ
x
min(x,m)∑
y=1
yfX(y)fS(x− y), x = 1, 2, . . . (9.10)
In the simplest of interpretations, the right hand side contains terms of fS(x −
1), . . . , fS(0) and hence defines a recursive formula for fS(x).
9.3 Fast Fourier Transform
Yet another method to compute the aggregate loss distribution is via an inversion
method. The theory is adapted from Panjer (2006) [101] and Robertson (1992) [102]
with the latter providing exhaustive detail on the mathematics needed and straight
forward examples to provide the mechanics of the algorithm. In the simplest of
descriptions, the discrete fourier transform (DFT) is an operation that helps compute
the convolution of two vectors: U, V . For brevity we have
DFT (U ∗ V ) = DFT (U) X DFT (V ) (9.11)
U ∗ V = IDFT
(
DFT (U) X DFT (V )
)
, (9.12)
where IDFT is the inverse of DFT. Hence to compute the convolution of two vectors,
the DFT of each vector is taken and the result multiplied together pointwise. The
convolution is recovered by taking the inverse of both sides. The reference to “Fast”
(FFT) lies in a computation simplification that reduces the required number of com-
putation and makes the algorithm perform faster.
Providing more of a detailed description, compound distributions lend themselves
naturally to inversion methods as their transformations are compound functions and
are easily computed when the frequency and severity components are known. For
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example, the characteristic function always exists and is unique. It is defined as
ϕS(z) = E[e
iSz] = PN [ϕX(z)]. (9.13)
The FFT algorithm can be used for inverting characteristic functions to obtain den-
sities of discrete-random variables.
Definition 9.3.1. (Fourier Transform) For any continuous function f(x), the Fourier
Transform is the mapping
f˜(z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)eizxdx, (9.14)
where f(x) is the PDF and f˜(z) is its characteristic function and is complex valued.
The original PDF can be recovered as
f(x) =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
f˜(z)e−izxdz. (9.15)
Being able to discritize f(x) is a necessity in order to carry out the computation on
the computer. In that sense, we work with the DFT.
Definition 9.3.2. (Discrete Fourier Transform) Let fx denote a function defined for
all integer values of x that is periodic with period length n (i.e. fx+n = fx for all
x). For the vector (f0, f1, . . . , fn−1), the Discrete Fourier Transform is the mapping
f˜x, x = . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , defined by
f˜k =
n−1∑
j=o
fjexp
(2pii
n
jk
)
, k = . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . . (9.16)
The inverse mapping is
fj =
1
n
n−1∑
k=o
f˜kexp
(−2pii
n
jk
)
, j = . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . . (9.17)
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From (9.16), it then becomes clear that in order to produce n values of f˜k, n
2 terms
need to be evaluated, or O(n2). The FFT reduces the number of computations to
O(n ln2 n). The algorithm uses the property that a DFT of length n can be rewritten
as the sum of two discrete transforms, each of length n
2
, the first consisting of even-
numbered points and the second consisting of odd-numbered points:
f˜k =
n−1∑
j=o
fjexp
(2pii
n
jk
)
=
n/2−1∑
j=o
f2jexp
(2pii
n
2jk
)
+
n/2−1∑
j=o
f2j+1exp
[2pii
n
(2j + 1)k
]
=
m−1∑
j=o
f2jexp
(2pii
m
jk
)
+ exp
(2pii
n
k
)m−1∑
j=o
f2j+1exp
(2pii
m
jk
)
,
where m = n
2
. Then
f˜k = f˜
a
k + exp
(2pii
n
k
)
f˜ bk , (9.18)
which in turn can be written as the sum of two transformations of length m
2
and
continued successively.
191
